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Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to collaboratively
compute, using cryptographic protocols, a function over their private data in a way that the
participants do not see each other’s data, they only see the final output. Typical MPC ex-
amples include statistical computations over joint private data, private set intersection, and
auctions. While these applications are examples of monolithic MPC, richer MPC appli-
cations move between “normal” (i.e., per-party local) and “secure” (i.e., joint, multi-party
secure) modes repeatedly, resulting overall in mixed-mode computations. For example,
we might use MPC to implement the role of the dealer in a game of mental poker – the
game will be divided into rounds of local decision-making (e.g. bidding) and joint inter-
action (e.g. dealing). Mixed-mode computations are also used to improve performance
over monolithic secure computations.
Starting with the Fairplay project, several MPC frameworks have been proposed in
the last decade to help programmers write MPC applications in a high-level language,
while the toolchain manages the low-level details. However, these frameworks are either
not expressive enough to allow writing mixed-mode applications or lack formal specifica-
tion, and reasoning capabilities, thereby diminishing the parties’ trust in such tools, and
the programs written using them. Furthermore, none of the frameworks provides a veri-
fied toolchain to run the MPC programs, leaving the potential of security holes that can
compromise the privacy of parties’ data.
This dissertation presents language-based techniques to make MPC more practical
and trustworthy. First, it presents the design and implementation of a new MPC Domain
Specific Language, called Wysteria, for writing rich mixed-mode MPC applications.
Wysteria provides several benefits over previous languages, including a conceptual sin-
gle thread of control, generic support for more than two parties, high-level abstractions
for secret shares, and a fully formalized type system and operational semantics. Using
Wysteria, we have implemented several MPC applications, including, for the first time,
a card dealing application.
The dissertation next presents Wys?, an embedding of Wysteria in F?, a full-
featured verification oriented programming language. Wys? improves on Wysteria along
three lines: (a) It enables programmers to formally verify the correctness and security
properties of their programs. As far as we know, Wys? is the first language to provide
verification capabilities for MPC programs. (b) It provides a partially verified toolchain
to run MPC programs, and finally (c) It enables the MPC programs to use, with no extra
effort, standard language constructs from the host language F?, thereby making it more
usable and scalable.
Finally, the dissertation develops static analyses that help optimize monolithic MPC
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Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) protocols [1–3] enable two or more parties
p1, ..., pn to cooperatively compute a function f over their private inputs x1, ..., xn in a way
that every party directly sees only the output f(x1, ..., xn) while keeping the variables xi
private. Some examples are
• the xi are arrays of private data and f is a statistical function (e.g., median) [4, 5];
• (private set intersection) the xi are private sets (implemented as arrays) and f is the
set-intersection operator ∩ [6, 7]; one use-case is determining only those friends,
interests, etc. that individuals have in common;
• (second-price auction) the xi are bids, and f determines the winning bidders [8]
In recent years MPC has also been used in detecting tax frauds [9] and collaborative
supply chain management [10].
MPC can be used for much more – it eliminates the need for a trusted third party
while providing similar data privacy guarantees. Users of an online dating application
do not have to trust the application server to match the compatible profiles, they can use
MPC and retain the control of their data. A web browser plugin can use MPC with the ad-
providers to compute relevant ads for a user without revealing all user preferences to the ad-
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provider. An email client plugin can use MPC with other email clients to collaboratively
build a spam filter without revealing emails to each other. In a game of online poker,
the players do not have to trust the game portal for card dealing, they can use MPC. In
summary, MPC provides a general purpose solution to address increasing data privacy
concerns.
The examples above clearly go beyond the secure computation of a single function
f . Instead, they move between “normal” (i.e., per-party local) computations and “secure”
(i.e., joint, multi-party secure) modes repeatedly, resulting overall in what we call mixed-
mode computations. For example, an online poker MPC application is divided into rounds
of local computations (for strategizing and bidding) and joint secure computations (for card
dealing). In addition, secure computations use and modify a secret state consisting of the
deck of cards. The parties secretly share the deck in a way that no single party can see the
current deck in clear, but in secure computations they can combine their shares to recover
it. Such a secure state is also known as secret shares.
Mixed-mode computations are also used to improve the performance over mono-
lithic secure computations. As one example, we can perform private set intersection by
having each party iteratively compare elements in their private sets, with only the compar-
isons (rather than the entire looping computation) carried out securely [7]. Computing the
joint median can similarly be done by restricting secure computations only to comparisons,
which prior work has shown can net up to a 30x performance improvement [5].
MPC for a function f is typically implemented using cryptographic protocols that
expect f to be represented as a boolean or arithmetic circuit [1–3, 11]. Several libraries
and intermediate languages have been designed that provide efficient building blocks for
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constructing circuits [12–14]. Programming directly with circuits and cryptography via
a host-language API can be painful, so starting with the Fairplay project [15] many re-
searchers have designed higher-level domain-specific languages (DSLs) in which to pro-
gram MPCs. In Fairplay, a compiler accepts a Pascal-like imperative program and com-
piles it to a garbled circuit [1]. More recent efforts by Holzer et al. [16] and Kreuter et
al. [17] support subsets of ANSI C, and follow-on work has expanded Fairplay’s expres-
siveness to handle n > 2 parties [18]. While such languages undoubtedly make it easier
to program MPCs, they still have several drawbacks regarding both security and usability.
First, projects like Fairplay focus only on how to compile normal-looking code into
a representation like a boolean circuit that can be run by an MPC engine. In most cases,
such compilation is done in advance. As such, mixed-mode programming is implemented
by writing local computations in some host language (like C or Java) that call out to the
MPC engine to evaluate the generated code. However, writing mixed-mode computations
in a single language has some compelling benefits over the multi-lingual approach. For
one, it is easier to write mixed-mode programs since the programmer can see all of the
interactions in one place, and not have to navigate foreign function interfaces, which are
hard to use [19]. For the same reason, programs are easier to understand, and thus answers
to security concerns (could the overall computation leak too much information about my
secrets?) will be more evident. Also, there is an opportunity for more dynamic execution
models, e.g., compiling secure blocks on the fly where the participants or elements of the
computation may be based on the results of prior interactions. Finally, there is an oppor-
tunity for greater code reuse, as a single language can encapsulate mixed mode protocols
as reusable library functions.
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Second, MPC participants should be able to reason that f is correct and sufficiently
privacy preserving, i.e., that it computes the intended function and its output will not
reveal too much information about the inputs [20]. For example, for the optimized private
set intersection [7], parties should be able to formally prove that the extra messages reveal
nothing beyond the final result. The goal of an MPC DSL is secure computations, and
such reasoning gives assurance that this goal is being achieved. Yet, only a few DSLs (e.g.
Sharemind DSL [21]) have a mathematical semantics that can serve as a basis for formal
reasoning.
Third, those languages that do have a semantics lack support for (semi-) automated
reasoning of MPC programs: only by-hand proofs are possible, which provide less as-
surance than formally verified proofs. A middle ground might be a mechanization of the
semantics and its metatheory [22], which adds greater assurance that it is correct [23], but
no DSL has a mechanized semantics.
Fourth, there is a gap between the semantics, if there is one, and the actual im-
plementation. Within that gap is the potential for security holes. Formal verification of
the MPC DSL’s toolchain can significantly reduce the occurrence of security-threatening
bugs [24–31], but no existing MPC DSL implementation has been (even partially) verified.
Finally, there is the practical problem that existing DSLs do not scale up, because
they lack the infrastructure of a full-featured language. Adding more features (to both the
language and the formalization) would help, but doing so quickly becomes unwieldy and
frustrating, especially when the added features are “standard” and do not have much to do
with MPC. We want access to libraries and frameworks for I/O, GUIs, etc. in a way that
easily adds to functionality without adding complexity or compromising security.
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This dissertation makes significant advances in solving each of the problems above.
In particular, our thesis is the following:
Formal methods from programming language design and program verification
can enable the development of rich and practical Secure Multi-party Compu-
tation applications, with strong correctness and security guarantees.
1.1 Overview
In this section, we present an overview of the contributions of this dissertation, re-
lating to how it addresses the problems mentioned above.
1.1.1 Wysteria: A programming language for mixed-mode MPC
We first present a new MPC DSL, called Wysteria, for writing mixed-mode se-
cure computations [32]. Wysteria is the first language to support writing mixed-mode,
multiparty computations in a generic manner, supporting any number of participants. We
summarize its several compelling features below.
Conceptual single-threaded semantics. All Wysteria programs operate in a com-
bination of parallel and secure modes, where the former identifies local computations
taking place on one or more hosts (in parallel), and the latter identifies secure computa-
tions occurring jointly among parties. Importantly, Wysteria mixed-mode computations
can be viewed as having a single thread of control, with all communication between hosts
expressed as variable bindings accessed within secure computations. Single threadedness
makes programs far easier to write and reason about (whether by humans or by automated
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analyses [5,33]). We formalize Wysteria’s single-threaded semantics and prove a simula-
tion theorem from single- to multi-threaded semantics. In both semantics, it is evident that
all communication among parties occurs via secure blocks, and thus, information flows are
easier to understand.
Generic support for more than two parties. Wysteria programs may involve an
arbitrary number of parties, such that which parties, and their number, can be determined
dynamically rather than necessarily at compile-time. To support such programs, Wyste-
ria provides a notion of principals as data which can be used to dynamically determine
computation participants or their outcomes (e.g., to identify winners in a tournament pro-
ceeding to the next round). Wysteria also implements a novel feature of wire bundles
that are used to represent the inputs and outputs of secure computations such that a single
party’s view of a wire bundle is their own value, while the shared view makes evident
all possible values. A secure computation, having the shared view, may iterate over the
contents of a wire bundle. The domain of such a wire bundle may be unspecified initially.
The Wysteria compiler employs dynamic circuit generation to produce circuits when un-
knowns (like wire bundle domains) become available. Despite this dynamism, Wysteria’s
meta-theoretical properties guarantee that participants proceed synchronously, i.e., they
will always agree on the protocol they are participating in.
Secret shares. Many interesting programs interleave local and secure computations
where the secured outcomes are revealed later. For example, in mental poker, each party
must maintain a representation of the deck of cards whose contents are only revealed as
cards are dealt. To support such programs, Wysteria provides secret shares as first-class
objects. Secret shares resemble wire bundles in that each party has a local view (copy)
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and these views are combined in secure blocks to recover the original value. The Wys-
teria single-threaded view ensures that shares are used properly; e.g., programs cannot
inadvertently combine the shares from different objects.
Refinement type system. Wysteria is a functional programming language that comes
equipped with a refinement type system to express the expectations and requirements of
computations in the language. In particular, the types for wire bundles and shares are de-
pendent, and directly identify the parties involved. For example, suppose we have a func-
tion is richer that takes a list of principals and their net worths and returns who is richest.
The logical refinement on the function’s return type will state that the returned principal is
one from the original set. Our type system also provides delegation effects for expressing
in which context a function can be called; e.g., a function that computes in parallel mode
cannot be called from within a secure computation, while the reverse is possible in certain
circumstances. In general, our type system ensures the standard freedom from type errors:
there will be no mistake of Alice communicating a string to a secure computation which
expects an integer. Wysteria’s mixed-mode design enables such reasoning easily: sepa-
rating the host and MPC languages would make a proof of type soundness for mixed-mode
programs far more difficult.
Wysteria is not the first language for mixed mode MPC, but is unique in its high-
level design, generality, and formal guarantees. For example, languages like L1 [34] and
SMCL [35] permit some mixed-mode computations to be expressed directly. However,
these languages lack Wysteria’s single-threaded semantics, exposing more low-level de-
tails, e.g., for performing communication or constructing secret shares. As such, there are
more opportunities for mistakes; e.g., one party may fail to always receive a sent mes-
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sage (or may receive the wrong one), or may not provide the right protocol shares. L1
is also limited to only two parties, and neither language has a type system expressing the
requirements for well-formed mixed-mode compositions (which is handled by our del-
egation effects). No prior system of which we are aware has formalized its operational
semantics and type system and shown them to be sensible.
We have implemented a Wysteria interpreter which executes secure blocks by com-
piling them to boolean circuits, executed by Choi et al.’s implementation [11] of the Gol-
dreich, Micali, and Wigderson (GMW) protocol [2]. We have used Wysteria to build a
broad array of mixed-mode programs proposed in the literature, along with some new ones,
most notably a card dealing application. Our experimental results demonstrate three key
points. First Wysteria’s performance is competitive with prior approaches; e.g., we can
reproduce the mixed-mode performance gains reported previously. Second, generic pro-
tocols for n-principals can be expressed with ease in Wysteria, and executed efficiently.
Finally, Wysteria’s novel high-level abstractions, e.g. secure state, enables expressing
novel protocols not present in the existing literature.
1.1.2 Wys?: A verified language extension for MPC
With Wysteria’s easy-to-use, high-level abstractions in hand, the dissertation next
focuses on improving the usability and security of Wysteria programs and its toolchain.
While Wysteria significantly advances the state-of-the-art of the MPC DSLs, it does
not provide formal reasoning capabilities, and being a standalone DSL, lacks the features
of a rich programming language. To that end, we present Wys? [36], an embedding of
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Wysteria in F? [37], a verification-oriented, full-featured programming language. Wys?
is what we call a Verified, Domain-Specific Integrated Language Extension, a new kind of
embedded DSL exemplified by following three elements.
Integrated language extension. Programmers can write Wys? MPC source programs
in what is essentially an extended dialect of F?. Like so-called shallow domain-specific
language embeddings, the Wysteria-specific combinators are expressed in normal F? syn-
tax, with prescriptions on their correct use expressed with F?’s dependent type-and-effect
system. This arrangement means that programmers can use F?’s semi-automated verifica-
tion facilities to prove correctness and security properties about their MPC programs.
Deep embedding of domain-specific semantics. A shallow embedding implements
the semantics of a DSL using the abstraction facilities of the host language, e.g., as a kind
of library. However, for Wysteria this is impossible because its core semantics cannot
be directly encoded in F?’s semantics. This is because a Wysteria program is like a kind
of SIMD program in which many parties alternate between computing locally on their
own data, in parallel, and computing jointly and securely on shared data. While such a
program can be viewed as having a single thread of control, it is not directly implemented
that way. As such, we take the approach of a typical deep embedding: We define an
interpreter in F? that operates over Wys? abstract syntax trees (ASTs), defined as an F?
data type; these trees are produced by running the F? compiler (in a special mode) on the
extended source program. Importantly, our interpreter does not need to understand all F?
constructs that might be extracted. Even though their use is intermixed with Wysteria-
specific constructs, their semantics is handled by a lightweight Foreign Function Interface
(FFI), mostly hidden from the source programmer.
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Partially verified implementation. Within F? we mechanize two operational seman-
tics for Wysteria: a single-threaded semantics that formalizes the SIMD view, mentioned
above, and a distributed semantics, that formalizes programs as they are actually run by
multiple parties. Importantly, we have machine-checked proofs that the single-threaded
semantics is sound with respect to the distributed semantics, and that the distributed se-
mantics is correctly implemented by our interpreter. As a result, we have verified that the
properties we prove about the Wysteria-extended F? source programs hold for the multi-
party programs that actually run. There is an important caveat, though: Our interpreter
makes use of a circuit library to compile ASTs to circuits and then execute them using
the Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW) multi-party computation protocol [2], but
at present this library is not formally verified. Formal verification of GMW (which is, at
present, an open problem) would add even greater assurance.
To enable reasoning about the security properties of Wys? programs, Wys? seman-
tics is instrumented with traces that record observations made by the parties during the
execution of a program. The Wys? API makes these traces available to the programmers,
using which they can state and prove security properties about their programs.
Using Wys? we have implemented several programs, including private set intersec-
tion (PSI) and joint median. For PSI and joint median we implemented two versions each,
a straightforward one, but which achieves poor performance, and a more optimized ver-
sion. We formally proved that the optimized and unoptimized versions are equivalent, both
functionally and with respect to privacy. In particular, we prove that the visible events in
the optimized version’s trace provides neither participant with any additional information
about the other’s secrets. Performance experiments confirm that the optimized versions
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do indeed perform better.
1.1.3 Knowledge inference for optimizing MPC
Wys?, with its Foreign Function Interface (FFI), enables MPC programs to inherit
standard functionality such as UI libraries, datatypes, etc. directly from the host language
F?. However, another usability concern with MPC has to do with the performance – MPC
cryptographic protocols are known to be prohibitively expensive. Researchers have shown
that in some cases, such as PSI [7] and median computation [5], a monolithic MPC pro-
gram can be optimized to a mixed-mode MPC program while retaining the privacy char-
acteristics of the monolithic version. In particular, the mixed-mode version reveals exactly
the values of those intermediate variables that would have been known in the monolithic
version as well.
The final part of this dissertation explores methods for inferring when and if vari-
ables in an MPC can be inferred by the participants, and thus may enable protocol op-
timizations [33]. Specifically, we consider two related problems: knowledge inference
and constructive knowledge inference. Both problems are specified by giving an MPC
as a single program that uses multiple parties’ variables. From this program, a solution
to the knowledge inference problem states which parties can learn which additional vari-
ables (other than the inputs and outputs), if any, from a cooperative run of the unoptimized
protocol. We call a knowledge inference solution constructive if, in addition to correctly
asserting that a party p knows a variable y, the solution also gives an evidence of party
p’s knowledge of y in the form of a program that computes y from p’s private data and
11
the final output. We provide a sound and complete solution for the knowledge inference
problem, and a sound and conditionally-complete solution to the constructive knowledge
inference problem. Our solutions build on previous work on template-based program ver-
ification [38, 39] formulating the knowledge problem as satisfiability of predicates which
are discharged using the Z3 SMT-solver [40] in the backend.
1.2 Threat model
Throughout this dissertation, we assume the semi-honest (also known as honest-
but-curious) threat model [41]. In this model, parties follow the protocol properly to its
completion, but keep a record of all the intermediate computations (internal coin tosses
and messages received from other parties). In other words, the parties are honest (they
follow the proper protocol) but curious (they are interested in learning other parties’ se-
crets). Previous work has also considered mixed-mode MPC protocols in the context of
semi-honest threat model [5, 7]. While this model yields weaker security than the mali-
cious model, it is useful if information leakage is the only concern (e.g. two corporations
who would be wary of negative reactions if they do not comply with the protocol). See
Section 6.2 for discussion on supporting malicious threat model.
1.3 Summary
In summary, this dissertation makes the following contributions:
1. We describe the design and implementation of a new MPC DSL, called Wysteria.
Wysteria is the first language to support writing mixed-mode MPCs in a generic
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manner, supporting any number of participants. It provide easy-to-use, high-level
abstractions with a conceptual single-threaded semantics that simplifies the reason-
ing about the correctness and security properties of MPC programs.
• We formalize two semantics for Wysteria, a single-threaded specification se-
mantics and a distributed, actual semantics, and prove that the two correspond.
• We implement a Wysteria interpreter that executes secure blocks by compil-
ing them at runtime to boolean circuits, executed by Choi et al.’s implementa-
tion of the Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson protocol.
• We program several MPC programs in Wysteria, including for the first time,
a card dealing application, and illustrate that Wysteria’s novel high-level ab-
stractions, e.g. secure state, enable expressing novel protocols not considered
previously in the literature.
2. We describe Wys?, an embedding of Wysteria in F?. The embedding is a Verified,
Domain-Specific Integrated Language Extension providing the benefits of (a) formal
verification of the correctness and security properties of the MPC programs, (b) par-
tially verified implementation of the Wysteria toolchain, and (c) a Foreign Func-
tion Interface that enables MPC programs to inherit standard language constructs
directly from the host language F?. The programs we have written with Wys? con-
stitute the first MPC programs to be formally verified, and the Wys? implementation
itself is the first MPC DSL to be be constructed with formal assurance.
3. Finally, we formalize the problem of knowledge inference and constructive knowl-
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edge inference, that can help optimize monolithic secure computations into mixed-
mode computations, with similar privacy characteristics as the monolithic versions.
We present solutions for both these problems and formally prove their soundness
and relative completeness.
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Chapter 2: Wysteria: A Programming Language for Mixed-mode MPC
This chapter presents Wysteria, a new MPC DSL that provides high-level abstrac-
tions to write mixed-mode secure computation programs. Wysteria provides a concep-
tual single-threaded semantics that can be used to reason about the correctness and security
properties of the MPC programs, while the Wysteria metatheory guarantees that the rea-
soning also applies to the actual protocol runs. Whereas Wysteria allows for informal,
lightweight reasoning about the MPC programs, in Chapter 3, we make such reasoning
formal and mechanize the Wysteria metatheory.
We have used Wysteria to program several MPC applications from the literature,
as well as some novel ones, including a card dealing application (Section 2.7.3). In our
experience, we have found Wysteria abstractions to be expressive and easy-to-use.
We first present an overview of Wysteria features with the help of several examples
(2.1), followed by the formal specification of the Wysteria syntax, type system, and oper-
ational semantics (2.2, 2.3, 2.4). We then present the Wysteria metatheoretic properties
(2.5), including progress and preservation theorems (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) and a
forward-simulation theorem that establishes the correspondence between the conceptual
single-threaded semantics and the actual protocol semantics (Theorem 3). We conclude
the chapter with Wysteria implementation (2.6) and evaluation (2.7).
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2.1 Wysteria overview
Wysteria is a functional programming language with first-class (higher order) func-
tions, variable binding with let, tuples (aka records), sums (aka variants or tagged unions),
and standard primitive values like integers and arrays. The main novelty of Wysteria is
that it allows the programmers to write a distributed MPC as a single program with a con-
ceptual single-threaded semantics, while the runtime takes care of the actual distributed
semantics.
2.1.1 Computation modes for secure and local computations
Wysteria defines two computation modes: secure mode in which secure (multi-
party) computations take place, and parallel mode in which one or more parties compute
locally, in parallel. Here is a version of the so-called millionaires’ problem that employs
both modes:1
let a =par({Alice})= read () in
let b =par({Bob})= read () in
let out =sec({Alice,Bob})= a > b in
out
Ignoring the par() and sec() annotations, this program is just a series of let-bindings: it
first reads Alice’s value, then reads Bob’s value, computes which is bigger (who is richer?),
and returns the result. The annotations indicate how and where these results should be
computed. The par({Alice}) annotation indicates that the read() (i.e., the rhs computation)
will be executed locally (and normally) at Alice’s location only, while the par({Bob}) an-
1This program does not actually type check in Wysteria, but it is useful for illustration; the corrected
program (using “wires”) is given shortly.
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notation indicates that the second read() will be executed at Bob’s location only. The
sec({Alice,Bob}) annotation indicates that a > b will be executed as a secure multiparty com-
putation between Alice and Bob. Notice communication from local nodes (Bob and Alice)
to the secure computation is done implicitly, as variable binding: the secure block “reads
in” values a and b from each site. Wysteria compiler sees this and compiles it to actual
communication. In general, Wysteria programs, though they will in actuality run on mul-
tiple hosts, can be viewed as having the apparent single-threaded semantics, i.e., as if there
were no annotations; we have proved a simulation theorem from single- to multi-threaded
semantics.
In the example, we used parallel mode merely as a means to acquire and commu-
nicate values to a secure-mode computation (which we sometimes call a secure block).
There are many occasions in which parallel mode is used as a substantial component of
the overall computation, often as a way to improve performance. On these occasions we
specify the mode par(w) where w is a set of principals, rather than (as above) a single prin-
cipal. In this case, the rhs of the let binding executes the given code at every principal
in the set. Indeed, the code in the example above is implicitly surrounded by the code
let result =par({Alice,Bob})= e in result (where e is the code given above). This says that Alice
and Bob both, in parallel, run the entire program. In doing so, they will delegate to other
computation modes, e.g., to a mode in which only Alice performs a computation (to bind to
a) or in which only Bob does one, or in which they jointly and securely compute the a > b.
The delegation rules stipulate that parallel mode computations among a set of principals
may delegate to any subset of those principals for either secure or parallel computations.
We will see several more examples as we go.
17
2.1.2 Wires for inputs and outputs
In the above example, we are implicitly expressing that a is Alice’s (acquired in
par({Alice}) mode) and b is Bob’s. But suppose we want to make the computation of out into
a function: what should the function’s type be, so that the requirements of input sources
are expressed? We do this with a language feature we call wires, as follows:
is richer = λa: W {Alice} nat. λb: W {Bob} nat.
let out =sec({Alice,Bob})= a[Alice] > b[Bob] in
out
Here, the is richer function takes two arguments a and b, each of which is a wire. The
wires express that the data “belongs to” a particular principal: a value of type W {Alice} t is
accessible only to Alice, which is to say, inside of par({Alice}) computations or sec({Alice}∪w)
computations (where w can be any set of principals); notably, it is not accessible from
within computations par({Alice}∪w}) where w is a nonempty set. Note that wires are given
dependent types [42, 43] which refer to principal values, in this case the values Alice and
Bob; we will see interesting uses of such types shortly. Here is how we can call this func-
tion:
let a =par({Alice})= read() in
let b =par({Bob})= read() in
let out = is richer (wire {Alice} a) (wire {Bob} b) in
out
This code is creating wires from Alice and Bob’s private values and passing them to
the function. Note that the output is not a wire, but just a regular value, and this is because
it should be accessible to both Alice and Bob.
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2.1.3 Delegation effects
Just as we use types to ensure that the inputs to a function are from the right party,
we can use effects on a function’s type to ensure that the caller is in a legal mode. For ex-
ample, changing the third line in the above program to let out =par({Alice})= is richer .. would
be inappropriate, as we would be attempting to invoke the is richer function only from Alice
even though we also require Bob to participate in the secure computation in the function
body. The requirement of joint involvement is expressed as a delegation effect in our type
system, which indicates the expected mode of the caller. The delegation effect for is richer
function is sec({Alice,Bob}), indicating that it must be called from a mode involving at least
Alice and Bob (e.g., par({Alice,Bob})). The effect annotates the function’s type; the type of
is richer is thus W {Alice}nat→W {Bob}nat −sec({Alice,Bob})→ bool; i.e., is richer takes Alice’s
wire and Bob’s wire, delegates to a secure block involving the two of them, and produces
a boolean value. Delegation effects like par({Alice,Bob}) are also possible.
Wire bundles. So far we have used single wires, but Wysteria also permits bundling
wires together, which (as we will see later) is particularly useful when parties are generic
over which and how many principals can participate in a secure computation. Here is our
example modified to use bundling:
is richer = λv: W {Alice,Bob} nat.
let out =sec({Alice,Bob})= v[Alice] > v[Bob] in
out
This code says that the input is a wire bundle whose values are from both Alice
and Bob. We extract the individual values from the bundle v inside of the secure block
using array-like projection syntax. To call this function after reading the inputs a and b we
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write is richer ((wire {Alice} a) ++(wire {Bob} b)). Here the calling code concatenates together,
using ++, the two wires from Alice and Bob into a bundle containing both of their inputs.
Of course, this is just an abstraction, and does not literally represent what is going on at
either party’s code when this is compiled. For principal p, an empty wire bundle · (“dot”)
is used for a wire bundle when p is not in its domain, so that for Alice the above wire
bundle would be represented as {Alice:a} ++· while for Bob it would be ·++{Bob:b}. When
the secure computation begins, each party contributes its own value for every input bundle,
and receives only its own value for every output bundle. The type system’s accessibility
rules for bundles generalize what was stated above: if v has type W ({A} ∪w1) nat, where
w1 may or may not be empty, then v[A] is only allowed in par({A}) mode or in sec({A} ∪w2)
mode (s.t. v is accessible to sec({A} ∪w2), and nowhere else.
2.1.4 First-class principals and n-party computation
Now suppose we would like to generalize our function to operate over an arbitrary
number of principals. At the moment we would have to write one function for two prin-
cipals, a different one for three, and yet another one for four. To be able to write just one
function for n parties we need two things, (1) a way to abstract which principals might be
involved in a computation, and (2) a way to iterate over wire bundles. Then we can write
a function that takes a wire bundle involving multiple arbitrary principals and iterate over
it to find the highest value, returning the principal who has it. Here is the code to do this:
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richest of = λms:ps. λv: W ms nat.
let out =sec(ms)=
wfold(None, v,
λrichest. λp. λn. match richest with
| None ⇒ Some p
| Some q⇒ if n > v[q] then Some p
else Some q)
in (wire ms out)
The idea is that ms abstracts an unknown set of principals (which has type ps), and
wfold permits iterating over the wire bundle for those principals: notice how ms appears in
the type of v. The wfold construct takes three arguments. Its first argument None is the initial
value for the loop’s accumulator (None is a value of optional type). The second argument v
is the wire bundle to iterate over. The wfold’s body above is an anonymous function with
three parameters: richest is the current accumulator, whose value is the richest principal
thus far (or None), p is the current principal under consideration, and n is p’s wire value, a
nat. In the None case of the match, no principal has yet been considered so the first becomes
a candidate to be richest. Otherwise, in the Some case, the protocol compares the current
maximum with the present principal’s worth and updates the accumulator. When the loop
terminates, it yields the value of the accumulator, which is placed in a wire bundle and
returned.
In addition to wfold, Wysteria also provides a way to apply a function to every
element of a wire bundle, producing a new bundle (like the standard functional map).
The richest of function can be applied concretely as follows (where the variables end-
ing in networth we assume are read from each party’s console):
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let all = {Alice,Bob,Charlie} in
let r : W all (ps{singl ∧⊆all} option) =
richest of all (wire {Alice} alice networth
++wire {Bob} bob networth
++wire {Charlie} charlie networth)
The richest of function illustrates that first-class principals are useful as the object of
computation: the function’s result r is a wire bundle carrying principal options. The type
for values in r is a refinement type of the form t{φ} where φ is a formula that refines the
base type t. The particular type states that every value in r is either None or Some(s) where
not only s has type ps (a set of principals), but that it is a singleton set (the singl part), and
this set is a subset of all (the⊆all part); i.e., s is exactly one of the set of principals involved
in the computation. Wysteria uses refinements to ensure delegation requirements, e.g., to
ensure that if ps0 is the set of principals in a nested parallel block, then the set of principals
ps1 in the enclosing block is a superset, i.e., that ps1 ⊇ ps0. Refinements capture relation-
ships between principal sets in their types to aid in proving such requirements during type
checking.
2.1.5 Secret shares
Secure computations are useful in that they only reveal the final outcome, and not any
intermediate results. However, in interactive settings we might not be able to perform an
entire secure computation at once but need to do it a little at a time, hiding the intermediate
results until the very end. To support this sort of program, Wysteria provides secret
shares. Within a secure computation, e.g., involving principals A and B, we can encode
a value of type t into shares having type Sh w t where w is the set of principals involved
22
in the computation (e.g., {A,B}). When a value of this type is returned, each party gets
its own encrypted share (similar to how wire bundles work, except that the contents are
abstract). When the principals engage in a subsequent secure computation their shares can
be recombined into the original value.
To illustrate the utility of secret shares in the context of mixed mode protocols, we
consider a simple two-player, two-round bidding game. In each of the two rounds, each
player submits a private bid. A player “wins” the game by having the higher average of
two bids. The twist is that after the first round, both players learn the identity of the higher
bidder, but not their bid. By learning which initial bid is higher, the players can adjust
their second bid to be either higher or lower, depending on their preferences and strategy.
Figure 2.1 shows the game as a mixed-mode computation that consists of two secure
blocks, one per round. In order to force players to commit to their initial bid while not
revealing it directly, the protocol stores the initial bids in secret shares. In the second
secure block, the protocol recovers these bids in order to compute the final winning bidder:
The first secure block above resembles the millionaires’ protocol, except that it re-
turns not only the principal c with the higher input but also secret shares of both inputs: sa
has type Sh {Alice,Bob} int, and both Alice and Bob will have a different value for sa, analo-
gous to wire bundles; the same goes for sb. The second block recovers the initial bids by
combining the players’ shares and computes the final bid as two averages.
Unlike past MPC languages that expose language primitives for secret sharing (e.g.,
[34]), in Wysteria the type system ensures that shares are not misused, e.g., shares for
different underlying values may not be combined.
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(∗ Bidding round 1 of 2 ∗)
let a1 =par({Alice})= read () in
let b1 =par({Bob})= read () in
let in1 = (wire {Alice} a1) ++(wire {Bob} b1) in
let (higher1, sa, sb) =sec({Alice,Bob})=
let c = if in1[Alice] > in2[Bob] then Alice else Bob in
(c, makesh in1[Alice], makesh in1[Bob])
in
print higher1 ;
(∗ Bidding round 2 of 2 ∗)
let a2 =par({Alice})= read () in
let b2 =par({Bob})= read () in
let in2 = (wire {Alice} a2) ++(wire {Bob} b2) in
let higher2 =sec({Alice,Bob})=
let (a1, b1) = (combsh sa, combsh sb) in
let bid a = (a1 + in2[Alice]) / 2 in
let bid b = (b1 + in2[Bob]) / 2 in
if bid a > bid b then Alice else Bob
in print higher2
Figure 2.1: Two round bidding game in Wysteria
2.2 Formal syntax
In this section we introduce λWy, the formal core calculus that underpins the lan-
guage design of Wysteria.
Figure 2.2 gives the λWy syntax for values v , expressions e, and types τ . λWy
contains standard values v consisting of variables x , natural numbers n (typed as nat),
sums inji v (typed by the form τ1 + τ2),2 and products (v1, v2) (typed by the form τ1× τ2).
In addition, λWy permits principals p to be values, as well as sets thereof, constructed from
singleton principal sets {w} and principal set unions w1 ∪ w2. These are all given type
ps φ, where φ is a type refinement; the type system ensures that if a value w has type ps φ,
2Sums model tagged unions or variant types
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Principal p, q ::= Alice | Bob | Charlie | · · ·
Value v , w ::= x | n | inji v | (v1, v2) | p | {w} | w1 ∪ w2
Expression e ::= v1⊕v2 | case (v , x1.e1, x2.e2) | fst (v) | snd (v) | λx .e | v1 v2 | fix x .λy .e
| array(v1, v2) | select(v1, v2) | update(v1, v2, v3) | let x = e1 in e2
| let x M= e1 in e2 | wirew (v) | v1 ++ v2 | v [w ] | wfoldw (v1, v2, v3)
|wappw (v1, v2) |wapsw (v1, v2) |wcopyw (v) |makesh(v) | combsh(v)
| v
Type environment Γ ::= . | Γ, x :M τ | Γ, x : τ
Mode M, N ::= m(w) | >
Modal operator m ::= p | s
Effect ε ::= · |M | ε1, ε2
Refinement φ ::= true | singl(ν) | ν ⊆ w | ν = w | φ1 ∧ φ2
Type τ ::= nat | τ1 + τ2 | τ1 × τ2 | ps φ |Ww τ | Array τ | Shw τ | x :τ1
ε→ τ2
Figure 2.2: λWy syntax
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then φ[w/ν] is valid.3 Refinements in λWy are relations in set theory. Refinements ν ⊆ w
and ν = w capture subset and equality relationships, respectively, with another value w .
The refinement singl(ν) indicates that the principal set is a singleton.
λWy expressions e are, for simplicity, in so-called A-normal form (ANF) [44], where
nearly all sub-expressions are values, as opposed to arbitrary nested expressions. ANF
form can be generated from an unrestricted Wysteria program with simple compiler sup-
port.
Expressions include arithmetic operations (v1⊕v2), case expressions (for computing
on sums), and fst and snd for accessing elements of a product. Expressions λx .e and v1 v2
denote abstractions and applications respectively. λWy also includes standard fix point
expressions (which encode loops) and mutable arrays: array(v1, v2) creates an array (of
type Array τ ) whose length is v1, and whose elements (of type τ ) are each initialized to
v2; array accesses are written as select(v1, v2) where v1 is an array and v2 is an index; and
array updates are written as update(v1, v2, v3), updating array v1 at index v2 with value v3.
Let bindings in λWy can optionally be annotated with a mode M , which indicates
that expression e1 should be executed in mode M as a delegation from the present mode.
Modes are either secure (operator s) or parallel (operator p), among a set of principals
w . Mode > represents is a special parallel mode among all principals; at run-time, > is
replaced with p(w) where w is the set of all principals participating in the computation.
Once the execution of e1 completes, e2 then executes in the original mode. Unannotated let
bindings execute in the present mode. λWy has dependent function types, written x :τ1
ε→
τ2, where x is bound in ε and τ2; the ε annotation is an effect that captures all the delegations
3We write φ[w/ν] to denote the result of substituting w for ν in φ.
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inside the function body. An effect is either empty, a mode, or a list of effects.
Wire bundle creation, concatenation, and folding are written wirew(v), w1 ++ w2,
and wfoldw(v1, v2, v3), respectively (the w annotation on wfold and other combinators
denotes the domain of the wire bundle being operated on). Wire bundles carrying a value
of type τ for each principal in a set w are given the (dependent) type Ww τ . We also
support mapping a wire bundle by a either a single function (wapsw(v1, v2)), or another
wire bundle of per-principal functions (wappw(v1, v2)). Finally, the form wcopyw(v) is
a coercion that allows wire bundles created in delegated computations to be visible in
computations that contain them (operationally, wcopyw(v) is a no-op). λWy also models
support for secret shares, which have type Shw τ , analogous to the type of wire bundles.
Shares of value v are created (in secure mode) with makesh(v) and reconstituted (also in
secure mode) with combsh(v).
2.3 Type system
At a high level, the λWy type system enforces the key invariants of a mixed-mode
protocol: (a) each variable can only be used in an appropriate mode, (b) delegated compu-
tations require that all participating principals are present in the current mode, (c) parallel
local state (viz., arrays) must remain consistent across parallel principals, and (d) code in
the secure blocks must be restricted so that it can be compiled to a boolean circuit in our
implementation. In this section, we present the typing rules, and show how these invariants
are maintained.
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Γ `M v : τ (Value typing)
t-var
x :M τ ∈ Γ ∨ x : τ ∈ Γ
Γ ` τ
Γ `M x : τ
t-nat
Γ `M n : nat
t-inj
Γ `M v : τi j ∈ {1, 2}
τj IsFlat Γ ` τj
Γ `M inji v : τ1 + τ2
t-prod
Γ `M vi : τi
Γ `M (v1, v2) : τ1 × τ2
t-princ
Γ `M p : ps (ν = {p})
t-psone
Γ `M w : ps (singl(ν))
Γ `M {w} : ps (ν = {w})
t-psunion
Γ `M wi : ps φi
Γ `M w1 ∪ w2 : ps (ν = w1 ∪ w2)
t-psvar
Γ `M x : ps φ
Γ `M x : ps (ν = x )
t-msub
Γ `M
Γ `M x : τ Γ `M N
N = s( )⇒ τ IsSecIn
Γ `N x : τ
t-sub
Γ `M v : τ1
Γ ` τ1 <: τ Γ ` τ
Γ `M v : τ
Figure 2.3: Value typing judgment
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Γ `M N (Mode M can delegate to mode N )
d-refl
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν = w1)
Γ ` m(w1) m(w2)
d-top
Γ ` w : ps φ
Γ ` >m(w)
d-par
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
Γ ` p(w1)  p(w2)
d-sec
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν = w1)
Γ ` p(w1)  s(w2)
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2 (Subtyping)
s-refl
Γ ` τ <: τ
s-trans
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2
Γ ` τ2 <: τ3
Γ ` τ1 <: τ3
s-sum
Γ ` τi <: τ ′i
Γ ` τ1 + τ2 <: τ ′1 + τ ′2
s-prod
Γ ` τi <: τ ′i
Γ ` τ1 × τ2 <: τ ′1 × τ ′2
s-princs
JΓK  φ1 ⇒ φ2
Γ ` ps φ1 <: ps φ2
s-wire
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2
Γ `Ww1 τ1 <: Ww2 τ2
s-array
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2
Γ ` τ2 <: τ1
Γ ` Array τ1 <: Array τ2
s-share
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν = w1)
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2
Γ ` τ2 <: τ1
Γ ` Shw1 τ1 <: Shw2 τ2
s-arrow
Γ ` τ ′1 <: τ1
Γ, x : τ ′1 ` τ2 <: τ ′2
Γ ` x :τ1
ε→ τ2 <: x :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2
Figure 2.4: Subtyping and delegation judgments
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2.3.1 Value typing
Figure 2.3 shows the value typing judgment Γ `M v : τ , read as under Γ and in
current mode M , value v has type τ . Variable bindings in Γ are of two forms: the usual
x : τ , and x :M τ where M is the mode in which x is defined. Rule t-var looks up the
binding of x in Γ, and checks that either x is bound with no mode annotation, or matches
the mode M in the binding to the current mode. It uses an auxiliary judgment for type
well-formedness, Γ ` τ , which enforces invariants like, for a wire bundle type Ww τ , w
should have a ps φ type. The rule t-inj uses another auxiliary judgment τ IsFlat which
holds for types τ that lack wire bundles and shares. Both auxiliary judgments are defined
in the Appendix A (Figures A.3, A.4). Wysteria disallows wire bundles and shares in
sum values, since it hides their precise sizes; the size information of wires and shares is
required for boolean circuit generation. The rules t-prod, t-princ, t-psone, t-psunion,
and t-psvar are unsurprising.
2.3.2 Delegations typing judgments
Rule t-msub is used to permit reading a variable in the present mode N , though
the variable is bound in mode M . This is permitted under two conditions: when N =
s( ) ⇒ τ IsSecIn, and when Γ ` M  N , which is read as under type environment
Γ, mode M can delegate computation to mode N . The former condition enforces that
variables accessible in secure blocks do not include functions known only to some parties
as they can’t be compiled to circuits by all the parties. As such, the condition excludes
wire bundles that carry functions. The condition Γ ` M  N captures the intuitive idea
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that a variable defined in a larger mode can be accessed in a smaller mode. It is defined
at the top of Figure 2.4. In addition to capturing valid variable accesses across different
modes, the same relation also checks when it is valid for a mode to delegate computation
to another mode (let x N= e1 in e2). The rule d-refl type checks the reflexive case, where
the refinement ν = w1 captures that w2 = w1 at run-time. The special mode>, that we use
to type check generic library code written in Wysteria, can delegate to any mode (rule d-
top). Recall that at run-time,> is replaced with p(w), where w is the set of all principals.
A parallel mode p(w1) can delegate computation to another parallel mode p(w2) only if
all the principals in w2 are present at the time of delegation, i.e. w2 ⊆ w1. The rule d-par
enforces this check by typing w2 with the ν ⊆ w1 refinement. Finally, principals in parallel
mode can begin a secure computation; rule d-sec again uses refinements to check this
delegation. We note that uses of rule d-par and rule d-sec can be combined to effectively
delegate from parallel mode to secure block consisting of a subset of the ambient principal
set. Secure modes are only allowed to delegate to themselves (via rule d-refl), since
secure blocks are implemented using monolithic boolean circuits.
2.3.3 Subtyping judgments
Rule t-sub is the (declarative) subsumption rule, and permits giving a value of type
τ1 the type τ if the τ is a subtype of τ1. More precisely, the subtyping judgment Γ ` τ1 <:
τ2 is read as under Γ type τ1 is a subtype of τ2. The rules for this judgment are given at
the bottom of Figure 2.4. Rules s-refl, s-trans, s-sum, s-prod, s-array, and s-arrow
are standard. Rule s-princs offloads reasoning about refinements to an auxiliary judgment
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written JΓK  φ1 ⇒ φ2, which reads assuming variables in Γ satisfy their refinements,
the refinement φ1 entails φ2. We elide the details of this ancillary judgment, as it can be
realized with an SMT solver; our implementation uses Z3 [40], as described in 2.6. For
wire bundles, the domain of the supertype, a principal set, must be a subset of domain of
the subtype, i.e. type Ww1 τ1 is a subtype of Ww2 τ2 if w2 ⊆ w1, and τ1 <: τ2 (rule s-
wire). As mentioned earlier, value w2 is typed with no mode annotation. Rule s-share is
similar but requires τ1 and τ2 to be invariant since circuit generation requires an fixed size
(in bits) for the shared value.
2.3.4 Expression typing
Figures 2.5 gives the typing judgment for expressions, written Γ `M e : τ ; ε and
read under Γ at mode M , the expression e has type τ and delegation effects ε. The rules
maintain the invariant that Γ ` M  ε, i.e. if e is well-typed, then M can perform all the
delegation effects in e.
The rules t-binop, t-fst, and t-snd are standard. Rule t-case is mostly standard, ex-
cept for two details. First, the effect in the conclusion contains the effects of both branches.
The second detail concerns secure blocks. We need to enforce that case expressions in se-
cure blocks do not return functions, since it won’t be possible to inline applications of such
functions when generating circuits. So, the premise (M = p( )∧ε = M)∨(τ IsFO∧ε = ·)
enforces that either the current mode is parallel, in which case there are no restrictions on
τ , but we add an effect p(·) so that secure blocks cannot reuse this code, or the type returned
by the branches is first order (viz., not a function).
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Γ `M e : τ ; ε (Expression typing: “Under Γ, expression e has type τ , and may be run at M . ”)
t-binop
Γ `M vi : nat
Γ `M v1 ⊕ v2 : nat; ·
t-fst
Γ `M v : τ1 × τ2
Γ `M fst (v) : τ1; ·
t-snd
Γ `M v : τ1 × τ2
Γ `M snd (v) : τ2; ·
t-case
(M = p( ) ∧ ε = p(·)) ∨ (τ IsFO ∧ ε = ·)
Γ ` v : τ1 + τ2
Γ, xi : τi `M ei : τ ; εi
Γ ` τ Γ `M  εi
Γ `M case (v , x1.e1, x2.e2) : τ ; ε, ε1, ε2
t-lam
Γ ` τ
Γ, x : τ `M e : τ1; ε
Γ `M λx .e : (x :τ
ε→ τ1); ·
t-app
Γ `M v1 : x :τ1
ε→ τ2
Γ ` v2 : τ1 Γ ` τ2[v2/x ]
Γ `M  ε[v2/x ]
M = s( )⇒ τ2 IsFO
Γ `M v1 v2 : τ2[v2/x ]; ε[v2/x ]
t-let1
Γ `M e1 : τ1; ε1
Γ, x : τ1 `M e2 : τ2; ε2
Γ ` τ2 Γ `M  ε2
Γ `M let x = e1 in e2 : τ2; ε1, ε2
t-let2
M = m( )
N = (w) Γ `M N
Γ `N e1 : τ1; ε1
Γ, x :m(w) τ1 `M e2 : τ2; ε2
Γ ` τ2 Γ `M  ε2
Γ `M let x
N
= e1 in e2 : τ2;N, ε1, ε2
t-fix
M = p( )
Γ ` (y :τ1
ε,p(·)→ τ2)
Γ `M  ε
Γ, x : (y :τ1
ε,p(·)→ τ2) `M λy .e : (y :τ1
ε,p(·)→ τ2); ·
Γ `M fix x .λy .e : (y :τ1
ε,p(·)→ τ2); ·
Figure 2.5: Expression typing judgments
33
Rule t-lam is the standard rule for typing a dependent effectful function: the variable
x may appear free in the type of function body τ1 and its effect ε, and ε appears on the
function type. Rule t-app is the function application rule. It checks that v1 is a function
type, v2 matches the argument type of the function,4 and that the application type τ2[v2/x ]
is well-formed in Γ. The rule performs two additional checks. First, it ensures that the
current mode M can perform the delegation effects inside the function body (Γ ` M 
ε[v2/x ]). Second, it disallows partial applications in secure blocks (M = s( )⇒ τ IsFO)
to prevent a need to represent functional values as circuits; our implementation of secure
blocks inlines all function applications before generating circuits.
Rule t-let1 is the typing rule for regular let bindings. Rule t-let2 type checks the let
bindings with delegation annotations. The rule differs from rule t-let1 in several aspects.
First, it checks that the delegation is legal (premise Γ ` M N ). Second, it checks e1 in
mode N , instead of current mode M . Third, it checks e2 with variable x bound in mode
m(w) in Γ. This mode consists of the outer modal operator m and the delegated party set
w , meaning that x is available only to principals in w , but within the ambient (secure or
parallel) block.
Rule t-fix type checks unguarded recursive loops (which are potentially non-terminating).
The rule is standard, but with the provisos that such loops are only permitted in parallel
blocks (M = p( )) and the current mode can perform all the effects of the loop (Γ `Mε).
4We restrict the values appearing in dependent types (v2 in this case) to be typed without any mode
annotation. We use an auxiliary judgment (similar to value-typing) Γ ` v : τ to type such values (see
Appendix A Figure A.1). This judgment can only access those variables in Γ that are bound without any
mode.
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Γ `M e : τ ; ε (Expression typing: “Under Γ, expression e has type τ , and may be run at M . ”)
t-array
M = p( ) Γ `M v1 : nat
Γ `M v2 : τ
Γ `M array(v1, v2) : Array τ ; ·
t-select
Γ `M v1 : Array τ
Γ `M v2 : nat
Γ `M select(v1, v2) : τ ; ·
t-update
M = p( )
mode(v1,Γ) = M
Γ `M v1 : Array τ
Γ `M v2 : nat
Γ `M v3 : τ
Γ `M update(v1, v2, v3) : unit; ·
Figure 2.6: Expression typing judgments for arrays
It also adds an effect p(·) to the final type, so that secure blocks cannot use such loops de-
fined in parallel blocks.
Figure 2.6 shows the typing judgments for arrays. The rules t-array, t-select, and
t-update type array creation, reading, and writing, respectively, and are standard with
the proviso that the first and third are only permitted in parallel blocks. For array writes,
the premise mode(v1,Γ) = M also requires the mode of the array to exactly match the
current mode, so that all principals who can access the array do the modification. We elide
the definition of this function, which simply extracts the mode of the argument from the
typing context (note that since the type of v1 is an array, and since programmers do not
write array locations in their programs directly, the value v1 must be a variable and not an
array location).
Figure 2.7 shows the typing judgments for wires. Rule t-wire introduces a wire
bundle for the given principal set w1, mapping each principal to the given value v . The
first premise Γ ` w1 : ps (ν ⊆ w2) requires that w1 ⊆ w2, i.e., all principals contributing
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Γ `M e : τ ; ε (Expression typing: “Under Γ, expression e has type τ , and may be run at M . ”)
t-wire
Γ ` w1 : ps (ν ⊆ w2)
m = s⇒ N = s(w2)
m = p⇒ N = p(w1)
Γ `N v : τ
m = s⇒ τ IsFO
τ IsFlat
Γ `m(w2) wirew1(v) : Ww1 τ ; ·
t-wproj
m = p⇒ φ = (ν = w1)
m = s⇒ φ = (ν ⊆ w1)
Γ `m(w1) v : Ww2 τ
Γ ` w2 : ps (φ ∧ singl(ν))
Γ `m(w1) v [w2] : τ ; ·
t-wireun
Γ `M v1 : Ww1 τ
Γ `M v2 : Ww2 τ
Γ `M v1 ++ v2 : W (w1 ∪ w2) τ ; ·
t-wfold
M = s( ) τ2 IsFO
φ = (ν ⊆ w ∧ singl(ν))
Γ `M v1 : Ww τ
Γ `M v2 : τ2
Γ `M v3 : τ2
·→ ps φ ·→ τ ·→ τ2
Γ `M wfoldw (v1, v2, v3) : τ2; ·
t-wapp
M = p( )
Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
Γ `M v2 : Ww (τ1
·→ τ2)
Γ `M wappw (v1, v2) : Ww τ2; ·
t-waps
M = s( )
τ2 IsFO τ2 IsFlat
Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
Γ `M v2 : τ1
·→ τ2
Γ `M wapsw (v1, v2) : Ww τ2; ·
t-wcopy
M = p(w1)
Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
Γ `p(w2) v : Ww2 τ
Γ `M wcopyw2(v) : Ww2 τ ; ·
Figure 2.7: Expression typing judgments for wires
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to the bundle are present in the current mode. The mode under which value v is typed
is determined by the modal operator m of the current mode. If it is p, v is typed under
p(w1). However, if it is s, v is typed under the current mode itself. In parallel blocks, where
parties execute locally, the wire value can be typed locally. However, in secure blocks, the
value needs to be typable in secure mode. The next premise m = s ⇒ τ IsFO ensures
that wire bundles created in secure mode do not contain functions, again to prevent private
code execution in secure blocks. Finally, the premise τ IsFlat prevents creation of wire
bundles containing shares.
Rule t-wproj types wire projection v [w2]. The premise Γ `m(w1) v : Ww2 τ ensures
that v is a wire bundle having w2 in its domain. To check w2, there are two subcases,
distinguished by current mode being secure or parallel. If the latter, there must be but
one participating principal, and that principal value needs to be equal to the index of wire
projection: the refinement φ enforces that w2 = w1, and w2 is a singleton. If projecting in
a secure block, the projected principal need only be a member of the current principal set.
Intuitively, this check ensures that principals are participants in any computation that uses
their private data.
The rule t-wireun concatenates two wire bundle arguments, reflecting the concate-
nation in the final type W (w1 ∪ w2) τ . The rules t-wfold, t-wapp, t-waps, and t-wcopy
type the remaining primitives for wire bundles. In rule t-wfold, the premise enforces
that wfold is only permitted in secure blocks, that the folding function is pure (viz., its
set of effects is empty), and that the types of the wire bundle, accumulator and function
agree. As with general function application in secure blocks, the rule enforces that the
result of the fold is first order. The rules t-wapp and t-waps are similar to each other, and
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Γ `M e : τ ; ε (Expression typing: “Under Γ, expression e has type τ , and may be run at M . ”)
t-makesh
M = s(w) τ IsFO
τ IsFlat Γ `M v : τ
Γ `M makesh(v) : Shw τ ; ·
t-combsh
M = s(w)
Γ `M v : Shw τ
Γ `M combsh(v) : τ ; ·
t-sube
Γ `M e : τ ′; ε
Γ ` τ ′ <: τ Γ ` τ
Γ `M e : τ ; ε
Figure 2.8: Remaining rules for expression typing
to rule t-wfold. In both rules, a function v2 is applied to the content of a wire bundle
v1. rule t-wapp handles parallel mode applications where the applied functions reside in
a wire bundle (i.e., each principal can provide their own function). Rule t-waps handles
a more restricted case where the applied function is not within a wire bundle; this form is
required in secure mode because to compile a secure block to a boolean circuit at run-time
each principal must know the function being applied. As with rule t-wfold, the applied
functions must be pure. Rule t-wcopy allows copying of a wire bundle value v from p(w2)
to p(w1) provided w2 ⊆ w1. This construct allows principals to carry over their private
values residing in a wire bundle from a smaller mode to a larger mode while maintaining
the privacy – principals in larger mode that are not in the wire bundle see an empty wire
bundle (·).
Figure 2.8 shows the remaining expression typing judgments for shares and the sub-
sumption rule. Rules t-makesh and t-combsh introduce and eliminate secret share values
of type Shw τ , respectively. In both rules, the type of share being introduced or elimi-
nated carries the principal set of the current mode, to enforce that all sharing participants
are present when the shares are combined. Values within shares must be flat and first-
38
Configuration C ::= M{σ;κ;ψ; e}
Store σ ::= · | σ{` :M v1, . . . , vk}
Stack κ ::= · | κ :: 〈M ;ψ; x .e〉 | κ :: 〈ψ; x .e〉
Environment ψ ::= · | ψ{x 7→M v} | ψ{x 7→ v}
Figure 2.9: Wysteria runtime configuration syntax
order so that their bit-level representation size can be determined. Finally, rule t-sube is
the subsumption rule for expressions.
2.4 Operational semantics
We define two distinct operational semantics for λWy programs, each with its own
role and advantages. The single-threaded semantics of λWy provides a deterministic view
of execution that makes apparent the synchrony of multi-party protocols. The multi-
threaded semantics of λWy provides a non-deterministic view of execution that makes
apparent the relative parallelism and privacy of multi-party protocols.
2.4.1 Single-threaded semantics
Wysteria’s single-threaded semantics defines a transition relation for machine con-
figurations (just configurations for short). A configuration C consists of a designated cur-
rent mode M , and four additional run-time components: a store σ, a stack κ, an envi-
ronment ψ and a program counter e (which is an expression representing the code to run
next). The definitions are shown in Figure 2.9.
A store σ models mutable arrays, and consists of a finite map from (array) locations
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` to value sequences v1, .. , vk . Each entry in the store additionally carries the mode M of
the allocation, which indicates which parties have access. A stack κ consists of a (possibly
empty) list of stack frames, of which there are two varieties. The first variety is introduced
by delegations (let bindings with mode annotations) and consists of a mode, an environ-
ment (which stores the values of local variables), and a return continuation, which is an
expression containing one free variable standing in for the return value supplied when the
frame is popped. The second variety is introduced by regular let-bindings where the mode
is invariant; it consists of only an environment and a return continuation.
An environment ψ consists of a finite map from variables to closed values. As with
stores, each entry in the environment additionally carries a mode M indicating which
principals have access and when (whether in secure or in parallel blocks). Note that we
extend the definition of values v from Figure 2.2 to include several new forms that ap-
pear only during execution. During run-time, we add forms to represent empty party sets
(written ·), empty wire bundles (written ·), single-principal wire bundles ({p : v}), wire
bundle concatenation (v1 ++ v2), array locations (`), and closures (written clos (ψ;λx .e)
and clos (ψ; fix f .λx .e)).
Our “environment-passing” semantics (in contrast to a semantics based on substitu-
tion) permits us to directly recover the multi-threaded view of each principal in the midst
of single-threaded execution. Later, we exploit this ability to show that the single and
multi-threaded semantics enjoy a precise correspondence. If we were to substitute val-
ues for variables directly into the program text these distinct views of the program’s state
would be tedious or impossible to recover.
We split the single-threaded semantics in two judgments, one that change the stack
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C1 −→ C2 Configuration stepping: “Configuration C1 steps to C2”
stpC-Local
M{σ1;κ;ψ1; e1} −→ M{σ2;κ;ψ2; e2} when σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2
stpC-Let
M{σ;κ;ψ; let x = e1 in e2} −→ M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
stpC-delPar
p(w1 ∪ w2){σ;κ;ψ; let x
p(w ′)
= e1 in e2} −→ p(w2){σ;κ :: 〈p(w1 ∪ w2);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
when ψJw ′K = w2
stpC-delSSec
s(w){σ;κ;ψ; let x s(w
′)
= e1 in e2} −→ s(w){σ;κ :: 〈s(w);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
when ψJw ′K = w
stpC-delPSec
p(w){σ;κ;ψ; let x s(w
′)
= e1 in e2} −→ p(w){σ;κ :: 〈p(w);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; securew ′(e1)}
stpC-secEnter
p(w){σ;κ;ψ; securew ′(e)} −→ s(w){σ;κ;ψ; e} when ψJw ′K = w
stpC-popStk1
N{σ;κ :: 〈M ;ψ1; x .e〉 ;ψ2; v} −→ M{σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→m(w) (ψ2JvKN )}; e}
when M = m( ) and N = (w)
stpC-popStk2
M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ1; x .e〉 ;ψ2; v} −→ M{σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→ (ψ2JvKM )}; e}
Figure 2.10: Delegation semantics of single-threaded configurations
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and the mode of the current configuration, and one that does not. Figure 2.10 shows
the judgments for the first kind. The judgment C1 −→ C2 can be read as saying con-
figuration C1 steps to C2. Configurations manage their current mode in a stack-based
discipline, using their stack to record and recover modes as the thread of execution en-
ters and leaves nested parallel and secure blocks. The rules of C1 −→ C2 handle eight
cases: Local stepping only (stpc-local), regular let-binding with no delegation annota-
tion (stpc-let), delegation to a parallel block (stpc-delpar), delegation to secure block
from a secure or parallel block (stpc-delssec and stpc-delpsec, respectively), entering a
secure block (stpc-secenter) and handling return values using the two varieties of stack
frames (stpc-popstk1 and stpc-popstk2).
Both delegation rules move the program counter under a let, saving the returning
context on the stack for later (to be used in stpc-popstk). Parallel delegation is permitted
when the current principals are a superset of the delegated principal set; secure delegation
is permitted when the sets coincide. Secure delegation occurs in two phases, which is
convenient later when relating the single-threaded configuration semantics to the multi-
threaded view; stpc-secenter handles the second phase of secure delegation.
The second judgment for single-threaded semantics, called local stepping judgment
σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2, covers all (common) cases where neither the stack nor the mode
of the configuration change. This judgment can be read as under store σ1 and environment
ψ1, expression e1 steps at modeM to σ2, ψ2 and e2. Most configuration stepping rules are
local, in the sense that they stay within one mode and do not affect the stack.
Figure 2.11 shows some cases for this judgment. We explain the first rule in detail,
as a model for the rest. Case analysis (stpl-case) branches based on the injection, step-
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-Case
σ;ψ; case (v , x1.e1, x2.e2)
M−→ σ;ψ{xi 7→ v ′}; ei when ψJvKM = inji v ′
stpL-Fst
σ;ψ; fst (v) M−→ σ;ψ; v1 when ψJvKM = (v1, v2)
stpL-Snd
σ;ψ; snd (v) M−→ σ;ψ; v2 when ψJvKM = (v1, v2)
stpL-BinOp
σ;ψ; v1 ⊕ v2
M−→ σ;ψ; v ′ when ψJv1KM = v ′1, ψJv2KM = v ′2 and
v ′1 ⊕ v ′2 = v ′
stpL-Lambda
σ;ψ;λx .e
M−→ σ;ψ; clos (ψ;λx .e)
stpL-Apply
σ;ψ1; v1 v2
M−→ σ;ψ2{x 7→ v ′}; e when ψ1Jv1KM = clos (ψ2;λx .e) and
ψ1Jv2K = v ′
stpL-Fix
σ;ψ; fix x .λy .e p(w)−→ σ;ψ; clos (ψ; fix x .λy .e)
stpL-FixApply
σ;ψ1; v1 v2
M−→ σ;ψ′; e when ψ1Jv1KM = clos (ψ; fix x .λy .e),
ψ1Jv2K = v ′ and
ψ′ = ψ{x 7→ clos (ψ; fix x .λy .e); y 7→ v ′}
Figure 2.11: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations
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ψJvKM = v ′ Environment lookup: “Closing v for M under ψ is v ′”
ψJ(v1, v2)KM = (v ′1, v ′2) when ψJv1KM = v ′1 and ψJv2KM = v ′2
ψJxKM = v when x 7→N v ∈ ψ and . ` N M
ψJxKM = v when x 7→ v ∈ ψ
Figure 2.12: Environment lookup judgments (selected rules)
ping to the appropriate branch and updating the environment with the payload value of
the injected value v ′. The incoming environment ψ closes the (possibly open) scrutinee
value v of the case expression using value bindings for the free variables accessible at the
current modeM . We write the closing operation as ψJvKM and show selected rules in Fig-
ure 2.12 (complete rules are in the Appendix A Figure A.5). Note the second rule makes
values bound in larger modes available in smaller modes. The rule stpl-case updates the
environment using the closed value, adding a new variable binding at the current mode.
The remainder of the rules follow a similar pattern of environment usage.
Projection of pairs (stpl-fst,stpl-snd) gives the first or second value of the pair (re-
spectively). Binary operations close the operands before computing a result (stpl-binop).
Lambdas and fix-points step similarly. In both cases a rule closes the expression, intro-
ducing a closure value with the current environment (stpl-lambda and stpl-fix). Their
application rules restore the environment from the closure, update it to hold the argument
binding, and in the case of the fix-points, a binding for the fix expression. The mode
p(w) enforces that (potentially unguarded) recursion via stpl-fix may not occur in secure
blocks.
Figure 2.13 shows the local stepping judgment for arrays and shares. The array prim-
itives access or update the store, which remained invariant in all the cases above. Array
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-array
σ;ψ; array(v1, v2)
M−→ σ{` :M wk};ψ; ` when ψJv1KM = k , ψJv2KM = w and nextM (σ) = `
stpL-select
σ;ψ; select(v1, v2)




M−→ σ;ψ; error when ψJv1KM = `, ψJv2KM = i , i /∈ [1..k ] and
σ(`) = {w̄}k
stpL-update
σ;ψ; update(v1, v2, v3)
M−→ σ′;ψ; () when ψJv1KM = `, ψJv2KM = i , ψJv3KM = w ′i
σ(`) = {w̄}k , j ∈ [1..k ],w ′j = wj for j 6= i and
σ′ = σ{` :M {w̄ ′}k}
stpL-upd-err
σ;ψ; update(v1, v2, v3)
M−→ σ;ψ; error when ψJv1KM = `, ψJv2KM = i , i /∈ [1..k ] and
σ(`) = {w̄}k
stpL-Makesh
σ;ψ; makesh(v) s(w)−→ σ;ψ; shw v ′ when ψJvKs(w) = v ′
stpL-Combsh
σ;ψ; combsh(v) s(w)−→ σ;ψ; v ′ when ψJvKs(w) = shw v ′
Figure 2.13: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations: arrays and shares
45
creation (stpl-array) updates the store with a fresh array location `; the location maps to
a sequence of v1 copies of initial value v2. The fresh location is chosen (deterministically)
by the auxiliary function nextM(σ). Array selection (stpl-select,stpl-sel-err) projects
a value from an array location by its index. The side conditions of stpl-select enforce
that the index is within range. When out of bounds, stpl-sel-err applies instead, step-
ping the program text to error, indicating that a fatal (out of bounds error) has occurred.
We classify an error program as halted rather than stuck. As with (“successfully”) halted
programs that consist only of a return value, the error program is intended to lack any
applicable stepping rules. Array updating (stpl-update,stpl-upd-err) is similar to pro-
jection, except that it updates the store with a new value at one index (and the same values
at all other indices). As with projection, an out-of-bounds array index results in the error
program.
For secret sharing, the two rules stpl-makesh and stpl-combsh give the semantics
of makesh and combsh, respectively. Both rules require secure computation, indicated
by the mode above the transition arrow. In stpl-makesh, the argument value is closed
and “distributed” as a share value shw v ′ associated with the principal setw of the current
mode s(w). stpl-combsh performs the reverse operation, “combining” the share values
of each principal of w to recover the original value.
The remaining local stepping rules support wire bundles and their combinators. Fig-
ure 2.14 shows the wire bundle creation and projection. stpl-wire introduces a wire bun-
dle for given party set w, mapping each principal in the set to the argument value (closed
under the current environment). stpl-wcopy is a no-op: it yields its argument wire bundle.
stpl-parproj projects from wire bundles in a parallel mode when the projected principal
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-Wire
σ;ψ; wirew (v)
M−→ σ;ψ; {|(ψJvKN )|}wiresw ′ where {|v |}wiresw1∪w2 = {|v |}
wires





M−→ σ;ψ; v and {|v |}wires{p} = {p : v}, {|v |}
wires
· = ·,
ψJwK = w ′,M = m( ),
m = s⇒ N = M and m = p⇒ N = p(w ′)
stpL-parProj
σ;ψ; v1[v2]
p({p})−→ σ;ψ; v ′ when ψJv2Kp({p}) = p and
ψJv1Kp({p}) = {p : v ′} ++ w ′
stpL-secProj
σ;ψ; v1[v2]
s({p}∪w)−→ σ;ψ; v ′ when ψJv2Ks({p}∪w) = p and
ψJv1Ks({p}∪w) = {p : v ′} ++ w ′
stpL-WireUn
σ;ψ; v1 ++ v2
M−→ σ;ψ; v ′1 ++ v ′2 when ψJv1KM = v ′1 and ψJv2KM = v ′2
Figure 2.14: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations: wires
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-wapp1
σ;ψ; wappw (v1, v2)
M−→ σ;ψ; · when ψJwK = ·
stpL-wapp2
σ;ψ; wappw (v1, v2)
M−→ σ;ψ; e when ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′,M = p(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1),
ψJv1KM = v ′1 and ψJv2KM = v ′2
where e = let z1
p({p})
= let z2 = v ′1[p] in let z3 = v ′2[p] in z2 z3 in
let z4 = wappw ′(v ′1, v ′2) in ((wire{p}(z1)) ++ z4)
Figure 2.15: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations: wapp
is present and alone. stpl-secproj projects from wire bundles in a secure mode when the
projected principal is present (alone or not).
We now turn to the wire combinators. The wire combinator rules follow a common
pattern. For each of the three combinators, there are two cases for the party set w that
indexes the combinator: either w is empty, or it consists of at least one principal. In
the empty cases, the combinators reduce according to their respective base cases. In the
inductive cases there is at least one principal p. In these cases, the combinators each
unfolds once for p (we intentionally keep the order of this unfolding non-deterministic, so
all orderings of principals are permitted).
In Figure 2.15, rule stpl-wapp1 reduces to the empty wire bundle (base case), and
rule stpl-wapp2 unfolds a parallel-mode wire application for p({p}), creating let-bindings
that project the argument and function from the two wire bundle arguments, perform the
function application and recursively process the remaining principals; finally, the unfold-
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-waps1
σ;ψ; wapsw (v1, v2)
M−→ σ;ψ; · when ψJwK = ·
stpL-waps2
σ;ψ; wapsw (v1, v2)
M−→ σ;ψ; e when ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′,M = s(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1),
ψJv1KM = v ′1 and ψJv2KM = v ′2
where e = let z1 = v ′1[p] in let z2 = v ′2 z1 in let z3 = wapsw ′(v ′1, v ′2) in
((wire{p}(z2)) ++ z3)
Figure 2.16: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations: waps
ing concatenates the resulting wire bundle for the other principals with that of p.
In Figure 2.16, rule stpl-waps1 reduces to the empty wire bundle (base case), while
rule stpl-waps2 is similar to stpl-wapp2, except that the function being applied v2 is not
carried in a wire bundle (recall that secure blocks forbid functions within wire bundles).
Finally, Figure 2.17 shows the rules for the last wire combinator. Rule stpl-wfold1
reduces to the accumulator value v2 (base case), while stpl-wfold2 projects a value for p
from v1 and applies the folding function v3 to the current accumulator v2, the principal p,
the projected value. The result of this application is used as the new accumulator in the
remaining folding steps.
2.4.2 Multi-threaded semantics
Whereas the single-threaded semantics of λWy makes synchrony evident, in actu-
ality a Wysteria program is run as a distributed program involving distinct computing
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σ1;ψ1; e1
M−→ σ2;ψ2; e2 Local stepping: “Under σ1 and ψ1, e1 steps at mode M to σ2, ψ2 and e2”
stpL-wfold1
σ;ψ; wfoldw (v1, v2, v3)
M−→ σ;ψ; v ′ when ψJwK = · and ψJv2KM = v ′
stpL-wfold2
σ;ψ; wfoldw (v1, v2, v3)
M−→ σ;ψ; e when ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′,M = s(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1),
ψJv1KM = v ′1, ψJv2KM = v ′2 and ψJv3KM = v ′3
where e = let z1 = v ′1[p] in let z2 = v ′3 v ′2 p z1 in wfoldw ′(v ′1, z2, v ′3)
Figure 2.17: Local stepping of single-threaded configurations: wfold
Protocol π ::= ε | π1 · π2 | A
Agent A ::= p {σ;κ;ψ; e} | s(w1w2) {σ;κ;ψ; e}
Figure 2.18: Wysteria protocol syntax
principals. We make this multi-agent view apparent in a multi-threaded semantics of λWy
which defines the notion of a protocol (Figure 2.18).
A protocol π consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of agents A. There are two
varieties of agents. First, principal agents are written p {σ;κ;ψ; e} and correspond to
the machine of a single principal p. Second, secure agents are written s(w1w2) {σ;κ;ψ; e}
and correspond to a secure block for principals w2, where w1 is the subset of these prin-
cipals still waiting for their result. Both varieties of agents consist of a store, stack, en-
vironment and expression – the same components as the single-threaded configurations
described above. We note that in the rules discussed below, we treat protocols as com-
mutative monoids, meaning that the order of composition does not matter, and that empty
protocols can be freely added and removed without changing the meaning.
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π1 −→ π2 Protocol stepping: “Protocol π1 steps to π2”
stpP-Private
p {σ1;κ1;ψ1; e1} −→ p {σ2;κ2;ψ2; e2}




σ;κ;ψ; let x p(w)= e1 in e2
}
−→ p {σ;κ1;ψ; e1}




σ;κ;ψ; let x m(w)= e1 in e2
}
−→ p {σ;κ;ψ; e2} when {p} 6⊆ ψJwK
stpP-Frame
π1 · π2 −→ π′1 · π2 when π1 −→ π′1
StpP-SecStep
s(ww ) {σ1;κ1;ψ1; e1} −→ s(ww ) {σ2;κ2;ψ2; e2}
when s(w){σ1;κ1;ψ1; e1} −→ s(w){σ2;κ2;ψ2; e2}
StpP-SecBegin
ε −→ s(·w ) {·; ·; ·; e}
StpP-SecEnd
s(·w2) {σ; ·;ψ; v} −→ ε
StpP-SecEnter
s(w1w2) {σ; ·;ψ; e} · p {σ
′;κ;ψ′; securew2(e)} −→ s(
w1∪{p}




w2 ) {σ′; ·;ψ; v} · p {σ;κ; ·; wait} −→ s(w1w2) {σ
′; ·;ψ; v} · p {σ;κ; ·; v ′}
when slicep(ψJvKs(w2)) ; v ′
Figure 2.19: Multi-threaded target protocol semantics
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Figure 2.19 defines the stepping judgment for protocols π1 −→ π2, read as pro-
tocol π1 steps to protocol π2. Rule stpp-private steps principal p’s computing agent in
mode p({p}) according to the single-threaded semantics. We note that this rule covers
nearly all parallel mode code, by virtue of parallel mode meaning “each principal does
the same thing in parallel.” However, single-threaded rules involving delegation effects,
stpc-delpar and stpc-secenter are different in multi-threaded semantics.
Parallel delegation reduces by case analysis on the agent’s principal p. Rule stpp-
present applies when p is a member of the delegated set. In that case, p simply reduces
by pushing e2 on the stack and continue to e1. When p is not a member of the delegated
set, rule stpp-absent entirely skips the first nested expression and continues with e2. The
type system ensures that in this case, p never uses x , and hence does not needs its binding
in the environment.
To see the effect of these rules, consider the following code, which is like the mil-





= read () in
let x2
p({Bob})
= read () in
let x3 = (wire{Alice}(x1)) ++ (wire{Bob}(x2)) in
let x4
s({Alice,Bob})
= x3[Alice] > x3[Bob] in
x4
To start, both Alice and Bob start running the program (call it e) in protocol Alice {·; ·; ·; e}·
Bob {·; ·; ·; e}. Consider evaluation for Bob’s portion. The protocol will take a step ac-
cording to stpp-absent (via stpp-frame) since the first let binding is for Alice (so Bob is
not permitted to see the result). Rule stpp-present binds the x2 to whatever is read from
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Bob’s console; suppose it is 5. Then, Bob will construct the wire bundle x3, where Alice’s
binding is absent and Bob’s binding x2 is 5.
At the same time, Alice will evaluate her portion of the protocol similarly, eventually
producing a wire bundle where her value for x1 is whatever was read in (6, say), and Bob’s
binding is absent. (Of course, up to this point each of the steps of one party might have
been interleaved with steps of the other.) The key is that elements of the joint protocol that
are private to one party are hidden from the others, in fact totally absent from others’ local
environments. Now, both are nearly poised to delegate to a secure block.
Secure delegation reduces in a series of phases that involve multi-agent coordination.
In the first phase, the principal agents involved in a secure block each reduce to a secure
expression securew(e), using stpc-delpsec via stpp-private. At any point during this
process, rule stpp-secbegin (non-deterministically) creates a secure agent with a matching
principal set w and expression e. After which, each principal agent can enter their input
into the secure computation via stpp-secenter, upon which they begin to wait, blocking
until the secure block completes. Their input takes the form of their current store σ and
environment ψ, which the rule combines with that of the secure agent. We explain the
combine operation below. Once all principals have entered their inputs into the secure
agent, the secure agent can step via stpp-secstep. The secure agent halts when its stack is
empty and its program is a value.
Once halted, the secure block’s principals can leave with the output value via stpp-
secleave. As values may refer to variables defined in the environment, the rule first closes
the value with the secure block’s environment, and then each party receives the slice of
the closed value that is relevant to him. We show selected slicing rules in Figure 2.20. The
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slicep(v1) ; v2 Value slicing: “Value v1 sliced for p is v2”




2) when slicep(vi) ; v ′i
slicep({p : v} ++ v1) ; {p : v}
slicep(v1 ++ v2) ; · when p 6∈ dom(v1 ++ v2)
slicep(ψ) ; ψ
′ Environment slicing: “Environment ψ sliced for p is ψ′”
slicep(ψ{x 7→p(w) v}) ; slicep(ψ){x 7→p({p}) slicep(v)} , p ∈ w
slicep(ψ{x 7→p(w) v}) ; slicep(ψ) , p 6∈ w
slicep(ψ{x 7→ v}) ; slicep(ψ){x 7→ slicep(v)}
Figure 2.20: Slicing judgments (selected rules)
complete definition is in the Appendix A Figures A.7 and A.9. Intuitively, the slice of a
value is just a congruence, except in the case of wire bundle values, where each principal
of the bundle gets its own component; other principals get ·, the empty wire bundle. The
combine operation mentioned above is analogous to slice, but in the reverse direction – it
combines the values in a congruent way, but for wire bundles it concatenates them (see
Appendix A Figure A.10).
Returning to our example, we can see that Bob and Alice will step to secure{Alice,Bob}(e ′)
(with the result poised to be bound to x4 in both cases) where e ′ is x3[Alice] > x3[Bob].
At this point we can begin a secure block for e ′ using stpp-secbegin and both Bob and
Alice join up with it using stpp-secenter. This causes their environments to be merged,
with the important feature that for wire bundles, each party contributes his/her own value,
and as such x3 in the joined computation is bound to {Alice : 6} ++ {Bob : 5}. Now the
secure block performs this computation while Alice and Bob’s protocols wait. When the
result 1 (for “true”) is computed, it is passed to each party via stpp-secleave, along with
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the sliced environment ψ′ (as such each party’s wire bundle now just contains his/her own
value). At this point each party steps to 1 as his final result.
2.5 Metatheory
We prove several meta-theoretical results for λWy that are relevant for mixed-mode
multi-party computations. Proofs for these results can be found in Appendix B. Antic-
ipating on Chapter 3, we have mechanized the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in
F? [37].
First, we show that well-typed Wysteria programs always make progress (and stay
well-typed). In particular, they never get stuck: they either complete with a final result, or
reach a well-defined error state (due to an out of bounds array access or update, but for no
other reason).
Theorem 1 (Progress). If Σ ` C1 : τ then either C1 halted or there exists configuration
C2 such that C1 −→ C2.
Theorem 2 (Preservation). If Σ1 ` C1 : τ and C1 −→ C2, then there exists Σ2 ⊇ Σ1 s.t.
Σ2 ` C2 : τ .
The premise Σ ` C1 : τ appears in both theorems and generalizes the notion of
well-typed expressions to that of well-typed configurations; it can be read as under store
typing Σ, configuration C1 has type τ . This definition involves giving a notion of well-
typed stores, stacks and environments, of which we give the full formal definitions in
Appendix A Figure A.12.
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Next, turning to the relationship between the single- and multi-threaded semantics,
the following theorem shows that every transition in the single-threaded semantics admits
corresponding transitions in the multi-threaded semantics:
Theorem 3 (Sound forward simulation). Suppose that Σ ` C1 : τ and that C1 −→ C2.
Then there exist π1 and π2 such that π1 −→∗ π2 and slicew(Ci) ; πi (for i ∈ {1, 2}),
where w is the set of all principals.
The conclusion of the theorem uses the auxiliary slicing judgment to construct a
multi-threaded protocol from a (single-threaded) configuration (Appendix A Figure A.8).
Turning to the multi-threaded semantics, the following theorem states that the non-
determinism of the protocol semantics always resolves to the same outcome, i.e., given
any two pairs of protocol steps that take a protocol to two different configurations, there
always exists two more steps that bring these two intermediate states into a common final
state:
Theorem 4 (Confluence). Suppose that π1 −→ π2 and π1 −→ π3, then there exists π4
such that π2 −→ π4 and π3 −→ π4.
A corollary of confluence is that every terminating run of the (non-deterministic)
multi-threaded semantics yields the same result. We formalize this corollary (and mech-
anize its proof) in Chapter 3.
One of the most important consequences of these theorems is that principals run-
ning parallel to one another, and whose computations successfully terminate in the single-
threaded semantics, will be properly synchronized in the multi-threaded semantics; e.g.,
no principal will be stuck waiting for another one that will never arrive.
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For correspondence in the other direction (multi- to single-threaded), we can prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Correspondence of final configurations). Let Σ ` C : τ and slicew(C) ; π,
where w is the set of all principals. If π −→∗ π′, where π′ is an error-free terminated
protocol, then there exists an error-free terminated C ′ s.t. C −→∗ C ′ and slicew(C ′) ; π′.
We would like to prove a stronger, backward simulation result that also holds for
non-terminating programs, but unfortunately it does not hold because of the possibility of
errors and divergence. For example, when computing let x M= e1 in e2, the single-threaded
semantics could diverge or get an array access error in e1, and therefore may never get to
compute e2. However, in multi-threaded semantics, principals not in M are allowed to
make progress in e2. Thus, for those steps in the multi-threaded semantics, we cannot give
a corresponding source configuration. We plan to take up backward simulation (e.g., by
refining the semantics) as future work.
Security. As can be seen in Figure 2.19, the definition of the multi-threaded seman-
tics makes apparent that all inter-principal communication (and thus information leakage)
occurs via secure blocks. As such, all information flows between parties must occur via
secure blocks. These flows are made more apparent by Wysteria’s single-threaded se-
mantics, and are thus easier to understand. In Chapter 3, we enhance the Wysteria API





















Figure 2.21: Overview of Wysteria system with four interacting clients.
2.6 Implementation
We have implemented a tool chain for Wysteria, including a front-end, a type
checker, and a run-time interpreter. Our implementation is written in OCaml, and is
roughly 6000 lines of code. Our implementation supports the core calculus features (in
gentler syntax) and also has named records and conditionals. To run a Wysteria program,
each party invokes the interpreter with the program file and his principal name. If the pro-
gram type checks it is interpreted. The interpreter dynamically generates boolean circuits
from secure blocks it encounters, running them using Choi et al.’s implementation [11] of
the Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson (GMW) protocol [2], which provably simulates (in
the semi-honest setting) a trusted third party. Figure 2.21 gives a high-level overview of
Wysteria running for four clients (labeledA,B, C andD). The remainder of this section
discusses the implementation in detail.
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2.6.1 Type checker
The Wysteria type checker uses standard techniques to turn the declarative type
rules presented earlier into an algorithm (e.g., inlining uses of subsumption to make the
typing rules syntax-directed). We use the Z3 SMT solver [40] to discharge the refinement
implications, encoding sets using Z3’s theory of arrays. Since Z3 cannot reason about
the cardinality of sets encoded this way, we add support for singl(ν) as an uninterpreted
logical function single that maps sets to booleans. Facts about this function are added to
Z3 in the rule t-princ.
2.6.2 Interpreter
When the interpreter reaches a secure block it compiles that block to a circuit in
several steps. First, it must convert the block to straight-line code. It does this by expand-
ing wfold and waps expressions (according to the now available principal sets), inlining
function calls, and selectively substituting in non-wire and non-share variables from its
environment. The type system ensures that, thanks to synchrony, each party will arrive at
the same result.
Next, the interpreter performs a type-directed translation to a boolean circuit, taking
place in two phases. In the first phase, it assigns a set of wire IDs to each value and
expression, where the number of wires depends on the corresponding type. The wires are
stitched together using high-level operators (e.g., ADD r1 r2 r3, where r1, r2, and r3 are
ranges of wire IDs). As usual, we generate circuits for both branches of case expressions
and feed their results to a multiplexer switched by the compiled guard expression’s output
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wire. Records and wire bundles are simply an aggregation of their components. Wire IDs
are also assigned to the input and output variables of each principal—these are the free
wire and share variables that remained in the block after the first step.
In the second phase, each high-level operator (e.g. ADD) is translated to low-level
AND and XOR gates. Once again, the overall translation is assured to produce exactly
same circuit, including wire ID assignments, at each party. Each host’s interpreter also
translates its input values into bit representations. Once the circuit is complete it is written
to disk.
At this point, the interpreter signals a local server process originally forked when
the interpreter started. This server process implements the secure computation using the
GMW library. This process reads in the circuit from disk and coordinates with other
parties’ GMW servers using network sockets. At the end of the circuit execution, the server
dumps the final output to a file, and signals back the interpreter. The interpreter then reads
in the result, converts it to the internal representation, and carries on with parallel mode
execution (or terminates if complete).
2.6.3 Secure computation extensions and optimizations
The GMW library did not originally support secret shares, but they were easy to add.
We extended the circuit representation to designate particular wires as making shares (due
to makesh(v) expressions) and reconstituting shares (due to combsh(v) expressions). For
the former, we modified the library to dump the designated (random) wire value to disk—











































































Figure 2.22: (a) n-party MPC examples. (b) Secure median vs mixed-mode median. (c)
Secure PSI vs mixed-mode PSI for different density.
We also optimized the library’s Oblivious Transfer (OT) extension implementation for the
mixed-mode setting.
2.7 Evaluation
We conduct two sets of experiments to study Wysteria’s empirical performance.
First we measure the performance of several n-party example programs of our own design
and drawn from the literature. We find that these programs run relatively quickly and scale
well with the number of principals. Second, we reproduce two experiments from the liter-
ature that demonstrate the performance advantage of mixed-mode vs. monolithic secure
computation.5 Finally, we use Wysteria to program an MPC card dealing application.
2.7.1 Secure computations for n parties
We have implemented several n-party protocols as Wysteria functions that are
generic in the participating principal set (whose identity and size can both can vary). The
5We ran all our experiments on Mac OS X 10.9, with 2.8 GHz Intel Core Duo processor and 4GB
memory. To isolate the performance of Wysteria from that of I/O, all the principals run on the same host,
and network communication uses local TCP/IP sockets.
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Richest protocol computes the richest principal, as described in Section 2.1. The GPS pro-
tocol computes, for each participating principal, the other principal that is nearest to their
location; everyone learns their nearest neighbor without knowing anyone’s exact location.
The Auction protocol computes the high bidder among a set of participating principals,
as well as the second-highest bid, which is revealed to everyone; only the auction holder
learns who is the winning bidder. We have also implemented the two-round bidding game
from Section 2.1 for multiple principals. Recall that this example crucially relies on Wys-
teria’s notion of secret shares, a high-level abstraction that existing MPC languages lack.
Figure 2.22(a) shows, for varying numbers of principals, the elapsed time to compute
these functions. We can see each of these computations is relatively fast and scales well
with increasing numbers of parties.
2.7.2 Mixed-mode secure computations
To investigate the performance advantages of mixed-mode secure computations, we
study two functions that mix modes: two-party median computes the median of two prin-
cipals’ elements, and two-party intersect is a PSI protocol that computes the intersection
of two principals’ elements. In both cases, we compare the mixed-mode version of the
protocol with the secure-only versions, which like FairplayMP [18], only use a single
monolithic secure block. We chose these protocols because they have been studied in past
literature on secure computation [5, 7, 33]; both protocols enjoy the property that by mix-
ing modes, certain computation steps in the secure-only version can either be off-loaded
to local computation (as in median) or avoided altogether (as in intersect), while providing
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let m =sec({A,B})=
let x1 = (fst w1[A]) in let x2 = (snd w1[A]) in
let y1 = (fst w2[B]) in let y2 = (snd w2[B]) in
let b1 = x1 ≤ y1 in
let x3 = if b1 then x2 else x1 in
let y3 = if b1 then y1 else y2 in
let b2 = x3 ≤ y3 in
if b2 then x3 else y3
in m
Figure 2.23: Monolithic median example in Wysteria
the same privacy guarantees.
Mixed-mode median. Figure 2.23 shows a simplified version of median that accepts
two numbers from each party.
The participating principals A and B store their (sorted, distinct) input pairs in wire
bundles w1 and w2 such that w1 contains A and B’s smaller numbers and w2 contains their
larger ones. First, the protocol compares the smaller numbers. Depending on this compar-
ison, the protocol discards one input for each principal. Then, it compares the remaining
two numbers and the smaller one is chosen as the median (thus preferring the lower-ranked
element when there is an even number).
Under certain common assumptions [33], the mixed-mode version from Figure 2.24
equivalently computes median with the same security properties.
The key difference compared with the secure-only version is that the conditional
assignments on lines 3 and 4 need not be done securely. Rather, the protocol reveals b1
and b2, allowing each principal to perform these steps locally. As we show in Chapter 4,
this change still preserves the final knowledge profile of each party, and is thus equally
secure in the semi-honest setting [33].
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let w1 =par(A,B)= (wire {A} x1) ++(wire {B} y1) in
let b1 =sec(A B)= (w1[A] ≤ w1[B]) in
let x3 =par(A)= if b1 then x2 else x1 in
let y3 =par(B)= if b1 then y1 else y2 in
let w2 =par(A,B)= (wire {A} x3) ++(wire {B} y3) in
let b2 =sec(A,B)= (w2[A] ≤ w2[B]) in
let m =sec(A,B)= if b2 then w2[A] else w2[B] in
m
Figure 2.24: Mixed-mode median example in Wysteria
Figure 2.22(b) compares the performance of mixed-mode median over secure-only
median for varying sizes of inputs (generalizing the program above).
We can see that the elapsed time for mixed-mode median remains comparatively
fixed, even as input sizes increase exponentially. By comparison, secure-only median
scales poorly with increasing input sizes. This performance difference illustrates the (some-
times dramatic) benefit of supporting mixed-mode computations.
Private set intersection. In intersect, two principals compute the intersection of their
private sets. The set sizes are assumed to be public knowledge. As with median, the intersect
protocol can be coded in two ways: a secure-only pairwise comparison protocol performs
n1×n2 comparisons inside the secure block which result from the straight-line expansion
of two nested loops. Huang et al. [7] propose two optimizations to this naive pairwise
comparison protocol. First, when a matching element is found, the inner loop can be short
circuited, avoiding its remaining iterations. Second, once an index in the inner loop is
known to have a match, it need not be compared in the rest of the computation. We refer
the reader to their paper for further explanation. We note that Wysteria allows program-
mers to easily express these optimizations in the language, using built-in primitives for
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expressing parallel-mode loops and arrays.
Figure 2.22(c) compares the secure-only and mixed-mode versions of intersect. For
the mixed-mode version, we consider three different densities of matching elements: 0.5,
0.75, and 0.95 (where half, three-quarters, and 95% of the elements are held in common).
For the unoptimized version, these densities do not affect performance, since it always
executes all program paths, performing comparisons for every pair of input elements. As
can be seen in the figure, as the density of matching elements increases, the mixed-mode
version is far more performant, even for larger input sizes. By contrast, the optimization
fails to improve performance at lower densities, as the algorithm starts to exhibit quadratic-
time behavior (as in the secure-only version).
2.7.3 MPC program for card dealing
We have implemented a generic n-party card dealing MPC application using Wys-
teria. In the application, each party maintains secret shares of already dealt cards in an
array. Secret shares ensure that no single-party can make sense of the cards on their own,
yet, the parties can combine their secret shares and recover the dealt cards in secure com-
putations. To deal a new card, parties enter a secure computation with a random number
as each party’s input. In the computation, the parties compute the sum of their random
numbers modulo 52. The computation returns secret shares of this value, which is the
potential new card, to each party. To ensure the freshness of the new card, parties enter a
loop where in the i-th loop iteration they perform a secure computation to check that the
previously dealt i-th card is different from the new card. If the new card is indeed unique,
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it is returned in clear to the party it was dealt for (and every party stores secret shares of
this card), if the card is not unique, they repeat the algorithm.
To gain more experience with the usability of Wysteria, we also built a user inter-
face for the card dealing application. Since Wysteria is a standalone DSL with no GUI
libraries etc., we had to use some other language for GUI programming. We chose the
Racket language [45] for this purpose. We designed the Wysteria card dealing program
and the Racket GUI to run as separate processes communicating using UNIX pipes. We
first added a sysop functionality to Wysteria for invoking generic shell commands (us-
ing the UNIX command line). When Wysteria application is started, it starts the Racket
GUI as another process, and sends it the local principal’s name. It then waits for a message
from the Racket GUI indicating that the user has initiated the card dealing. The Racket
GUI sends this message to the Wysteria application when the user presses a Deal button
on the GUI. Once every user has pressed the button on their local ends, their correspond-
ing Wysteria program instances then deal five cards each using MPC, and send their own
cards to the local Racket GUI process, which then renders the cards.6
In building this application, it became clear to us that to make Wysteria more us-
able, we needed to embed it in a rich host language, so that the application code other
than the core MPC part (GUI etc.) can be programmed in the host language, and Wys-
teria code can be more seamlessly integrated with it. The next chapter presents such an
embedding of Wysteria in a more general-purpose programming language.
6The Racket code for this application was programmed by Rebecca MacKenzie, an undergraduate visit-
ing student at the time.
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2.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented Wysteria, a new MPC DSL for writing mixed-mode
secure multi-party computations. Wysteria provides high-level abstractions with a con-
ceptual single-threaded semantics that can be used to reason about the correctness and
security properties of the Wysteria programs.
We formalized the Wysteria syntax and type system. We also formalized two op-
erational semantics for Wysteria, a single-threaded specification semantics and an actual
multi-threaded protocol semantics. We proved several theorems about Wysteria, par-
ticularly a type soundness theorem and a forward simulation theorem that establishes the
correspondence between the two Wysteria semantics.
We presented an implementation of Wysteria, and its evaluation on several bench-
marks, including a novel card dealing MPC application. Our experiments show that Wys-
teria abstractions are high-level, easy-to-use, and enable writing rich applications.
In the next chapter, we enhance Wysteria capabilities to (a) enable formal reason-
ing about the correctness and security properties of MPC programs, (b) provide a partially
verified toolchain, and (c) include more language features such as datatypes and libraries
for I/O, GUIs, etc.
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Chapter 3: Wys?: A Verified Language Extension for Mixed-mode MPC
Wysteria significantly advances the state-of-the-art of the MPC DSLs. With its
formalized conceptual single-threaded semantics, it enables the programmers to write and
reason about MPCs like a single-threaded program, while the Wysteria metatheory guar-
antees that the reasoning also applies to the actual protocol runs. Yet, Wysteria has its
limitations. Since an MPC program computes on parties’ sensitive, private data, it is de-
sirable for the parties to be able to formally reason that the program computes the correct
function and is sufficiently privacy preserving, i.e. it does not reveal more than the in-
tended information about their inputs. Wysteria provides only lightweight, informal rea-
soning capabilities. Furthermore, reasoning about the source MPC programs only is not
enough. Ultimately, the programs are executed by the MPC toolchain, and security bugs in
the toolchain can compromise the privacy of parties’ inputs. Formal verification [24–31]
significantly reduces the occurrence of correctness and security bugs in the software. Still,
the Wysteria toolchain is not verified. Finally, as we pointed out at the end of Chapter 2,
Wysteria, being a standalone DSL, lacks the elements of a full-featured programming
language such as datatypes, GUI libraries and so on. We also note that none of the exist-
ing MPC toolchains provide the verification of source MPC programs and (even partially)
verified toolchain.
68
This chapter presents Wys?, which addresses these problems. Wys? is an embed-
ding of Wysteria in F? [37], a verification-oriented, full-featured programming language.
Wys? solves the problems above in the following manner.
First, Wys? programs are essentially F? programs written against an MPC library
that exports the Wysteria API. And so, programmers can formally verify their Wys?
MPC programs by using the F?’s type-and-effect system to specify the correctness and se-
curity properties, and F?’s semi-automated verification facilities to prove that the programs
satisfy those properties. As an example, for the optimized PSI program [7] and the opti-
mized median program [5], we have proved that the extra rounds of secure computations
and message exchanges do not reveal anything more than the final result.
Second, Wys? provides a partially verified interpreter to run the MPC programs.
We implement the custom Wysteria semantics (the actual multi-threaded protocol se-
mantics) by defining an interpreter in F? that operates over Wys? abstract syntax trees
(ASTs), defined as a datatype; these trees are produced by running the F? compiler (in a
special mode) on the extended source program. We formalize the two operational seman-
tics for Wysteria (Section 2.4) in F? and mechanize the proofs that the single-threaded
semantics is sound with respect to the distributed semantics, and that the distributed se-
mantics is correctly implemented by our interpreter. As a result, we have verified that the
properties we prove about the Wysteria-extended F? source programs hold for the multi-
party programs that actually run. We have not yet verified the circuit library that compiles
Wys? ASTs to circuits and run them using the GMW protocol [11]. Formal verification
of GMW is an open problem, and we leave it for future work.
Finally, Wys? embedding allows MPC programs to use, with no extra effort, stan-
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dard language features (such as datatypes) and libraries (such as for I/O) directly from F?.
Wys? provides a Foreign Function Interface (FFI) that enables MPC programs to seam-
lessly integrate with the F? code. As a pleasant side-effect, the embedding also simplifies
the Wysteria language design substantially making it more standard and streamlined, we
point out the simplifications as we present Wys? details.
We first present a primer on F? (Section 3.1), followed by an overview of Wys? with
the help of some examples (Section 3.2). We then formalize Wys? and its (mechanically
verified) metatheory (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 present implementation
and evaluation of Wys?.
3.1 F? primer
F? is an ML-like functional language, but with a more expressive type system based
on dependent refinement types and monadic effects. Programmers can use F? types to ex-
press precise and compact specifications, including the correctness and security properties
of their programs. The F? type checker then attempts to prove that the programs meet their
specifications by generating proof obligations (using a weakest precondition calculus) and
discharging them with the help of an SMT solver (e.g. Z3 [40]).
F? supports the verification of effectful code (e.g. code that uses State and Ex-
ceptions) by having a monadic type system where each monad is indexed with pre- and
post-conditions. F? has primitive support for commonly used effects such as State and
Exception, but the programmer can also define domain-specific effects and use them for
verifying domain-specific programs.
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For example, to verify stateful code, F? provides an ST monad. The ST monad is
indexed with a return type – the return type of an ST computation, a pre-condition – a
predicate on the input state, and a post-condition – a predicate on the input state, the return
value, and the output state. Programmers can annotate stateful computations with types
in the ST monad, and the F? type checker can type-check the specifications. Consider a
function that increments the contents of an int reference:
let incr r = r := !r + 1
A possible type for the incr function is:
val incr: r:ref int→ST unit (fun s0→True) (fun s0 u s1→ sel s0 r ≥ 0 =⇒ sel s1 r ≥ 0)
The type says that the incr function takes a ref int as an argument and performs a state-
ful computation, we can see the ST monad indexed with the return type of the computation
(unit) and a pre- and post-condition. The function fun s0→True is the (trivial) pre-condition
predicate on the input state s0 (fun x→ e defines an anonymous function with argument x
and body e). (fun s0 u s1→ sel s0 r ≥ 0 =⇒ sel s1 r ≥ 0) is the post-condition predicate on the
input state s0, the return value u, and the final state s1. The specification states that if in the
input state, reference r contains a non-negative integer (sel s0 r ≥ 0), then in the final state
also r contains a non-negative integer (sel s1 r ≥ 0).
This specification is quite weak. Neither does it capture the precise relation between
the contents of r before and after the incr function, nor does it capture the fact that incr does
not change any other location in the input state. Indeed, we can give incr a stronger type
that captures these properties:
val incr: r:ref int→ST unit (fun s0→True) (fun s0 u s1→ s1 = upd s0 r (sel s0 r + 1))
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of a Wys? deployment
This specification says that the output state s1 is same as the input state s0, except at
location r where the content of r is incremented by 1.
For both the specifications above, the F? type checker generates a verification con-
dition as a proof obligation, and proves it using the SMT solver.
3.2 Verified programming in Wys?
We now present an overview of Wys?. Wys? inherits the basic programming model
from Wysteria (Chapter 2). We will illustrate it using an example. Consider a dating
application that enables its users to compute their common interests without revealing all
their private interests to one another. This is an instance of the private set intersection (PSI)
problem. We illustrate the main concepts of Wys? by showing, in several stages, how to
program, optimize, verify and deploy this application—Figure 3.1 provides an overview.
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3.2.1 Secure computations with as sec
Similar to Wysteria, in Wys?, an MPC is written as a single specification which
executes in one of two computation modes. The sec mode specifies a secure computation to
be carried out among multiple parties. Here is the private set intersection example written
in Wys?:
let psi a b input a input b =
as sec {a,b} (fun ()→
let r = List.intersect (reveal input a) (reveal input b)
give a r ++give b r)
The four arguments to psi are, respectively, principal identifiers for Alice and Bob,
and Alice and Bob’s inputs, expressed as lists. The as sec ps f construct indicates that thunk
f should be run in sec mode. Essentially as sec construct in Wys? plays the role of secure
delegation from Wysteria. In this mode, the code may jointly access the secrets of the
principals ps. In this case, we jointly intersect input a and input b, the inputs of a and b, and
then return the same result r to both a and b.
Outside of sec mode, Alice would not be permitted to see Bob’s input, and vice versa,
but inside both can be made visible using the reveal coercion. Note that we did not have
such a coercion in Wysteria, instead Wysteria type system prohibited using the private
inputs from other parties using a custom typing judgment form that tracked the access
mode of variables (Figure 2.3). F?, being a general-purpose language, has a more standard
typing judgment. Therefore, Wys? uses explicit coercions to enforce the access control.
Specifically, private values of parties are sealed, and need to be explicitly revealed before
use. During reveal, the Wys? API checks the current mode to ensure that it is allowed to
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reveal the value. We provide more details on sealed values later in the section.
Coming back to the example, finally the code constructs a wire bundle, associating
a result for each principal (which in this case is the same)—give p v builds a singleton wire
bundle p 7→ v and ++ concatenates disjoint wire bundles. Again, the concept of wire
bundles is same as that in Wysteria.
Running this code requires the following steps. First, we run the F? compiler in a
special mode that extracts the above code, psi.fst, into the Wys? AST as a data structure in
psi.ml. Wys? has only a few constructs of its own, like as sec (the full syntax is in Figure 3.5
in Section 3.3), and these are extracted to Wys?-specific nodes. The rest of a program’s
code is extracted into FFI nodes that indicate the use of, or calls into, functionality pro-
vided by F? itself.
The next step is for each party, Alice and Bob, to run the extracted program using
the Wys? interpreter. This interpreter is written in F? and provably implements a deep
embedding of the F? semantics, also specified in F? (shown in Figures 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10
in Section 3.3). This interpreter is extracted to OCaml code by a standard F? process.
When each party reaches as sec ps f, the interpreter’s back-end compiles f, on-the-fly, for
particular values of the secrets in f’s environment, to a boolean circuit. First-order, loop-
free code can be compiled to a circuit; Wys? provides specialized support for several
common combinators (e.g., List.mem, List.nth etc.).
The circuit is handed to the GMW library, that we used in Chapter 2, by Choi et
al. [11]. Running the protocol at each party starts by confirming that they wish to run the
same circuit, and then proceeds by generating (XOR-based) secret shares [46] for each
party’s secret inputs. Running the GMW protocol involves evaluating the boolean circuit
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for f over the secret shares, involving communication between the parties for each AND-
gate.
One obvious question is how both parties are able to get this process off the ground,
running this program of four inputs, when only three of the inputs are known to them (the
principals and their own input). In Wys?, values specific to each principal are sealed with
the principal’s name (which appears in the sealed container’s type). As such, the types
of input a and input b are, respectively, list (sealed {a} int) and list (sealed {b} int). When the
program is run on Alice’s host, the former will be a list of n of Alice’s values, whereas
the latter will be a list of n garbage values (which we denote as •). The reverse will be
true on Bob’s host. When the circuit is constructed, each principal links their non-garbage
values to the relevant input wires of the circuit. Likewise, they populate a local copy of
the output wire bundle with what is returned to them, with other principals’ components
absent from the wire bundle.
We would like MPC’s like psi to be called from normal F? programs. For example,
we would like the logic for a dating application, which involves reading inputs, displaying
results, etc. to be able to call into psi to compute common interests. To achieve this, Wys?
provides a way to compute a “single-party projection” of multi-party functions, i.e., a
version of psi that can be called with just a single party’s inputs. The other party’s inputs
are filled in with sealed garbage values, as described above. Calling this function from F?
code also kicks off the Wys? interpreter, so that it can run psi as described above. When
the interpreter completes, the result is returned and the F? program can continue. We note
that our Wysteria DSL implementation in Chapter 2 was standalone and lacked elements
of a full-featured programming language, such as datatypes and I/O libraries.
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3.2.2 Optimizing PSI with as par
Although psi gets the job done, it turns out to be inefficient (as we have already seen
in Section 2.7). Better implementations of PSI involve performing a mixed-mode compu-
tation, where each participant evaluates some local computations in parallel (e.g., iterating
over the elements of their sets) interleaved with small amounts of jointly evaluated, cryp-
tographically secure computations. Wys?’s second computation mode, called par mode,
supports such mixed-mode computation. In particular, the construct as par ps f states that
each principal in ps should locally execute the thunk f, simultaneously (any principal not in
the set ps simply skips the expression). Within f, principals may engage in secure compu-
tations via as sec. Essentially as par construct in Wys? plays the role of parallel delegation
in Wysteria.
Figure 3.2 shows the optimized version of PSI [7], which uses as par. The function
psi opt (line 12) begins by using as par involving Alice and Bob. In the provided thunk, each
principal calls for each alice la lb, which in turn calls check each bob a lb, for each element a
of Alice’s list la. Secure computation occurs at the use of as sec at line 8. Within the
circuit, Alice and Bob securely compare their values ax and bx, and gather a list (list bool).
There is one outer list for each of Alice’s elements, the ith inner list contains comparisons
of Alice’s ith value with some of Bob’s values—rather than comparing each of Alice’s
elements with all of Bob’s, the code is optimized (as described below) to omit redundant
comparisons. At line 13, both parties build a matrix of comparisons from the boolean
lists. Alice inspects the rows of the matrix (line 14) to determine which of her elements
are in the intersection; Bob inspects the columns (line 15); and the joint function gives a
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1 let rec for each alice a b la lb =
2 if la=[] then []
3 else let lb, r = check each bob a b (List.hd la) lb in
4 r::for each alice a b (List.tl la) lb
5 and check each bob a b ax lb =
6 if lb=[] then [], []
7 else let bx = List.hd lb in
8 let r = as sec {a,b} (fun ()→ reveal ax = reveal bx) in
9 if r then List.tl lb, [r]
10 else let lb’, r’ = check each bob a b ax (List.tl lb) in
11 bx::lb’, r::r’
12 let psi opt a b la lb = as par {a,b} (fun ()→
13 let bs = build matrix (for each alice la lb) in
14 let ia = as par {a} (fun ()→ filteri (contains true ◦ row bs) la) in
15 let ib = as par {b} (fun ()→ filteri (contains true ◦ col bs) lb) in
16 give a ia ++give b ib)
Figure 3.2: Optimized PSI example in Wys?
result to each principal (line 16).
The optimizations are at line 9. Once we detect that element ax is in the intersec-
tion, we return immediately instead of comparing ax against the remaining elements of lb.
Furthermore, we remove bx from lb, excluding it from any future comparisons with other
elements of Alice’s set la. Since la and lb are representations of sets (no repeats), all the
excluded comparisons are guaranteed to be false.
One might wonder whether we could have programmed most of this code normal
F?, relying on just sec mode for the circuit evaluation. However, recalling that our goal
is to formally reason about the code and prove it correct and secure, par mode provides
significant benefits. In particular, the SIMD model provided by Wys? (and Wysteria)
enables us to capture many invariants for free. For example, proving the correctness of
psi opt requires reasoning that both participants iterate their loops in lock step—Wys? as-
sures this by construction. Besides, the code would be harder to write (and read) if it were
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split across multiple functions or files. As a general guideline, we use F? for code written
from the view of a single principal, and Wys? when programming for all principals at
once, and rely on the FFI to mediate between the two.
3.2.3 Embedding a type system for Wys? in F?
Using the abstractions provided by Wysteria, designing various high-level, multi-
party computation protocols is relatively easy. However, before deploying such protocols,
three important questions arise.
1. Is the protocol realizable? For example, does a computation that is claimed to be
executed only by some principals ps (e.g., using an as par ps or an as sec ps) only ever
access data belonging to ps?
2. Does the protocol correctly implement the desired functionality? For example, does
it correctly compute the intersection of Alice and Bob’s sets?
3. Is the protocol secure? For example, do the optimizations of the previous section that
omit certain comparisons inadvertently also release information besides the final
answer?
While Wysteria type system addresses the first of the three questions, it provides
only on-paper reasoning capabilities for the next two. By embedding Wysteria in F? and
leveraging its type system, we address each of these three questions.
Our strategy is to make use of F?’s extensible, monadic dependent type-and-effect
system to define a new indexed monad (called Wys) and use it to describe precise trace prop-
erties of Wysteria multi-party computations. Additionally, we make use of an abstract
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type, sealed ps t, representing a value accessible only to the principals in ps. Combining the
Wys monad with the sealed type, we encode a form of information-flow control to ensure
that protocols are realizable.
The Wys monad provides several features. First, all DSL code is typed in this monad,
encapsulating it from the rest of F?. Within the monad, computations and their specifica-
tions can make use of two kinds of ghost state: modes and traces. The mode of a compu-
tation indicates whether the computation is running in an as par or in an as sec context. The
trace of a computation records the sequence and nesting structure of messages exchanged
between parties as they jointly execute as sec expressions—the result of a computation and
its trace constitute its observable behavior. The Wys monad is, in essence, the product of
a reader monad on modes and a writer monad on traces.
We note that while Wysteria (Chapter 2) had the same two computation modes, it
lacked the formal notion of traces.
Formally, we define the following types of modes and traces. A mode Mode m ps is
pair of a mode tag (either Par or Sec) and a set of principals ps. A trace is a forest of trace
element (telt) trees. The leaves of the trees record messages TMsg x that are received as the
result of executing an as sec block. The tree structure represented by the TScope ps t nodes
record the set of principals that are able to observe the messages in the trace t.
type mtag = Par | Sec
type mode = Mode: m:mtag→ ps:prins→mode
type telt =
| TMsg : x:α→ telt
| TScope: ps:prins→ t:list telt→ telt
type trace = list telt
Every Wys? computation e has a monadic computation type Wys t pre post (similar
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to the ST monad from Section 3.1). The type indicates that e is in the Wys monad (so it
may perform multi-party computations); t is its result type; pre is a pre-condition on the
mode in which e may be executed; and post is a post-condition relating the computation’s
mode, its result value, and its trace of observable events. When run in a context with mode
m satisfying the pre-condition predicate pre m, e may send and receive message according
to some trace tr, and if and when it returns, the result is a t-typed value v validating the
post-condition predicate post m v tr. The style of indexing a monad with a computation’s
pre- and post-condition is a standard technique [37,47,48]—we focus on the specifications
of combinators specific to Wys?.
We now describe some of the Wysteria-specific combinators in Wys?, and how we
give them types in F?. The complete API is shown in Figure 3.4.
Defining as sec in Wys?.
1 val as sec: ps:prins→ f:(unit→Wys a pre post)→Wys a
2 (requires (fun m→m=Mode Par ps ∧ pre (Mode Sec ps)))
3 (ensures (fun m r tr→ tr=[TMsg r] ∧ post (Mode Sec ps) r [])))
The type of as sec captures the Wysteria type system invariants for secure delega-
tion, and provides post-condition invariants about the computation results and traces. It
is dependent on the first parameter, ps. Its second argument f is the thunk to be evaluated
in as sec mode. The result’s computation type has the form Wys a (requires φ) (ensures ψ), for
some pre-condition and post-condition predicates φ andψ, respectively. The free variables
in the type (a, pre and post) are implicitly universally quantified (at the front); we use the
requires and ensures keywords for readability—they are not semantically significant.
The pre-condition of as sec is a predicate on the mode m of the computation in whose
context as sec ps f is called. For all the ps to jointly execute f, we require all of them to transi-
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tion to perform the as sec ps f call simultaneously, i.e., the current mode must be Mode Par ps.
We also require the pre-condition pre of f to be valid once the mode has transitioned to
Mode Sec ps—line 2 says just this.
The post-condition of as sec is a predicate relating the initial mode m, the result r:a,
and the trace tr of the computation. Line 3 states that the trace of a secure computation
as sec ps f is just a singleton [TMsg r], reflecting that its execution reveals only result r.1 It
also ensures that the result r is related to the mode in which f is run (Mode Sec ps) and the
empty trace [] (since f has no observables) according to post, the post-condition of f.
A limitation of our current embedding is that it does not enforce invariants related
to the first-order inputs, etc., that help ensure that at runtime the secure computation can
be successfully compiled to a boolean circuit (Section 2.3). Instead, Wys? toolchain gives
a runtime error.
Access control with sealed types. To ensure that a program never relies on computing
with data that it cannot access, we type secrets belonging to a set of principals ps using the
type sealed ps t. This is an abstract type manipulated only according to the interface shown
in Figure 3.3, a variation on a previous, translucent abstractions pattern used in F? [37].
The type sealed ps t encapsulates a t value. To extract the underlying value, on can
either call unseal or reveal. The unseal function is marked Ghost—meaning that it can only
be called in specifications. In their types, the first parameter ps is marked as an implicit
parameter, using the # notation. On the other hand, reveal can be called in concrete Wys-
teria programs, although with constraints on the mode. Its pre-condition says that when
executing in Mode Par ps’, all current participants must be listed in the seal, i.e., ps’ ⊆ ps.
1This is the “ideal functionality” ensured by the backend, e.g., GMW.
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type sealed : prins→Type→Type
val unseal: #ps:prins→ sealed ps α→Ghost α
val seal: ps:prins→ x:α→Wys (sealed ps α)
(requires (fun m→ ps ⊆ m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ x=unseal r ∧ tr=[]))
val reveal: #ps:prins→ x:sealed ps α→Wys α
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Par =⇒ m.ps ⊆ ps ∧
m.mode=Sec =⇒ m.ps ∩ ps 6= ∅))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r=unseal a ∧ tr=[]))
Figure 3.3: Access control with sealed types
However, when executing in Mode Sec ps’, only a subset of current participants is required:
ps’ ∩ ps 6= ∅. This is because the secure computation is executed for all of ps’, so it can
access any of their individual data. Creating sealed values using seal is straightforward.
In both cases, the post-condition says that there are no observable events and that
the returned value is the underlying value in the seal (produced by unseal). Recall that
Wysteria does not have corresponding constructs. There access control is implemented
using mode annotations in type environment bindings (Section 2.3).
We show the complete Wys? API in Figure 3.4 for reference. Wire bundle rules will
be explained in the context of single-threaded operational semantics in Section 3.3.3.
3.2.4 Correctness and security verification
Using the Wys monad and the sealed type, we can write down precise types for our psi
program, proving various useful properties. We discuss the statements of the main lemmas
we prove and the proof structure. By programming the protocols using the high-level
abstractions provided by Wys?, our proofs are relatively straightforward. In particular, we
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val as sec: ps:prins→ f:(unit→Wys a pre post)→Wys a
(requires (fun m→m=Mode Par ps ∧ pre (Mode Sec ps)))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ tr=[TMsg r] ∧ post (Mode Sec ps) r [])))
val as par: ps:prins→ (unit→Wys a pre post)→Wys (sealed ps a)
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Par ∧ ps ⊆ m.ps ∧ can seal ps a ∧ pre (Mode Par ps)))
(ensures (fun m r tr→∃t. tr=[TScope ps t] ∧ post (Mode Par ps) (unseal r) t)))
type sealed : prins→Type→Type
val unseal: #ps:prins→ sealed ps α→Ghost α
val seal: ps:prins→ x:α→Wys (sealed ps α)
(requires (fun m→ ps ⊆ m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ x=unseal r ∧ tr=[]))
val reveal: #ps:prins→ x:sealed ps α→Wys α
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Par =⇒ m.ps ⊆ ps ∧ m.mode=Sec =⇒ m.ps ∩ ps 6= ∅))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r=unseal a ∧ tr=[]))
type wire : prins→Type→Type
(∗ we omit the signatures and axioms for ghost select, contains, join, and const wire functions on wires ∗)
(∗ type eprins is also a set of principals, but unlike prins, it admits the empty set ∗)
val mkwire p: #ps1:prins→ eps:eprins→ x:sealed α ps1→Wys (wire α eps)
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Par ∧ eps ⊆ ps1 ∧ eps ⊆ m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r = const wire eps (unseal x) ∧ tr = []))
val mkwire s: eps:eprins→ x:α→Wys (wire α eps)
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Sec ∧ eps ⊆ m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r = const wire eps x ∧ tr = []))
val project: #eps:eprins→ p:prin→ x:wire α eps{contains p x} →Wys α
(requires (fun m→m.mode=Par =⇒ m.ps = singleton p ∧ m.mode=Sec =⇒ mem p m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r = select p x ∧ tr = []))
val concat: #epsx:eprins→ #epsy:eprins→ x:wire α epsx→ y:wire α epsy →Wys (wire α (epsx ∪ epsy))
(requires (fun m→ disjoint (dom x) (dom y)))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ r = join x y ∧ tr = [])
Figure 3.4: Wys? API in F?
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rely heavily on the view that both parties execute (different fragments of) the same code.
In contrast, reasoning directly against the low-level message passing semantics would be
much more unwieldy. In Section 3.3, by formalizing the connection between the high- and
low-level semantics, we justify our source-level reasoning.
We present the structure of the security and correctness proof for psi opt by showing
the top-level specification for psi opt:
val psi opt : la:list (sealed Alice int)→ lb:list (sealed Bob int)
→Wys (wire {Alice,Bob} (list int))
(requires (fun m→m=Mode Par {Alice, Bob} ∧
no dups la ∧ no dups lb))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ let ia = as set (Wire.get r Alice) in
let ib = as set (Wire.get r Bob) in
ia = ib ∧ ia = (as set la ∩ as set lb) ∧
tr = psi opt trace la lb))
The signature above establishes that when Alice and Bob simultaneously execute
psi opt (they start together in Par mode), with lists la and lb containing their secrets (without
any duplicates), then if and when the protocol terminates, they both obtain that same re-
sults ia and ib corresponding to the intersection of their sets, i.e., the protocol is functionally
correct.
To prove properties beyond functional correctness, we also prove that the trace of
observable events from a run of psi la lb is described by the function psi opt trace la lb. This
is a purely specification function that, in effect, records each of the boolean results of every
as sec comparison performed during a run of psi—it has the same structure as for each alice
and check each bob.
Given a full characterization of the observable behavior of psi opt trace la lb in terms
of its inputs, we can prove optimizations correct using relational reasoning [49] and we
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can also prove security hyperproperties [50] by relating traces from multiple runs of the
protocol.
Our goal is to prove a noninterference with delimited release [51] property for psi opt.
Our attacker model is the “honest-but-curious” model where the attackers are the partici-
pants in the protocol themselves. That is, we assume that the participants in the protocol
play their roles faithfully, but they are motivated to deduce as much as they can about the
other participants’ secrets by observing the protocol. We do not aim to prove security
properties against a third-party network adversary.
For psi, from the perspective of Alice as the attacker, we aim prove that for two runs
of the protocol in which Alice’s input is constant but Bob’s varies, Alice learns no more by
observing the the protocol trace than what she is allowed to. Covering Bob’s perspective
symmetrically, we show that in two runs of psi la0 lb0 and psi la1 lb1 that satisfy formula Ψ
below, the traces observed by Alice and Bob are indistinguishable, up to permutation,
where la0, la1, lb0, lb1 have type lset int, the type of integer sets represented as lists.
Ψ la0 la1 lb0 lb1 = intersect la0 lb0 = intersect la1 lb1 ∧
length la0 = length la1 ∧ length lb0 = length lb1
In other words, Alice and Bob learns no more than the intersection of their sets and
the size of the other’s set; Ψ is the predicate that delimits the information released by the
protocol. As far as we are aware, this is the first formal proof of correctness and security
of Huang et al.’s optimized, private set-intersection protocol.2
The proof is in the style of a step-wise refinement, via psi, an inefficient variant
2 In carrying out this proof, it becomes evident that Alice and Bob learn the size of each other’s sets.
One can compose psi opt with other protocols to partially hide the size—Wys? makes it easy to compose
protocols simply by composing their functions.
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of the psi opt program. Running psi la lb always involves doing exactly length la ∗ length lb
comparisons in two nested loops. We prove the following relational security property for
psi, relating the traces trace psi la0 lb0 and trace psi la1 lb1—the formal statement of the lemma
we prove in F? is shown below.
val psi is secure: la0: → lb0: → la1: → lb1: → Lemma
(requires (Ψ la0 la1 lb0 lb1))
(ensures (permutation (trace psi la0 lb0) (trace psi la1 lb1)))
We reason about the traces of psi only up to permutation. Given that Alice has no
prior knowledge of the choice of representation of Bob’s set (Bob can shuffle his list), the
traces Alice observes are equivalent up to permutation—we can formalize this observation
using a probabilistic, relational variant of F? [52], but have yet to do so.
As a next step, we prove that optimizing psi to psi opt is secure by showing that there
exists a function f, such that for any trace tr=trace psi la lb, the trace of psi opt, trace psi opt la lb,
can be computed by f (length la) tr. In other words, the trace produced psi opt la lb can be
computed using a function of information already available to Alice (or Bob) when she
(or he) observes a run of the secure, unoptimized version psi la lb. As such, the optimiza-
tions do not reveal further information.
3.2.5 Relating security proofs to cryptographic security
The security proofs in Wys? correspond to the idealized model, where the parties
directly see only the final output of a secure computation. This is evident from the specifi-
cation of the as sec API – only the final output is added to the trace of observable events. To
relate the proof to the actual implementation, we assume that the underlying cryptographic
protocol (e.g. GMW in our implementation) is secure, and then appeal to the composition
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theorem by Canetti [53] to establish that the program securely realizes the mixed-mode
(also known as reactive) functionality given by the specification.
3.3 Wys? formalization
In the previous section, we presented examples of verifying properties about Wys?
programs using F?’s logic. However, these programs are not executed using the F? (single-
threaded) semantics; instead they have a distributed semantics carried out by multiple
parties. So, how do the properties that we verify using F? carry over to the actual runs?
In this section, we present the metatheory that answers this question. First, we for-
malize the Wys? single-threaded (ST) semantics, arguing that it faithfully realizes the F?
semantics, including the Wys? API presented in Section 3.2. Next, we formalize the dis-
tributed (DS) semantics that the multiple parties use to run Wys? programs. Our theorems
establish the correspondence between the two semantics, thereby ensuring that the prop-
erties that we verify using F? carry over to the actual protocol runs. We have mechanized
all the metatheory presented in this section in F?.
3.3.1 Comparison with Wysteria formalization
Many of the Wys? constructs are similar to Wysteria. As we have already seen,
as par and as sec in Wys? correspond to the parallel and secure delegations from Wysteria.
However, Wys? considerably simplifies the language design. To enforce access control,
as we have already seen, Wys? uses sealed values, an abstraction that is not present in
Wysteria. Since sealed values abstraction provides explicit access control, instead of
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using non-standard runtime environments that carry a mode annotation with each vari-
able to value mapping (Section 2.4.1), Wys? uses standard environments with no mode
annotations. Wys? also introduces the formal notion of traces.
In Wys?, we have also considerably simplified the operational semantics rules re-
lated to the secure blocks entry and exit. Recall that in Wysteria, we modeled a two-phase
secure blocks entry and exit (Section 2.4.2). In Wys?, we instead model a single-phase
entry and exit, where each party simultaneously steps in and out of the secure block. We
also omit the wire combinators waps, wapp, and wfold in Wys?, and use general fix-points
instead.
In terms of metatheory, we have mechanically verified the Wys? metatheory (se-
mantics correspondence theorem, and a new theorem that relates the terminating runs in
the single-threaded semantics to terminating runs in the protocol semantics). In contrast,
Wysteria metatheoretic proofs were only “on-paper”.
Currently Wys? has certain limitations also. In terms of compilation to circuits, as
mentioned earlier, Wys? type system does not check prerequisite conditions for successful
circuit compilation (e.g. no private function inputs). Wys? circuit library also does not
perform general loop unrolling. In metatheory, Wys? does not provide a separate type
soundness theorem (as Wysteria did). Doing so would require us to formalize the F?
type system and operational semantics. We plan to pursue these in future (also see Sec-
tion 3.3.3).
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Principal p Principal set s FFI constant c, f
Constant c ::= p | s | () | true | false | c
Expression e ::= as par e1 e2 | as sec e1 e2 | seal e1 e2 | reveal e | ffi f ē
| mkwire e1 e2 | project e1 e2 | concat e1 e2
| c | x | let x = e1 in e2 | λx.e | e1 e2 | fix f.λx.e | if e1 then e2 else e3
Figure 3.5: Wys? syntax
3.3.2 Syntax
Figure 3.5 shows the complete syntax of Wys?. Principal and principal sets are
first-class values, and are denoted by p and s respectively. Constants in the language also
include () (unit), booleans, and FFI constants c. Expressions e include the regular forms
for functions, applications, let bindings, etc. and the Wys?-specific constructs. Among
the ones that we have not seen in Section 3.2, expression mkwire e1 e2 creates a wire bundle
from principals in e1 (which is a principal set) to the value computed by e2. project e1 e2
projects the value of principal e1 from the wire bundle e2, and concat e1 e2 concatenates
the two wire bundles.
Host language (i.e., F?) constructs are also part of the syntax of Wys?, including
constants c include strings, integers, lists, tuples, etc. Likewise, host language function-
s/primitives can be called from Wys?—ffi f ē is the invocation of a host-language function
f with arguments ē. The FFI confers two benefits. First, it simplifies the core language
while still allowing full consideration of security relevant properties. Second, it helps the
language scale by incorporating many of the standard features, libraries, etc. from the host
language.
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Wire m ::= · | m[p 7→ v]
Value v ::= p | s | () | true | false | sealed s v | m | v | (L, λx.e) | (L, fix f.λx.e) | •
Mode M ::= Par s | Sec s
Context E ::= 〈〉 | as par 〈〉 e | as par v 〈〉 | . . .
Frame F ::= (M,L,E, T )
Stack X ::= · | F,X
Environment L ::= · | L[x 7→ v]
Trace element t ::= TMsg v | TScope s T
Trace T ::= · | t, T
Configuration C ::= M ;X;L;T ; e
Par component P ::= · | P [p 7→ C]
Sec component S ::= · | S[s 7→ C]
Protocol π ::= P ;S
Figure 3.6: Runtime configuration syntax
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S-let
X1 = (M ;L; let x = 〈〉 in e2;T ), X
M ;X;L;T ; let x = e1 in e2 →M ;X1;L; ·; e1
S-app
M ;X;L;T ; (L1, λx.e) v →M ;X;L1[x 7→ v];T ; e
S-aspar
M = Par s1 s ⊆ s1 X1 = (M ;L; seal s 〈〉;T ), X
M ;X;L;T ; as par s (L1, λx.e)→ Par s;X1;L1[x 7→ ()]; ·; e
S-asparret
can seal s v X = (M1;L1; seal s 〈〉;T1), X1 T2 = snoc T1 (TScope s T )
M ;X;L;T ; v →M1;X1;L1;T2; sealed s v
S-assec
M = Par s X1 = (M ;L; 〈〉;T ), X
M ;X;L;T ; as sec s (L1, λx.e)→ Sec s;X1;L1[x 7→ ()]; ·; e
S-assecret
is sec M
X = (M1;L1; 〈〉;T ), X1
T1 = snoc T (TMsg v)
M ;X;L; ·; v →M1;X1;L1;T1; v
S-seal
can seal s v M = s1 s ⊆ s1
M ;X;L;T ; seal s v →M ;X;L;T ; sealed s v
S-reveal
M = Par s1 ⇒ s1 ⊆ s
M = Sec s1 ⇒ s1 ∩ s 6= φ
M ;X;L;T ; reveal (sealed s v)→M ;X;L;T ; v
S-ffi
v = exec ffi f v̄
M ;X;L;T ; ffi f v̄ →M ;X;L;T ; v
Figure 3.7: Wys? ST semantics (selected rules)
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3.3.3 Single-threaded semantics
The ST semantics is a model of the F? semantics and the Wys? API. The ST se-
mantics defines a judgment C → C ′ that represents a single step of an abstract machine.
Here, C is a configuration M ;X;L;T ; e. This five-tuple consists of a mode M , a stack
X , an environment L, a trace T , and an expression e. The syntax for these elements is
given in Figure 3.6. The stack and environment are standard; the trace T and mode M
were discussed in the previous section.
The ST semantics is formalized in the style of Hieb and Felleisen [54], where the
redex is chosen by (standard) evaluation contexts E, which prescribe left-to-right, call-
by-value evaluation order. A few of the core rules are given in Figure 3.7. In essence,
the semantics extends a standard reduction machinery for a call-by-value, lambda calcu-
lus (in direct correspondence with a pure fragment of F?), with several Wysteria-specific
constructs. We argue, by inspection, that the Wysteria-specific constructs are in 1-1 cor-
respondence with their specifications in the Wys monad. Despite the “eyeball closeness”,
there is room for formal discrepancy between the ST semantics and its static model within
F?’s Wys monad. We leave to future work formally proving a correspondence between the
ST semantics and µF?, the official semantics of F? in F? [37].
The standard constructs such as let bindings (let x = e1 in e2), applications (e1 e2),
etc. evaluate as usual (see rules S-let and S-app), where the mode and traces play no role.
Rules S-aspar and S-asparret reduce an as par expression once its arguments are fully
evaluated. S-aspar first checks that the current mode is Par and contains all the principals
from the set s. It then pushes a seal s 〈〉 frame on the stack, and starts evaluating e. The
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rule S-asparret pops the frame and seals the result, so that it is accessible only to the
principals in s. The rule also creates a trace element TScope s T , essentially making
observations during the reduction of e (i.e., T ) visible only to the principals in s.
To see that these rules faithfully model the F? API, consider the F? type of as par,
shown below.
1 val as par: ps:prins→ (unit→Wys a pre post)→Wys (sealed ps a)
2 (requires (fun m→m.mode=Par ∧ ps ⊆ m.ps ∧
3 can seal ps a ∧ pre (Mode Par ps)))
4 (ensures (fun m r tr→∃t. tr=[TScope ps t] ∧
5 post (Mode Par ps) (unseal r) t)))
Rule S-aspar implements the pre-condition on line 2. For the pre-condition on
line 3, rule S-asparret checks that the returned value can be sealed.3 The rule also gener-
ates a trace element TScope s T , as per the post-condition on line 4, and returns the sealed
value, as per the return type of the API and the post-condition on line 5.
Next consider the rules S-assec and S-assecret. Again, we can see that the rules
implement the type of as sec (shown in Section 3.2). The rule S-assec checks the pre-
condition of the API, and the rule S-assecret generates a trace observation TMsg v, as
per the post-condition of the API.
In a similar manner, we can easily see that the rule S-reveal implements the corre-
sponding pre- and post-conditions as given in Section 3.2. The rule S-ffi implements the
FFI call by calling a host-language function exec ffi. As expected, calling a host-language
function has no effect on the Wys?-specific state. Concretely, this is enforced by F?’s
monadic encapsulation of effects. The remaining rules are straightforward.
We show rest of the β-reduction rules for the ST semantics in Figure 3.8. We leave
3For technical reasons, function closures may not be sealed; see the end of Section 3.3.4 for details.
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S-mkwirep
M = Par s v = sealed s2 v1
can wire v1 s1 ⊆ s s1 ⊆ s2
M ;X;L;T ; mkwire s1 v →M ;X;L;T ; [s1 7→ v1]
S-mkwires
M = Sec s can wire v s1 ⊆ s
M ;X;L;T ; mkwire s1 v →M ;X;L;T ; [s1 7→ v]
S-projwirep
s = {p} m = m′[p 7→ v]
Par s;X;L;T ; project p m→ Par s;X;L;T ; v
S-projwires
p ∈ s m = m′[p 7→ v]
Sec s;X;L;T ; project p m→ Sec s;X;L;T ; v
S-concat
M ;X;L;T ; concat m1 m2 →M ;X;L;T ;m1 ]m2
S-letb
e = let x = v1 in e2
M ;X;L;T ; e→M ;X;L[x 7→ v1];T ; e2
S-fix
M ;X;L;T ; fix f.λx.e→M ;X;L;T ; (L, fix f.λx.e)
S-fun
M ;X;L;T ;λx.e→M ;X;L;T ; (L, λx.e)
S-fixapp
L2 = L1[f 7→ fix f.λx.e][x 7→ v]
M ;X;L;T ; (L1, fix f.λx.e) v →M ;X;L2;T ; e
S-if
v = true⇒ e = e1 v = false⇒ e = e2
M ;X;L;T ; if v then e1 else e2 →M ;X;L;T ; e
Figure 3.8: Wys? ST semantics (remaining β-reduction rules)
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out the context rules that are standard and simply move around the evaluation contexts.
Rule S-mkwirep creates a wire bundle in the Par mode. To ensure that the parties in
the domain of the wire bundle have access to the mapped value, it requires the second
argument to be a sealed value accessible to the parties in the domain (s1 ⊆ s2). It also
checks the current mode party set is a superset of the domain (s1 ⊆ s). Rule S-mkwires
is similar except it does not require the mapped value to be a sealed value, as the secure
context has access to the inputs of all the parties. Both the rules use an auxiliary function
can wire that checks that the value being mapped is not itself a wire bundle or a function
closure. These checks are similar to what we had for Wysteria in Chapter 2. Rule S-
projwirep projects p’s mapping from a wire bundle in a Par context. As in Wysteria, the
rule requires s = {p}. Rest of the rules are straightforward.
3.3.4 Distributed semantics
The DS semantics implements judgments of the form π −→ π′, where a protocol
π is a tuple (P ;S) such that P maps each principal to its local configuration and S maps
a set of principals to the configuration of an ongoing, secure computation. Both kinds of
configurations (local and secure) have the form C (per Figure 3.6).
In the DS semantics, principals evaluate the same program locally and asynchronously
until they reach a secure computation, at which point they synchronize to jointly perform
the computation. This semantics is expressed with four rules, given in Figure 3.10, which
state that either: (1) a principal can take a step in their local configuration, (2) a secure
computation can take a step, (3) some principals can enter a new secure computation, and
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L-aspar1
p ∈ s X1 = (M ;L; seal s 〈〉;T ), X
M ;X;L;T ; as par s (L1, λx.e) ;M ;X1;L1[x 7→ ()]; ·; e
L-asparret
can seal s v X = (M ;L1; seal s 〈〉;T1), X1 T2 = append T1 T
M ;X;L;T ; v ;M ;X1;L1;T2; sealed s v
L-aspar2
p 6∈ s
M ;X;L;T ; as par s (L1, λx.e) ;M ;X;L;T ; sealed s •
L-seal
can seal s v
p ∈ s⇒ v1 = seal s v p 6∈ s⇒ v1 = seal s •
M ;X;L;T ; seal s v ;M ;X;L;T ; v1
L-reveal
p ∈ s
M ;X;L;T ; reveal (sealed s v) ;M ;X;L;T ; v
L-mkwire
v = sealed v1 can wire v1
p ∈ s⇒ m = [p 7→ v1] p 6∈ s⇒ m = ·
M ;X;L;T ; mkwire s v ;M ;X;L;T ;m
L-projwire
m = [p 7→ v]
M ;X;L;T ; project p m;M ;X;L;T ; v
L-concat
M ;X;L;T ; concat m1 m2 ;M ;X;L;T ;m1 ]m2
Figure 3.9: Distributed semantics, selected local rules (M is always Par {p})
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P-par
C ; C ′
P [p 7→ C];S −→ P [p 7→ C ′];S
P-enter
∀p ∈ s. P [p].e = as sec s (Lp, λx.e) s 6∈ dom(S) L = combine L̄p
P ;S −→ P ;S[s 7→ Sec s; ·;L[x 7→ ()]; ·; e]
P-sec
C → C ′
P ;S[s 7→ C] −→ P ;S[s 7→ C ′]
P-exit
S[s] = Sec s; ·;L;T ; v P ′ = ∀p ∈ s. P [p 7→ P [p] / (slice v p v)] S′ = S \ s
P ;S −→ P ′;S′
Figure 3.10: Distributed semantics, multi-party rules
finally, (4) a secure computation can return the result to the (waiting) participants.
The first case is covered by rule P-par, which (non-deterministically) chooses a prin-
cipal’s configuration and evaluates it according to the local evaluation judgment C ; C ′,
which is given in Figure 3.9 (discussed below). The second case is covered by P-sec,
which evaluates using the ST semantics. The last two cases are covered by P-enter and
P-exit, also discussed below.
Local evaluation. The rules in Figure 3.9 present the local evaluation semantics.
These express how a single principal behaves while in par mode; as such, mode M will
always be Par {p}. Local evaluation agrees with the ST semantics for the standard language
constructs (not shown) and differs for Wys?-specific constructs.4
For an as par expression, a principal either participates in the computation, or skips
4Our formal development actually shares the code for both sets of rules, using an extra flag to indicate
whether a rule is “local” or “joint”.
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it. Rules L-aspar1 and L-asparret handle the case when p ∈ s, and so, the principal p
participates in the computation. The rules closely mirror the corresponding ST semantics
rules. One difference in the rule L-asparret is that the trace T is not scoped. In the
DS semantics, traces only contain TMsg elements; i.e., a trace is the (flat) list of secure
computation outputs observed by that active principal. If p 6∈ s, then the principal skips
the computation with the result being a sealed value containing garbage • (rule L-aspar2).
The contents of the sealed value do not matter, since the principal will not be allowed to
unseal the value anyway.
Rule L-seal has the same intuition as above. Rule L-reveal allows principal p
to reveal the value sealed s v, only if p ∈ s. Rule L-mkwire creates a wire bundle. If
the current mode principal is in the domain of the wire bundle, then it simply maps the
contents of the sealed value in a singleton wire bundle, otherwise the rule creates an empty
wire bundle. Rule L-projwire projects current principal’s component from a wire bundle.
As mentioned earlier, rest of the rules for reducing standard constructs are similar to the
ST semantics and hence not shown here. As should be the case, there are no local rules
for as sec—to perform a secure computation parties need to combine their data and jointly
do the computation.
Entering/exiting secure computations. Returning to Figure 3.10, Rule P-enter han-
dles the case when principals enter a secure computation. It requires that all the principals
p ∈ s must have the expression form as sec s (Lp, λx.e), where Lp is their local environ-
ment associated with the closure. Each party’s local environment contains its secret values
(in addition to some public values). Conceptually, a secure computation combines these
environments, thereby producing a joint view, and evaluates e under the combination. We
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define an auxiliary combine v function on values as follows:
combine v (•, v) = v
combine v (v, •) = v
combine v (p, p) = p
combine v (sealed s v1, sealed s v2) = sealed s (combine v v1 v2)
...
The first two rules handle the case when one of the values is garbage; in these cases,
the function picks the other value. For sealed values, if the set s is the same, the function
recursively combines the contents. The combine function for the environments combines
the mappings pointwise. The combine functions for n values and environments is a folding
of the corresponding function.
So now, consider the following code:
let x = as par alice (fun x→ 2) in
let y = as par bob (fun x→ 3) in
let z = as sec (alice, bob) (fun z→ (unseal x) + (unseal y)) in ...
In alice’s environment x will be mapped to sealed alice 2, whereas in bob’s environment
it will be mapped to sealed alice •. Similarly, in alice’s environment y will be mapped to
sealed bob •, whereas in bob’s environment it will be mapped to sealed bob 3. Before the
secure computation, their environments will be combined, producing an environment with
x mapped to sealed alice 2 and y mapped to sealed bob 3, and then, the secure computation
function will be evaluated in this new environment.
Although the combine v function as written is a partial function, our metatheory guar-
antees that at runtime, the function always succeeds. Since the principals are computing
the same program over their view of the data, these views are structurally similar.
So, the rule P-enter combines the principals’ environments, and creates a new entry
in the S map. The principals are now waiting for the secure computation to finish.
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The rule P-exit applies when a secure computation has terminated and returns re-
sults to the waiting principals. If the secure computation terminates with value v, each
principal gets the value slice v p v. The slice v function is analogous to combine v, but in the
opposite direction—it strips off the parts of v that are not accessible to p. Some cases for
the slice v function are:
slice v p p’ = p’
slice v p (sealed s v) = sealed s •, if p 6∈ s
slice v p (sealed s v) = sealed s (slice v p v), if p ∈ s
As an example, consider the following code:
let x = as sec (alice, bob) (fun x→ let y = ... in seal alice y)
Since the return value of the secure computation is sealed for alice, bob will get a
sealed alice •, produced using the slice v function on the result of seal alice y.
In the rule P-exit, the / notation is defined as:
M ;X;L;T ; / v = M ;X;L; concat T [TMsg v]; v
That is, the returned value is also added to the principal’s trace to note their obser-
vation of the value.
We now return to the point of not allowing closures to be sealed. Consider the
following example:
let x = as par alice 2 in
let y = as par bob (fun z→ x) in
let z = as sec ab (fun z→
let a = reveal y in
let b = reveal (a ()) in
b) in
z
In the source semantics, the program returns 2 to both the parties. In the target
semantics, just before the call to the secure block, alice’s environment would map x to seal
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alice 2 and y to seal bob •, whereas bob’s environment would map x to seal alice •, and y to the
closure (L, fun z→ x), where Lmaps x to seal alice •. Now, as per the target semantics, their
environments are combined, and in the combined environment y gets the value from bob’s
environment, but the closure for y has a garbage value for x. Thus, running this program
in the target semantics fails to make progress.
We found this problem during our effort of mechanizing the semantics. For now, we
do not allow closures to be boxed. We plan to fix the problem in future.
3.3.5 Metatheory
Our goal is to show that the ST semantics faithfully represents the semantics of Wys?
programs as they are executed by multiple parties, i.e., according to the DS semantics. We
do this by proving simulation of the ST semantics by the DS semantics, and by proving
confluence of the DS semantics.
Simulation. We define a slice s C function that returns the corresponding protocol
πC for an ST configuration C. In the P component of πC , each principal p ∈ s is mapped
to their slice of the protocol. For slicing values, we use the same slice v function as before.
Traces are sliced as follows:
slice tr p (TMsg v) = [TMsg (slice v p v)]
slice tr p (TScope s T) = slice tr p T, if p ∈ s
slice tr p (TScope s T) = [], if p 6∈ s
The slice of an expression (e.g., the source program) is itself. For all other compo-
nents of C, slice functions are defined analogously.
We say that C is terminal if it is in Par mode and is fully reduced to a value (i.e.,
C.e is a value and C.X is empty). Similarly, a protocol π = (P, S) is terminal if S is
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empty and all the local configurations in P are terminal. The simulation theorem is then
the following:
Theorem 6 (Simulation of ST by DS). Let s be the set of all principals. If C1 →∗ C2, and
C2 is terminal, then there exists some derivation (slice s C1) −→∗ (slice s C2) such that
(slice s C2) is terminal.
Notably, each principal’s value and trace in protocol (slice s C2) is the slice of the
value and trace in C2.
Confluence. We say that a protocol π strongly terminates in the terminal protocol
πt, written as π ⇓ πt, if all possible runs of π terminate in some number of steps in πt.
Our confluence result then says:
Theorem 7 (Confluence of DS). If π −→∗ πt and πt is terminal, then π ⇓ πt.
Combining the two theorems, we get a corollary that establishes the soundness of
the ST semantics w.r.t. the DS semantics:
Corollary 8 (Soundness of ST semantics). Let s be the set of all principals. If C1 →∗ C2,
and C2 is terminal, then (slice s C1) ⇓ (slice s C2).
Now suppose that for a Wys? source program, we prove in F? a post-condition that
the result is sealed alice n, for some n > 0. By the soundness of the ST semantics, we
can conclude that when the program is run in the DS semantics, it may diverge, but if it
terminates, alice’s output will also be sealed alice n, and for all other principals their outputs
will be sealed alice •. Aside from the correspondence on results, our semantics also covers
correspondence on traces. Thus, via our embedding of Wysteria in F?, the correctness
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and security properties that we prove about a Wys? program using F?’s logic, hold for the
program that actually runs.
Of course, this statement is caveated by how we produce an actual implementation
from the DS semantics; details are presented in the next section.
3.4 Implementation
This section describes our Wys? interpreter. We have proved that the core of this
interpreter implements our formal semantics, adding confidence that bugs have not been
introduced in the translation from formalism to implementation.
3.4.1 Wys? interpreter
The formal semantics presented in the prior section is mechanized as an inductive
type in F?. This style is useful for proving properties, but does not directly translate to
an implementation. Therefore, we implement an interpretation function step in F? and
prove that it corresponds to the rules; i.e., that for all input configurations C, step(C) =
C ′ implies that C ; C ′ according to the semantics. Then, the core of each principal’s
implementation is an F? stub function tstep that repeatedly invokes step on the AST of the
source program (produced by the F? extractor run in a custom mode), unless the AST
is an as sec node. Functions step and tstep are extracted to OCaml using the standard F?
extraction.
Local evaluation is not defined for as sec, so the stub implements what amounts to
P-enter and P-exit from Figure 3.10. When the stub notices the program has reached
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an as sec expression, it calls into a circuit library we have written that converts the AST
of the second argument of as sec to a boolean circuit. This circuit and the encoded inputs
are communicated to a co-located server, written using a library due to Choi et al. [11]
that implements the GMW MPC protocol. The server evaluates the circuit, coordinating
with the GMW servers of the other principals, and sends back the result. The circuit
library decodes the result and returns it to the stub. The stub then carries on with the local
evaluation.
Our F? formalization of Wys? is 5000 lines of code, including all the metatheory.
It makes abundant use of F?’s dependent types to state and prove invariants. The im-
plementation of the (verified) step function is essentially a big switch-case on the current
expression, and is 60 lines of code. The tstep stub is another 15 lines. The size of the
(unverified) circuit library, not including the GMW implementation, is 836 lines.
The stub, the implementation of GMW, the circuit library, and the F? extractor (in-
cluding our custom Wys? mode for it) are part of our trusted computing base. As such,
bugs in them could constitute security holes. Verifying these components as well (espe-
cially the circuit library and the GMW implementation, which are open problems to our
knowledge) is interesting future work.
3.4.2 Secure server backend
We also provide a secure server backend for the alternative deployment scenarios
where the parties are willing to reveal their inputs to a trusted server (perhaps running
inside a secure enclave, such as Intel SGX [55]).
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In this backend, when the (local) interpreter reaches an as sec expression, it sends its
inputs and the secure computation AST to a secure server. The secure server (written in
F?), implements the ST semantics directly. It receives the inputs (and the same AST) from
all the principals involved, combines their inputs (using the combine function extracted from
our F? development), and then interprets the AST in this combined environment using the
same semantics as our F? development. When the secure computation finishes, in addition
to sending the output to each party, the server also communicates a cryptographic proof of
its correctness using cryptographic signatures. We have verified the use of cryptography
using a technique similar to Fournet et al. [56]. The local interpreter instances receive
the output, verify the accompanying cryptographic signature, and carry on with the local
evaluation. We conjecture that such a server could be useful for a trusted hardware based
deployment scenario.
3.4.3 FFI
When writing a source Wys? program (in F?), the programmer can call functions
from an FFI module.5 During compilation, the FFI module is extracted to OCaml using
the regular F? extraction. The custom mode of the F? extraction that we have implemented,
identifies the FFI calls in the Wys? program, and extracts them to an E ffi AST form, which
is part of the AST expression type.
type exp = . . .
| E ffi: f:α→ args:list exp→ inj:β → exp
The f argument is extracted to be the name of the FFI function, that links to the
5How F? programs call into Wys? functions was described in Section 3.2.1.
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extracted OCaml function. We explain the inj argument shortly.
When evaluating the Wys? AST, the interpreter may reach an E ffi f args inj node.
As we saw in Section 3.3.3, the interpreter calls a library function exec ffi with the list of
values, in addition it also passes the inj argument. The exec ffi function first un-embeds any
embedded host-language arguments. The un-embedding function is straightforward (the
values shown below are from the value AST form):
unembed V unit = ()
unembed (V ffi v) = v (∗ values in the host language ∗)
unembed (V seal s v) = V seal s v
Interpreter specific values, such as V seal, are passed as is. The FFI module does not
have access to the Wys? API in F?, and hence it can only use these values parametrically.
exec ffi then calls the OCaml function f with the un-embedded arguments. The OCaml
function returns some result, that needs to be embedded back to the AST. So, the question
is how can we embed the result at runtime? Inspecting the type of the result is not an
option. The custom F? extraction mode comes to our rescue.
When the extractor compiles an FFI call in the source program to an E ffi node,
it has the type information for the return value of the FFI call. Using this information,
it instruments the E ffi node with an injection, a function that can be used at runtime to
embed the FFI call result back to the AST. For example, if the result is (), the injection is
(an OCaml function) fun x→V unit. If the return value is an interpreter value (e.g. V seal),
the injection is the identity. If the return value is some host value (such as a list, tuple, or
int), the injection creates an V ffi node. exec ffi uses the injection to embed the result back
to the AST, and returns it to the interpreter.
Our interface essentially provides a form of monomorphic, first-order interoperabil-
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Figure 3.11: Time to run (in secs) normal and optimized PSI for varying per-party set
sizes and intersection densities.
ity between the (dynamically typed) interpreter and the host language. We do not foresee
any problems extending our current work to higher order with coercions [57].
3.5 Applications
Private set intersection. We evaluate the performance of the psi (computing inter-
section in a single secure computation), and the psi opt (the optimized version) algorithms
from Section 3.2. The programs that we benchmark are slightly different than the ones
presented there, in that the local col and row functions are not the verified ones. The results
are shown in Figure 3.11. We measure the time (in seconds) for per party set sizes 96,
128, and 256, and intersection densities (i.e. the fraction of elements that are common)
0.5, 0.75, and 0.9.
The time taken by the unoptimized version is independent of the intersection den-
sity since it always compares all pairs of values. However, as the intersection density
increases, the optimized version performs far better – it is able to skip many comparisons.
For lower densities (< 0.35), the optimization does not improve performance, as the algo-
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rithm essentially becomes quadratic, and the setup cost for each secure computation takes
over.
We note that our Wysteria evaluation resulted in a similar performance profile for
PSI (Section 2.7).
Joint median. We program unoptimized and optimized versions of the two-party
joint median (Section 2.7). The programs take two distinct, sorted inputs from alice, x1
and x2, and two distinct, sorted inputs from bob, y1 and y2 and return the median of all
four. In the unoptimized version, the whole computation takes place as a monolithic se-
cure computation, whereas the optimized version breaks the computation, revealing some
intermediate results, and off-loading some parts to the local hosts (much like PSI).
For both the versions, we prove functional correctness:
val median: x:sealed Alice (int ∗ int)→ y:sealed Bob (int ∗ int)→Wys int
(requires (fun m→m = Mode Par {Alice, Bob}))
(ensures (fun r t→ (pre (unseal x) (unseal x) =⇒
r = median spec (unseal x) (unseal y))))
where median spec is an idealized median specification. For the unoptimized version,
we prove that the trace is [TMsg r], where r is the result of the computation, basically re-
flecting that the principals only see the final result. We prove the optimized version to be
secure using a relational argument that the trace does not reveal more than the output.
Card dealing. We have implemented an MPC-based card dealing application in
Wys?. Such an application can play the role of the dealer in a game of online poker, thereby
eliminating the need to trust the game portal for card dealing. The application relies on
Wys?’s support for secret shares [46]. Using secret shares, the participating parties can
share a value in a way that none of the parties can observe the actual value individually
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(each party’s share consists of some random-looking bytes), but they can recover the value
by combining their shares in a secure block.
In the application, the parties maintain a list of secret shares of already dealt cards
(the number of already dealt cards is public information). To deal a new card, each party
first generates a random number locally. The parties then perform a secure computation
to compute the sum of their random numbers modulo 52, let’s call it n. The output of the
secure block is secret shares of n. Before declaring n as the newly dealt card, the parties
needs to ensure that the card n has not already been dealt. To do so, they iterate over the
list of secret shares of already dealt cards, and for each element of the list, check that it
is different from n. The check is performed in a secure block that simply combines the
shares of n, combines the shares of the list element, and checks the equality of the two
values. If n is different from all the previously dealt cards, it is declared to be the new
card, else the parties repeat the protocol by again generating a fresh random number each.
Wys? exports the following API for secret shares:
type Sh: Type→Type
type can sh: Type→Type
assume Cansh int: can sh int
val v of sh: #a:Type→ sh:Sh a→Ghost a
val ps of sh: #a:Type→ sh:Sh a→Ghost prins
val mk sh: #a:Type→ x:a→Wys (Sh a)
(requires (fun m→m.mode = Sec ∧ can sh a))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ v of sh r = x ∧ ps of sh r = m.ps ∧ tr = [])
val comb sh: #a:Type→ x:Sh a→Wys a
(requires (fun m→m.mode = Sec ∧ ps of sh x = m.ps))
(ensures (fun m r tr→ v of sh x = r ∧ tr = [])
Type Sh a types the shares of values of type a. Our implementation currently sup-
ports shares of int values only; the can sh predicate enforces this restriction on the source
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programs. Extend secret shares support for other types (such as pairs) should be straight-
forward. Functions v of sh and ps of sh are marked Ghost, meaning that they can only be
used in specifications for reasoning purposes. In the concrete code, shares are created and
combined using the mk sh and comb sh functions. Together, the specifications of these func-
tions enforce that the shares are created and combined by the same set of parties (through
ps of sh), and that comb sh recovers the original value (through v of sh). The Wys? inter-
preter transparently handles the low-level details of extracting shares from the GMW im-
plementation of Choi et al. (mk sh), and reconstituting the shares back (comb sh).
In addition to implementing the card dealing application in Wys?, we have formally
verified that the returned card is fresh. The signature of the function that checks for fresh-
ness of the newly dealt card is as follows (abc is the set of parties):
val check fresh:
l:list (Sh int){∀ s’. mem s’ l =⇒ ps of sh s’ = abc} → s:Sh int{ps of sh s = abc}
→Wys bool (requires (fun m→m = Mode Par abc))
(ensures (fun r → r⇐⇒ (∀ s’. mem s’ l =⇒
not (v of sh s’ = v of sh s))))
The specification says that the function takes two arguments: l is the list of secret
shares of already dealt cards, and s is the secret shares of the newly dealt card. The function
returns a boolean r that is true if and only if the concrete value (v of sh) of s is different
from the concrete values of all the elements of the list l. Using Wys?, we verify that the
implementation of check fresh meets this specification.
Other applications and secure server. We have implemented some more applica-
tions in Wys?, including a geo-location sharing application. At the moment, we have only
run these applications using a secure server backend. In this backend, as sec works by liter-
ally sending code and inputs to a separate server that implements the ST semantics directly.
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The server returns the result with a cryptographic proof of correctness to each party (we
have verified the use of cryptography using a technique similar to [56]). We conjecture
that such a server could be useful for a trusted hardware based deployment scenario.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have presented Wys?, a Verified, Domain-specific Integrated Lan-
guage Extension hosted in F?. Wys? advances Wysteria on three fronts: (a) It enables
the programmers to formally verify the correctness and security properties of their MPC
programs using F?’s expressive type-and-effect system, (b) It provides a partially verified
toolchain to run the MPC programs, thereby significantly reducing the risk of security-
critical bugs in the toolchain, and (c) It enables MPC programs to use standard language
constructs and libraries directly from F?, thereby enhancing the usability and scalability
of the language. Wys? also simplifies the Wysteria language, making it more standard.
Wys? also has certain limitations as compared to Wysteria. In particular, the Wys?
API does not perform checks that are prerequisite for successful circuit compilation at
runtime (such as no private functions as input). Currently, such errors manifest in Wys?
at runtime.
We presented an implementation of Wys? with two backends for secure computa-
tion. One that is based on the circuit library of Choi et al. [11], and one that uses a trusted
server. We presented several examples that we have implemented using Wys?.
In the next chapter, we present static analyses that help optimize a monolithic MPC
into a mixed-mode MPC with same privacy characteristics.
111
Chapter 4: Knowledge Inference for Optimizing Secure Multi-party Com-
putations
In the previous chapters, we have seen that decomposing a monolithic secure multi-
party computation into a mixed-mode secure multi-party computation sometimes provides
big performance gains. We experimentally demonstrated such gains specifically for the
private set intersection and joint median computation in Section 2.7. Indeed, other re-
searchers have observed similar results [5, 7].
While Wysteria and Wys? provide language abstractions that enable programmers
to program and formally verify the mixed-mode MPCs, in this chapter we consider the
problem of optimizing a monolithic MPC into a mixed-mode MPC, providing similar
privacy guarantees as the monolithic version.
A key observation underlying such optimizations is that while MPC protocols typ-
ically only reveal the final output to each party, a party may be able to infer the results
of intermediate computations given the final output, their inputs, and the function being
computed. When such inference is possible, the inferable intermediate results need not be
cryptographically concealed. Revealing inferable results does not change the knowledge
profile of the protocol: If the party will eventually know the intermediate result (e.g., given
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the final output), then revealing it earlier does not change what is known to whom.1 De-
composing monolithic protocols into smaller protocols that explicitly reveal intermediate
results can significantly improve their performance.
Within the context of MPCs, we formally define notions of knowledge (of a pro-
gram variable y to a party p), and the problems of knowledge inference and constructive
knowledge inference. A solution to the knowledge inference problem states which parties
can learn which additional variables, if any, from a cooperative run of the unoptimized
protocol. We call a knowledge inference solution constructive if, in addition to correctly
asserting that a party p knows a variable y, the solution also gives an evidence of party
p’s knowledge of y in the form of a program that computes y from p’s private data and the
final output.
We present algorithms that solve these problems, prove their soundness, and char-
acterize the conditions under which they are also complete (Section 4.2). We implement
our solutions and evaluate them experimentally (Section 4.4). While previous work has
explored techniques for optimizing MPCs using knowledge inference [5], ours is the first
to formalize the problem and its solutions, in addition to experimentally measure their
performance. We begin with an overview of the problem as applied to the joint median
computation MPC.
1 As mentioned in Section 1.2, we assume the semi-honest threat model.
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4.1 Overview
Consider the joint median computation between two parties Alice and Bob.2
1 (∗ assume a1 < a2, b1 < b2, distinct (a1, a2, b1, b2) ∗)
2
3 let median a1 a2 b1 b2 =
4 let x1 = a1 ≤ b1 in
5 let a3 = if x1 then a2 else a1 in
6 let b3 = if x1 then b1 else b2 in
7 let x2 = a3 ≤ b3 in
8 let m = if x2 then a3 else m = b3 in
9 m
Let a1 and a2 be Alice’s inputs and b1 and b2 be Bob’s. We also assume that these
numbers are distinct, with a1 < a2 and b1 < b2. At the end of the computation, both parties
share the joint median output m.
In the unoptimized version of secure computation for this example, the whole pro-
gram is computed as a single secure computation. However, one can show that, with the
knowledge of a1, a2, and m, Alice can always infer the values of x1 and x2, no matter what
Bob’s input values are [4]. Similarly, Bob can also infer the values of x1 and x2 from the
knowledge of b1, b2, and m. Therefore, declassifying values of x1 and x2 explicitly to Al-
ice and Bob during the computation would not compromise privacy, since they can infer
them anyway, and it turns out that doing so it enables the following, more efficient MPC
protocol:
Alice and Bob compute a1 ≤ b1 using secure computation and share the output x1
(line 4). Alice locally computes a3 (line 5). Bob locally computes b3 (line 6). Alice and
2While we show the example using a functional language syntax, our implementation operates on C++
programs.
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Bob compute a3 ≤ b3 using secure computation and share the output x2 (line 7). If x2 is
true, Alice sends a3 to Bob as the final median, else if x2 is false, Bob sends Alice b3 as
the final median (line 8 and 9).
Thus, in the optimized version, only the two comparisons, need to be done securely.
Moreover, Alice and Bob do not learn anything more than they did in the unoptimized
version. For median computation on a joint set with 64 elements, Kerschbaum [5] shows
30x performance improvement using this optimization. We have also seen similar gains
in Wysteria evaluation (Section 2.7).
More generally, in our setting, party p knows the (deterministic) program (call it S),
his own input set I , and his outputO.3 We say party p can infer the value of local variable
y ∈ S if there exists a function F such that y = F (I, O) in all runs of S. Another way
of putting it is that no matter the values of p’s inputs or those of other participants of the
MPC, p can always compute y given knowledge of only his inputs and the final result. Our
goal to find all those variables in S that p can infer. We can do this by either showing
merely that the required function F exists, without saying what it is, or we can produce
F directly, thus constituting a constructive proof. In this paper we present approaches to
both tasks.
4.1.1 Knowledge inference
To show that an intermediate variable can be expressed as a function of one party’s
inputs and outputs, we can attempt to prove that given any pair of runs ofS that agree on the
3Some MPCs may have different outputs for different parties; in the median example, there is a single




=a1 < b1 ∧ x1 = true ∧ a3 = a2 ∧ b3 = b1 ∧ a3 < b3 ∧ x2 = true ∧m = a3 ∧ φpre
ϕ2
def
=a1 < b1 ∧ x1 = true ∧ a3 = a2 ∧ b3 = b1 ∧ a3 ≥ b3 ∧ x2 = false ∧m = b3 ∧ φpre
ϕ3
def
=a1 ≥ b1 ∧ x1 = false ∧ a3 = a1 ∧ b3 = b2 ∧ a3 < b3 ∧ x2 = true ∧m = a3 ∧ φpre
ϕ4
def
=a1 ≥ b1 ∧ x1 = false ∧ a3 = a1 ∧ b3 = b2 ∧ a3 ≥ b3 ∧ x2 = false ∧m = b3 ∧ φpre
Figure 4.1: Path conditions for secure median
valuations of variables in I and O (but may not agree on the input and output variables of
other parties), the valuations of y on those two runs must also agree. In other words, y can
be determined uniquely from I andO, and thus a function F exists such that F (I, O) = y.
We can construct such a proof in two steps.
First we use a program analysis to produce a formula φpost that soundly approxi-
mates the final state of the program S (that is, the final values of all program variables)
for all possible program runs. So that the meaning of a variable y mentioned in φpost is
unambiguous, we assume that a variable is assigned at most once during a program run.
One program analysis we might use to produce φpost is symbolic execution [58].
Each feasible program path is characterized by a path condition ϕi, which is a set of pred-
icates relating the program variables. The path conditions can be combined to provide a





ϕi. For the median program
above, there are four possible paths, having the path conditions given in Figure 4.1.
Consider the first path condition ϕ1. Conceptually, it describes the program path
in which then branch of both conditionals (lines 5 and 8) is taken. The remaining three
paths constitute the other three possible branching combinations. Note that each path also
requires φpre. This formula defines the publicly-known constraints on all inputs; in the
case of the median program we have φpre
def
= a1 < a2∧ b1 < b2∧ a1 6= b1∧ a1 6= b2∧ a2 6=
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b1 ∧ a2 6= b2.
The next step is to prove that any two runs of the program S that agree on variables
known to p will also agree on the value of y. This statement is a 2-safety property [59],
and we can prove it using a technique called self-composition [60]. The idea is to reduce
this two-run condition on program S to a condition on a single run of a self-composed
program Sc, which is the sequential composition of S with itself, with the second copy of
S’s variables renamed, e.g., so that x is renamed to x′. Given the formula φscpost for this
self-composed program, we can ask whether, under the assumption that the normal and
primed versions of p-visible variables are equal, that the normal and primed version of y
is also equal.
As an example, Figure 4.2 shows self composition of the median function. We write
median’ for the function median but with the local variables renamed to x1’, x2’, .... The self-
composed program effectively runs median twice, on two separate spaces of variables. We
can express the question of knowledge inference as a question on the relationship between
the two copies of the variables. Namely, Alice can infer x1 if and only if for every feasible
final state of the composed program, when the two copies of a1,a2,m agree on their values
then the copies of x1 agree on their value. More formally we need to check the validity of
the following formula for any feasible final state.
φscpost ∧ (a1 = a1’ ∧ a2 = a2’ ∧ m = m’)⇒ (x1 = x1’)
Here, the formulaφscpost will involve sixteen path conditions (self-composition squares
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(∗ a1 < a2, b1 < b2, distinct (a1, a2, b1, b2) ∗)
m = median a1 a2 b1 b2;
(∗ a1’< a2’, b1’< b2’, distinct (a1’, a2’, b1’, b2’) ∗)
m’ = median’ a1’ a2’ b1’ b2’
Figure 4.2: Median computation composed with itself.
the number of paths). For example, among them will be:
ϕsc1
def
=a1 < b1 ∧ x1 = true ∧ a3 = a2 ∧ b3 = b1 ∧ a3 < b3 ∧ x2 = true ∧ m = a3 ∧ φpre ∧
a1’ < b1’ ∧ x1’ = true ∧ a3’ = a2’ ∧ b3’ = b1’ ∧ a3’ < b3’ ∧ x2’ = true ∧ m’ = a3’
∧ φ′pre
The formula ϕsc1 is actually the conjunction of ϕ1 with a version of ϕ1 that has all
its variables renamed to the primed versions. We can think of the entire post condition
φscpost = ϕ
sc
1 ∨ ... ∨ ϕsc16 as the conjunction of the post condition φpost with its primed
version.
Being a quantifier-free formula in the theory of integer linear arithmetic, the final
formula poses no problem for an SMT solver such as Z3 [40], which can indeed verify its
validity. Additionally, the same can be said for Alice’s knowledge of x2 and a3, and Bob’s
knowledge of x1, x2 and b3.
The knowledge inference question bears a close resemblance to deciding the prop-
erty of delimited release [51]. We explore this connection in more detail in Section 4.3.
4.1.2 Constructive Knowledge Inference
The technique just described can establish that there exists some function F such
that y = F (I, O), where y is an intermediate variable in S, and I and O are variables
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known to party p. However, this technique cannot say what F actually is. To construct F
we can leverage ideas from template-based program verification.
Program verification generally aims at inferring invariants in a program that are
strong enough to verify some assertions of interest. Template-based program verification
[38, 39] requires programmers to specify the structure of these invariants in the form of
a template. The algorithm then generates verification constraints for the assertions, to
be solved by an SMT solver (e.g. Z3 [40]). A solution to the constraints yields a valid
proof of the correctness of the assertions as well as a solution to the template unknowns.
Gulwani et al. [38] present constraint-based verification techniques over the abstraction of
linear arithmetic and Srivastava et al. [39] present these techniques over the abstraction of
predicates.
To infer p’s knowledge of a variable y, our algorithm tries to infer a formula φ s.t. (a)
at the end of the program y = φ, and (b) φ only mentions the input and output variables
known to p. If we add an assertion y = φ at the end of the program, and provide a
template structure for φ (limited to formulae over variables known to p) this becomes a
template-driven verification problem where the assertion and the invariant are the same.
A successful verification of the assertion y = φ establishes p’s knowledge of y, and also
the solution for φ yields a formula for y in terms of input and output variables of p.
The template structure for this problem is defined as follows. Suppose y is a boolean
variable. Then the template for φ requires it to be in disjunctive normal form (DNF) such
that there are exactly d disjuncts each consisting of c conjuncts, with each conjunct drawn
from a set of predicates Q. This set contains predicates over linear expressions involving
I and O. In the median example, for Alice, one choice of Q is {v1  v2 | v1, v2 ∈
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{a1, a2,m}, ∈ {>,≥, <,≤,=, 6=}}. For Bob, similar Q would be {v1  v2 | v1, v2 ∈
{b1, b2,m}, ∈ {>,≥, <,≤,=, 6=}}.
Our algorithm searches for a φ conforming to the prescribed template. For example,
if (c = 2, d = 2), then the search space for φ is all the boolean formulae (q1 ∧ q2) ∨ (q3 ∧
q4), q1, q2, q3, q4 ∈ Q. We denote this search space for formulae as DNF(c, d,Q). A naive
search algorithm would make O(|Q|cd) queries to the SMT solver, one for every possible
formula in DNF(c, d,Q). This algorithm is complete in the sense that if there exists a
solution for φ in DNF(c, d,Q) then the naive search algorithm finds it. Our algorithm,
on the other hand, makes O(|Q|c + |Q|d) queries to the SMT solver, and still guarantees
completeness, provided the existence of solution in DNF(c, d,Q).
Consider variable x1 from the median example. With QAlice and QBob as above, and
(c = 1, d = 1), we are able to establish knowledge of x1 for both Alice and Bob as: x1 =
m > a1 for Alice, and x1 = m ≤ b1 for Bob. Interestingly, (c = 1, d = 1) is insufficient to
discover invariants describing Alice’s and Bob’s knowledge of x2. With (c = 1, d = 2),
we are able to establish Alice’s knowledge of x2 as x2 = (m = a1 ∨ m = a2). And with
(c = 2, d = 1), we are able to establish Bob’s knowledge of x2 as x2 = (m 6= b1∧m 6= b2).
In general, starting with (c = 1, d = 1), we can increment (c, d) in steps until either we
find a solution or we leave x as being unknown to p.
We can also infer formulae for integer variables. In this case we use a different
template structure, and leverage ideas from Gulwani et al. [38]. We discuss the algorithm
further in the next section.
Constructive knowledge inference problem is closely related to the problem of infer-
ring output function in required release [61], a connection we explore more in Section 4.3.
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Value v ::= n | true | false
Exprn./Formula e, φ ::= v | x | e1  e2
Binary operator  ∈ {≤,≥, >,<,=, 6=} ∪ {∧,∨,¬,⇒} ∪ {+,−}
Statement S ::= x := e | S1;S2 | skip | if e then S1 else S2
Figure 4.3: Syntax.
4.2 Formal development
In this section, we formally describe our knowledge inference algorithm. We first
give the language syntax, operational semantics, and formal definition of knowledge in
Section 4.2.1. We then present inference in Section 4.2.2, and constructive inference in
Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Language Syntax
Let parties p1, . . . , pn want to compute a secure computationS whose syntax is given
in Figure 4.3. The language is standard aside from the omission of a looping construct;
this makes sense in our setting since most MPC methods forbid dynamic looping (rather,
they require a static loop unrolling). Our methods support loops as well, but we elide
them nevertheless to keep the formalization simpler. We also assume, for simplicity, that
each program path is in single assignment form, i.e. in an execution of a program, every
variable is assigned at most once.
The semantics of computations is given in Figure 4.4. The judgments have the form
〈σ, S〉 ⇓ σ′, meaning, statement S executed in state σ results in new state σ′. States σ are
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(E-Var)
〈σ, x〉 ⇓ σ[x]
(E-Val)
〈σ, v〉 ⇓ v
(E-BinOp)
〈σ, e1〉 ⇓ v1 〈σ, e2〉 ⇓ v2
〈σ, e1  e2〉 ⇓ v1  v2
(E-Assign)
x 6∈ dom(σ) 〈σ, e〉 ⇓ v
〈σ, x := e〉 ⇓ σ[x 7→ v]
(E-Seq)
〈σ, S1〉 ⇓ σ′ 〈σ′, S2〉 ⇓ σ′′
〈σ, S1;S2〉 ⇓ σ′′
(E-IfTrue)
〈σ, e〉 ⇓ true 〈σ, S1〉 ⇓ σ′
〈σ, if e then S1 else S2〉 ⇓ σ′
(E-IfFalse)
〈σ, e〉 ⇓ false 〈σ, S2〉 ⇓ σ′
〈σ, if e then S1 else S2〉 ⇓ σ′
(E-Skip)
〈σ, skip〉 ⇓ σ
(φ-Valid)
〈σ, φ〉 ⇓ true
σ |= φ
Figure 4.4: Semantics.
maps from variables x to values v; we write σ[x] to look up x in σ, and we write σ[x 7→ v]
to define a map identical to σ except that x maps to v. The figure also defines an auxiliary
judgment for expressions having the form 〈σ, e〉 ⇓ v, meaning, expression e evaluated in
state σ results in value v. The rules are standard, with one exception. The rule (E-Assign)
checks that x 6∈ dom(σ) to enforce single assignment form for the current program path.
When an expression is viewed as a formula φ, we write σ |= φ to mean that in σ the
formula φ evaluates to true. We also write predicate to mean a boolean valued formula.
Let V be a set of variables. We define two states as being equivalent on a set of
variables as follows:
Definition 9 (Equivalence of States). Two states, σ1 and σ2, are equivalent on a set of
variables V , written as σ1
V≡ σ2, iff ∀x ∈ V , σ1[x] = σ2[x].
Let φpre denote the precondition for a secure computation program S. It represents
the assumptions that S makes about parties’ inputs. In the median example, φpre = a1 <
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a2 ∧ b1 < b2 ∧ a1 6= b1 ∧ a1 6= b2 ∧ a2 6= b1 ∧ a2 6= b2. We are interested in executions
〈σ, S〉 ⇓ σ′ when σ |= φpre.
We now define knowledge of a variable y to a party p in S, written as K(S, p, y).
Informally, y is known to p, if, whenever two final states of S are equivalent on the set of
input and output variables of p, they are also equivalent on {y}.
Definition 10. [Knowledge of a Variable] Let S be a secure computation program with
precondition φpre. For a party p in the computation, let I be the set of input variables of p,
and O be the set of output variables of p. Then, a variable y in S is known to p, written as
K(S, p, y), if for all initial states σ1, σ2 s.t. σ1 |= φpre, σ2 |= φpre, and σ1
I≡ σ2, whenever
〈σ1, S〉 ⇓ σ′1 and 〈σ2, S〉 ⇓ σ′2 s.t. σ′1
O≡ σ′2, we have σ′1
{y}
≡ σ′2.
The definition models the 2-safety property discussed in the Section 4.1. It says
that the value of y can be uniquely determined from the knowledge of input and output
variables of p, independent of the inputs of other parties in the computation. We should
be careful when defining knowledge for extensions of the language in Figure 4.3. For
example, although an RSA modulus N uniquely identifies the two primes p and q in the
information-theoretic sense, it is computationally hard to infer p and q from N . We now
give the formal description of knowledge inference algorithm.
4.2.2 Knowledge Inference
The problem of knowledge inference is as follows. For a secure computation pro-
gram S, we want to know whether a party p knows a program variable y according to
Definition 10. We present our knowledge inference algorithm in Figure 4.7, but before
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ς(skip, φ) = φ
ς(x := e, φ) = φ ∧ (x = e)
ς(S1; S2, φ) = ς(S2, ς(S1, φ))
ς(if e then S1 else S2, φ) = (e ∧ ς(S1, φ)) ∨ (¬e ∧ ς(S2, φ))
Figure 4.5: Postcondition of a predicate φ w.r.t. statement S.
that we give some auxiliary definitions.
Definition 11 (Validity of a Predicate). A predicate φ is valid at the end of a program S
with precondition φpre, if ∀σ s.t. σ |= φpre, 〈σ, S〉 ⇓ σ′, we have σ′ |= φ.
We define the postcondition of a predicate φ w.r.t. statement S, written as ς(S, φ),
in Figure 4.5. The following theorem states the properties of ς(S, φ).
Theorem 12 (Soundness and Completeness of Postcondition). For a program S with
precondition φpre, ς(S, φpre) is valid at the end of program S (Soundness). Moreover, for
any other predicate φ s.t. φ is valid at the end of S, ς(S, φpre)⇒ φ (Completeness).
Proof. Soundness – Structural induction on S. Completeness – Structural induction on S
and using following lemma for each case. Let σ |= ς(S, φpre). Then, ∃σ′ s.t. σ′ |= φpre,
〈σ′, S〉 ⇓ σ, and dom(σ′) = dom(σ) − Def(S), where Def(S) is the set of variables
defined by S.
The theorem depends on the program paths being in single assignment form. Specif-
ically, the postcondition rule for assignment statement assumes that x does not occur in
φ.
We now define a variable renaming translation on predicates. The idea is to replace




〈θ, x〉 〈θ, θ[x]〉
(T-Var2)
x 6∈ dom(θ) x′ is fresh
〈θ, x〉 〈θ[x 7→ x′], x′〉
(T-BinOp)
〈θ, φ1〉 〈θ′, φ′1〉 〈θ′, φ2〉 〈θ′′, φ′2〉
〈θ, φ1  φ2〉 〈θ′′, φ′1  φ′2〉
(T-Val)
〈θ, v〉 〈θ, v〉
Figure 4.6: Variable renaming translation for a predicate.
1 InferKnowledge(S, φpre)
2 for each party p
3 let I be the set of p’s input variables.
4 let O be the set of p’s output variables.
5 φpost := ς(S, φpre);





8 for each program variable y
9 φ := (φpost ∧ φ′post ∧ φk)⇒ (y = θ[y]);
10 if (`alg φ)
11 output y is known to p.
12 else
13 output y is not known to p.
Figure 4.7: Knowledge inference algorithm
variables to variables. The translation judgment is shown in Figure 4.6. We define similar
translation judgments for statements and states and refer to them in the theorem proofs
later on, however we do not show them here for lack of space.
Our algorithm is parameterized by an SMT solver (e.g. Z3 [40], STP [62]), that we
denote as alg. We use alg to determine whether a given predicate is a tautology (always
true). We write `alg φ as the query to alg for predicate φ.
The knowledge inference algorithm is shown in Figure 4.7. It takes as input the
secure computation program S and its precondition φpre. For each party p and program
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variable y, it outputs whether p knows y or not.
The algorithm first computes the postcondition of φpre w.r.t. S (φpost). It then per-
forms variable translation on φpost to generate φ′post. Essentially φpost and φ′post model two
different runs of the program. φk then asserts that ∀x ∈ I ∪ O, x has same value across
these two runs. Under these assumptions, if a program variable y also has same value
across these two runs, the variable y is known to p.
The soundness theorem of our algorithm is as follows:
Theorem 13 (Soundness of Knowledge Inference). Let S be a secure computation pro-
gram with the precondition φpre. If InferKnowledge(S, φpre) outputs variable y is known
to party p, then K(S, p, y).
Proof. We want to prove that for two states σ and σ′ s.t. σ
I∪O≡ σ′, σ[y] = σ[y′] (see
Definition 10). If we translate σ according to θ to yield σ′ (dom(σ) ∩ dom(σ′) = ε),
then we can see that σ ∪ σ′ |= φpost, σ ∪ σ′ |= φ′post (soundness of postcondition), and
σ ∪ σ′ |= φk (using above equivalence). Thus, it follows from line 9 in Figure 4.7 that
σ ∪ σ′ |= (y = θ[y]).
Moreover, we can also state a completeness theorem.
Theorem 14 (Completeness of Knowledge Inference). Let S be a secure computation
program with precondition φpre. For a program variable y and party p, if K(S, p, y), then
InferKnowledge(S, φpre) outputs variable y is known to party p.
Proof. For a program S, let S ′ be the translation of S. Then, we can see that φpost∧φ′post∧
φk = ς(S;S ′, φpre ∧ φ′pre ∧ φk). By completeness of postcondition, if y = θ[y] is valid at
the end of S;S ′, line 9 in Figure 4.7 must be true.
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1 ConstructKnowledgeB (S, φpre)
2 for each party p
3 construct the predicate set Q.
4 for each boolean program variable y
5 c = 1; d = 1;
6 do
7 φ := CFormula(y, c, d,Q);
8 increment (c, d) in lockstep.
9 while (φ is failure and c < cmax, d < dmax);
10 if (φ = failure)
11 output y is not known to p.
12 else
13 output y is known to p by φ.
Figure 4.8: Constructive knowledge inference for boolean variables
4.2.3 Constructive Knowledge Inference
The knowledge inference algorithm from Figure 4.7 establishes whether p knows y
or not, however it does not give a formula for y in terms of p’s input and output variables.
In this section, we present constructive knowledge inference algorithms, that output such
a formula.
Constructive knowledge inference for boolean variables. Define the verification
condition of a predicate φ w.r.t. a statement S with precondition φpre, VC(S, φpre, φ), as
ς(S, φpre)⇒ φ. Then, if `alg VC(S, φpre, φ), the predicate φ is valid at the end of S.
Recall that to construct knowledge of variable y for a party p, we want to infer a
formula φ, s.t. at the end of the program y = φ holds. For boolean variables, the search
space for φ is DNF(c, d,Q), where Q is a set of predicates constructed from input and
output variables of p.
The algorithm for boolean variables is shown in Figure 4.8. For each party p, it first
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1 CFormula(y, c, d,Q) ## construct φ s.t. y ⇔ φ
2 let L be the lattice (2Q,⇒,> = {},⊥ = Q).
3 φL := CFormulaL(y, c,L); φR := CFormulaR(y, d,Q);
4 if (φL = failure || φR = failure)
5 return failure ;
6 φ := VC(S, φpre, φR ⇒ φL);
7 if (`alg φ)
8 return φR;
9 else
10 return failure ;
11
12 CFormulaR(y, d,Q) ## construct φR s.t. y ⇒ φR
13 N := {}; ## set of tuples that satisfy y ⇒ φR
14 for all (q1, . . . , qd) ∈ (Q×1 Q · · · ×d−1 Q)




16 if (`alg φ)
17 N := N ∪ {(q1, . . . , qd)};
18 if (N = {})









1 CFormulaL(y, c,L) ## construct φL s.t. φL ⇒ y
2 N := {}; ## set of lattice nodes that satisfy φL ⇒ y
3 visit lattice L nodes in BFS order,
4 when node N is visited, do
5 if (N = {})
6 φN := true;
7 else





10 φ := VC(S, φpre, φN ⇒ y);
11 if (`alg φ)
12 N := N ∪ {N};
13 truncate sublattice rooted at N from BFS.
14 else
15 for each child M of N in L
16 if (|M | ≤ c && M is unvisited)
17 add M to BFS worklist.
18 if (N = {})









Figure 4.9: Routines CFormula, CFormulaL, and CFormulaR
constructs a predicate set Q. As mentioned earlier, this can either be provided as input by
the programmer, or it can be mined from the expressions appearing in the program. For
each boolean program variable y, starting with (c = 1, d = 1) and incrementing (c, d)
in lockstep until (cmax, dmax), it tries to find φ. It uses an auxiliary routine CFormula,
defined in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9 consists of the subroutine CFormula and two other subroutines, that it
invokes, CFormulaL and CFormulaR. We divide the problem of constructing φ into sub-
problems of constructing φL and φR s.t. (a) φL and φR consist only of predicates from Q,
and (b) at the end of the program, φL ⇒ y, y ⇒ φR, and φR ⇒ φL hold. Then, we have
φ = φR. CFormulaL constructs φL and CFormulaR constructs φR.
Construction of φL. To construct φL (CFormulaL in Figure 4.9), we perform breadth








q′)) with > = {} and ⊥ = Q, and collect all nodes of the lattice
that form a solution to φL ⇒ y. A node N in the lattice is a solution to φL ⇒ y if
`alg VC(S, φpre, (
∧
q∈N
q) ⇒ y). When we find a node N that is a solution, we delete the
subtree rooted at N from the lattice, since any node in the subtree is a “weaker” solution










q′) ⇒ y, we already have `alg (
∧
q∈M
q) ⇒ y). Moreover, we also prune
any subtree rooted at a node (including the node itself) whose size is greater than c (since
the current search space is DNF(c, d,Q), we need not consider lattice nodes with more







q). IfN = {}, the algorithm fails to infer p’s knowledge of y (under input
values of c and d). Construction of φL makes O(|Q|c) queries to the SMT solver.
Construction of φR. To construct φR (CFormulaR in Figure 4.9), we consider all
possible (q1, . . . , qd) ∈ (Q ×1 Q · · · ×d−1 Q) , and collect all such tuples that form a










qi). IfN = {}, the
algorithm fails to infer P ’s knowledge of y (under input values of c and d). Construction
of φR makes O(|Q|d) queries to the SMT solver.
Construction of φ. We now check that φR ⇒ φL is valid at the end of the program
using the formulae for φL and φR constructed above (CFormula in Figure 4.9). If it is, y
is known to p using the formula φR, otherwise our algorithm returns y is not known to p
(under input values of c and d).
Constructive knowledge inference for integer variables. For integer variables in the
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1 ConstructKnowledgeI(S, φpre)
2 for each party p
3 let {xi}i∈1...n be input and output variables of p.
4 for each integer program variable y
5 let ai, i ∈ 1 . . . n be n integer unknowns.
6 φ := −y +
n∑
i=1
aixi ≥ 0 ∧ y +
n∑
i=1
− aixi ≥ 0;
7 verify φ at the end of S.
8 if verification fails
9 output y is not known to p.
10 else




Figure 4.10: Constructive knowledge inference for integer variables
program S, constructive knowledge inference algorithm is shown in Figure 4.10. To verify
φ on line 6, we use the algorithm given by Gulwani et al. [38]. Their algorithm uses Farka’s
lemma to convert φ into SAT solver constraints, the solution of which returns a solution




We state soundness theorems for constructive knowledge inference algorithms as
follows:
Theorem 15 (Soundness of Constructive Knowledge Inference). Let S be a secure compu-
tation program with precondition φpre. If ConstructKnowledgeB(S, φpre) (Figure 4.8)
and ConstructKnowledgeI(S, φpre) (Figure 4.10) output variable y is known to party
p, then K(S, p, y).
Proof. If the algorithms infer y = φ for a party p, then y = φ is valid at the end of S.
Moreover, since only variables in φ are variables from I ∪ O (input and output variables
of p), p knows y by Definition 10.
Moreover, constructive knowledge inference algorithms are also complete, provided
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a solution exists in the template form they consider.
Theorem 16 (Completeness of Constructive Knowledge Inference for Boolean Variables).
Let S be a secure computation program. For a party p, let Q be a set of predicates, where
the only variables appearing in each predicate in Q are input and output variables of p.
Let y be a boolean program variable in S. If ∃φ s.t. x = φ at the end of S, and φ is in
DNF(c, d,Q) form, for some values of (c, d), then CFormula(y, c, d,Q) returns a solution
(and not failure).
Proof. We give an outline for (c = 2, d = 2), the proof for general case follows similarly.
Let y = φ at the end of S s.t. φ is in DNF(c, d,Q) form. Then, for some q1, q2, q3, q4 ∈ Q,
y = (q1∧q2)∨(q3∧q4), equivalently, y = (q1∨q3)∧(q1∨q4)∧(q2∨q3)∧(q2∨q4). Since
CFormulaR considers all elements inQ×Q, it would construct φR = (q1∨q3)∧(q1∨q4)∧
(q2∨q3)∧(q2∨q4)∧φ′, for someφ′ (possibly just true). On the other hand, since CFormulaL
considers all lattice nodes up to size c, it would construct φL = (q1 ∧ q2) ∨ (q3 ∧ q4) ∨ φ′′
for some φ′′ (possibly just false). We can see that φR ⇒ φL, and hence CFormula returns
φR.
The following theorem of completeness for integer variables follows from the com-
pleteness of the algorithm by Gulwani et al. [38]4.
Theorem 17 (Completeness of Constructive Knowledge Inference for Integer Variables).
Let S be a secure computation program. Let y be an integer variable in S. For a party p,




4Similar to the restriction in [38], the theorem holds if checking the invariant y = φ does not require
integral reasoning.
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at the end of S, then ConstructKnowledgeI(S, φpre) (Figure 4.10) outputs y is known
to p.
Proof. Follows from the completeness of [38].
4.3 Discussion
This section considers some aspects of our approach, including the possible use
of type-based information flow analysis for knowledge inference, and the application of
knowledge inference to allowing MPC computations with loops.
Applying information flow analysis. In the limit, we can use a grossly over-approximating
language-based information flow analysis [63] for knowledge inference. Following the for-
mulation relating knowledge inference to delimited release given above, we can label each
of party p’s input variables as L and all other input variables as H , restricting valid flows
in the program as L v H as usual, while explicitly declassifying the final output when it
is returned. Then we can do type inference [64, 65] to determine whether any unlabeled,
local variables can safely be given labelL, and if so then we know these can be determined
solely from knowledge of p’s inputs.
Such a type-based analysis is less precise than the semantic analysis we have given to
this point. It cannot, for example, infer the knowledge of x1 and x2 in the median example.
As soon as it sees x1 = a1≤ b1 in the median example, it assumes that there is information
flow from both a1 and b1 to x1, and hence, neither Alice nor Bob can determine x1 alone.
However, it is far less expensive than a semantic analysis, and there are some useful
examples where such an analysis is enough to establish knowledge facts. Consider the
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1 ## variables with suffix A are Alice ’ s inputs ,
2 ## with suffix B are Bob’s. yd is known to both.
3 int lot size ( int fvA, int cA, int hvA, int fbB, int hbB, int yd)
4
5 int a, b, c, d, e, f , g, h, i ;
6
7 a = 2 ∗ yd;
8 b = a ∗ fvA;
9 c = yd / cA;
10 d = c ∗ hvA;
11
12 e = 2 ∗ yd;
13 f = e ∗ fbB;
14
15 g = f + b;
16 h = hbB + d;
17 i = g / h;
18
19 return sqrt ( i ); ## integer square root
Figure 4.11: Joint economic lot size example
joint economic lot size computation example from Kerschbaum [5], shown in Figure 4.11.
The program computes an order quantity (or lot size) between a buyer (Bob) and vendor
(Alice). The buyer’s private inputs include the holding cost per item (hbB) and the fixed
ordering costs per order (fbB). The vendor’s private inputs include the holding cost per item
(hvA), the fixed setup costs per order (fvA), and the capacity (cA). Both parties know the
yearly demand of the buyer (yd). For vendor Alice, if we label yd, fvA, cA, hvA as L, fbB, hbB
asH , and do type inference in an information flow type system, it can infer that a, b, c, d can
have label L and are thus known to Alice. Similarly, it can infer that e, f are known to Bob.
Using these knowledge facts, the MPC protocol can be optimized to compute lines 7-10
locally on Alice’s host, and lines 12-13 locally on Bob’s host, leaving only lines 15-17,
and 19 to be computed securely.
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Adding loops to the programs. MPC programs do not admit loop constructs because
in many cases the execution of a loop, specifically the number of times it iterates, can
potentially reveal information about parties’ input values beyond what is revealed by the
output. However, if we can prove that using their own input and output variables, all
parties in the secure computation can infer the number of loop iterations, we can allow
MPC programs to have loops in them, without compromising security. For example, for a
loop .. i = 0; while(i < n) { ... ++i;} .. , if n is already known to all the parties in the computation,
they can infer the number of loop iterations, and hence running this loop in MPC does not
compromise security.
Constructive knowledge inference can be useful in this situation. In particular, we
can use it to infer loop invariants in terms of known variables for a party, and if we can do
so for all the parties, we can admit the loop in MPC.
4.4 Experiments
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of our approach. We provide
performance measurements for our algorithms on several example programs.
4.4.1 Implementation
We present evaluation of three implementations of our algorithms – two for the
knowledge inference algorithm from Figure 4.7 that handle linear and non-linear arith-
metic respectively, and one for the constructive knowledge inference algorithm from Fig-
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ures 4.8 and 4.9. 5
Convex polyhedra based implementation. We have implemented the knowledge in-
ference algorithm from Figure 4.7 using the polyhedra powerset domain as implemented
in Parma Polyhedra Library (PPL, v0.11.2) [66]. This approach represents the program
postcondition, φpost, as a set of convex polyhedra (each of which is a conjunction of linear
inequalities), interpreted over real-valued variables. We use polyhedra in the implemen-
tation to avoid reasoning about integers as much as possible. To verify the validity of φ
(line 9 in Figure 4.7), we check if the negation of φ has an integer solution. This corre-
sponds to checking, for every polyhedron/disjunct ϕ in φpost∧φ′post∧φk, that the formulae
ϕ ∧ (y > y′) and ϕ ∧ (y < y′) define convex regions with no real points (quick check)
and no integer points (slower check). If so, φ is valid. This implementation only handles
programs that use linear arithmetic.
Bitvectors based implementation. Our second implementation of the algorithm from
Figure 4.7 uses a bitvector representation of program variables via the Simple Theorem
Prover [62] (STP, revision 1671). This implementation handles non-linear arithmetic. It
represents formulae (postcondition, φ) using logical and arithmetic expressions over fixed-
width bit vectors. The validity of φ is checked using STP. In addition, STP allows us to
construct formulas that relate individual bits of the integer variables, which means we can
construct for every 1 ≤ i ≤ x (for bit width x) the formula φpost ∧ φ′post ∧ φk ⇒ (yi = y′i)
where yi designates bit i of variable y. Checking validity of such formulas lets us conclude
that parties can potentially infer individual bits, even if they cannot infer whole variables.
5The implementation and evaluation of the non-constructive knowledge inference algorithm was done
































































































Constructive algorithm for boolean variables. We have implemented the construc-
tive knowledge inference algorithm for boolean variables (Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9) using
the LLVM compiler infrastructure [67]. We use the Z3 SMT solver [40] for the validity
queries.
4.4.2 Results
We have conducted the experiments on a Mac Pro with two 2.26 GHz quad-core
Xeon processors, 16 GB RAM, and running OS X v10.8. The results are in Figure 4.12.
The top chart shows time taken (in log-scale) by our three implementations, POLY
(convex polyhedra based), BVx (bit-vector based, for x as 8, 16, and 32), and CONS (con-
structive algorithm), on several example programs (discussed later). We evaluated BVx
on all programs, whereas other implementations only on the (linear) median examples. In
all programs, we try to infer all variables for both the parties. Additionally, in the case of
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BVx, we also try to infer every intermediate bit.
The bottom chart provides some characteristics of the test cases that contribute to
the running times above: the total number of variables in the test cases, and for the linear
programs, the number of convex disjuncts in program postcondition (see POLY imple-
mentation description).
Median example. We consider the joint median computation for 2, 3, 4, and 5 inputs
per party. Unsurprisingly, the time taken by non-constructive implementations increases
with the number of inputs. POLY is especially susceptible to the large number of disjuncts
in the program postcondition (due to the large number of paths), taking around 24 seconds
for analyzing median5, up from as little as 0.044 seconds for analyzing median2.
For CONS, we consider the set Q for Alice as {m  ai} and for Bob as {m 
bi}, where  ∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=, 6=}, and ai and bi range over inputs of Alice and Bob
respectively. We used (c = 2, d = 2) for all input sizes. It is able to infer knowledge of all
comparisons for all the median programs. However, as the number of candidate predicates
(|Q|) increases, the algorithm takes more time. For median with 4 inputs, for example,
|QAlice| = |QBob| = 24, and it takes ∼41 seconds to infer all the variables for both parties,
as compared to ∼2 seconds in the case of 2 inputs per party and |QAlice| = |QBob| = 12.
We note that at present, our implementation does not aggressively optimize the use
of the SMT solver (like caching query responses etc.) that can potentially bring down the
inference time since there are lots of redundant validity queries. Moreover, the CONS
implementation computes ς for every to-be-inferred variable, something that can be opti-
mized as well.
Lot size example. The joint computation of economic lot size in Figure 4.11 is a
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non-linear arithmetic example. As described in Section 4.3, information flow analysis
infers that Alice knows a, b, c, d and Bob knows e, f. Using BVx, for x as 8, 16,
and 32, we infer the same conclusions. In addition, various bits of some other variables
are inferred. For example, Alice knows bit 1 of f and g, while Bob knows bit 1 of b and g.
These are due to the multiplications by 2 on lines 9 and 15, resulting in null bits of lowest
order. The performance of BVx for this test case naturally decreases as x is increased. For
x as 8, the analysis takes around 2.4 seconds, while for x as 32, it takes 165 seconds. Note
that a significant portion of this additional time is spent checking a much larger number
of bits for partial inference (when complete variables cannot be inferred).
1 ## assume 0 ≤ a, b < 0x0fff
2 int masked average (int a, int b)
3 int sum = a + b;
4 int avg = sum / 2;
5 return (avg & 0xfff0 );
Figure 4.13: Masked average example
Masked average example. Our final example serves to better demonstrate the infer-
ence of bits of variables that cannot be inferred completely. Inference on the scale of bits
lets us determine bit-width requirements of a circuit implementing some computation, as
well as determine which bits can be revealed ahead of time due to the output of the com-
putation. Consider a masked average function in Figure 4.13. The function outputs the
high-order bits of the average of two 16 (or 32) bit inputs, which are assumed to be 12
bits big. BVx implementations for x as 16 and 32, analyzes this function in 0.25 and 0.50
seconds respectively.
If we only consider the input assumptions (view the program as outputting nothing),
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then both parties can infer the null values of sum at bits 14-16 and of avg at bits 13-16 .
Additionally, since the function returns all but the lower 4 bits of the average, knowledge
inference lets us conclude that bits 6-13 of sum and bits 5-12 of avg can be inferred given
the output. An optimized circuit for this function would (a) reduce the size of sum and avg
to 13 and 12 bits respectively, and (b) reveal bits 6-13 of sum after computing it, so that
the final division circuit can be performed with just 5 bits.
4.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented algorithms for knowledge inference in MPC programs,
that can be used to optimize a monolithic MPC program into a mixed-mode MPC pro-
gram, with formal guarantee that the mixed-mode version does not reveal more than the
monolithic version. Such an optimization can result in big performance gains in some
cases, as we have demonstrated in previous chapters for the PSI program and the joint
median computation program.
We formalized the notion of knowledge in an MPC program, and the problem of
knowledge inference that asks whether a party knows a variable in the MPC program. We
formulated a related constructive knowledge inference problem, that in addition demands
a witness of a party’s knowledge of a variable. We then presented algorithms for solv-
ing the knowledge inference and constructive knowledge inference problems, formalized
them, and proved their soundness and (conditional) completeness. We also presented an
implementation and empirical evaluation of our algorithms.
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Chapter 5: Related Work
5.1 Circuit libraries
VMCrypt [12] and FastGC [13] are frameworks for building and executing Yao’s
garbled circuits [1] directly. They employ several techniques, such as free XOR gates [68],
pipelined execution, and so on, that improve the running time and memory requirements
of the garbled circuits protocol.
Mood et al. [14] port the garbled circuits protocol execution to mobile phones. They
control the memory requirements by using a novel intermediate language, called PAL. Cir-
cuits are generated from PAL by using a database of pre-generated circuits matching in-
structions to their circuit representations. They port the Fairplay compiler [15] to Android,
and generate circuits that were previously infeasible to create in the mobile environment.
Huang et al. [69] also demonstrate MPC applications, such as common contacts, running
on the smartphones. They use custom, hand-optimized circuits for this purpose.
While these frameworks have presented generic techniques that make Yao’s protocol
practical even for larger circuits, it is arguably hard to program large MPC application
directly using these libraries. As such, they can be easily used as a backend for Wysteria
and Wys?.
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5.2 High-level DSLs for MPC
Fairplay [15] was the first high-level MPC DSL. It compiles a garbled circuit from
a Pascal-like imperative program. The entry point to this program is a function whose
two arguments are players, which are records defining each participant’s expected input
and output type. More recently, Holzer et al. [16] developed a compiler for programs
with similarly specified entry points, but written in (a subset of) ANSI C. The TASTY
compiler produces secure computations that may combine homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits [70]. Its input language, TASTYL, requires explicit specification of com-
munication between parties, as well as the means of secure computation. More recently,
OblivC [71] is an extension to C for two-party MPC that annotates variables and condi-
tionals with an obliv qualifier to identify private inputs; these programs are compiled by
source-to-source translation. All these languages are however limited to two-parties, have
limited support for mixed-mode, and do not have a formalized specification.
Laud et al. [21] present a DSL for programming low-level MPC protocols related to
efficient integer and floating-point operations. They formalize their language, type system,
and semantics. The DSLs that we have presented in this dissertation are meant for higher-
level applications, and it should be possible to use the techniques from Laud et al. in the
backend for such applications.
FairplayMP [18] supports n > 2 parties. Its programs are similar to those of Fair-
play, but now the entry point can contain many player arguments, including arrays of play-
ers, where the size of the array is statically known. The wire bundles in Wysteria and
Wys? have a similar feel to arrays of players. Just as FairplayMP programs can iterate over
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(arbitrary-but-known-length) arrays of players in a secure computation, we provide con-
structs for iterating over wire bundles. Unlike the arrays in FairplayMP, however, our wire
bundles have the possibility of representing different subsets of principals’ data, rather
than assume that all principals are always present; moreover, in Wysteria and Wys?,
these subsets can themselves be treated as variable.
5.2.1 Support for mixed-mode computations
L1 [34] is an intermediate language for mixed-mode SMC, but is limited to two
parties. Compared to L1, Wysteria provides more generality and ease of use. Further,
Wysteria programmers need not be concerned with the low-level mechanics of inter-
party communication and secret sharing, avoiding entire classes of potential misuse (e.g.,
when two parties wait to receive from each other at the same time, or when they attempt
to combine shares of distinct objects).
Kreuter et al. [17] present PCF, a circuit format language for expressing mixed-mode
secure computations for two parties. They implement an interpreter to load and execute
PCF programs. Their interpreter uses online circuit compression and lazy gate generation
for more efficient circuit compilation. However, compared to our DSLs, it is (by design)
very low level, in that it lacks abstractions for supporting multiple parties, as well as a
formal semantics.
SMCL [35] is a language for secure computations involving a replicated client and
a shared “server” which represents secure multiparty computations. Our DSLs are less
rigid in their specification of roles: we have secure and parallel computations involving
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arbitrary numbers of principals, rather than all of them, or just one, as in SMCL. SMCL
provides a type system that aims to enforce some information flow properties modulo
declassification. SMCL’s successor, VIFF [72], reflects the SMCL computational model
as a library/DSL in Python.
Liu et al. [73] define a typed intermediate language for mixed-mode SMC protocols.
They support stateful secure computations using an ORAM-based [74] backend. They
build a compiler that aims to provide instruction-trace obliviousness [75] and memory-
trace obliviousness [76] properties. Their source programs do not have computation mode
annotations. Instead the programs contain simple annotations identifying the private data
of the parties, while the compiler performs an information-flow based analysis to assign
code blocks to either local computations (Par blocks) or secure computations (Sec blocks).
However, such an information-flow based analysis is often inadequate in identifying
the optimal placement of secure blocks. For example, their type system would not be able
to identify that in the joint median computation example, only the comparisons need to
be done securely. In terms of language design, their language is simplistic as compared to
Wysteria, e.g. it lacks function abstractions and is limited to two parties only. Another
implication of their design choice is that the programmer has to explicitly put declassify
annotations for the secure block outputs.
On the other hand, in Wysteria, the programmer has to provide the computation
mode annotations and the secure blocks outputs are implicitly declassified. Arguably,
Wysteria provides the programmers more flexibility in terms of secure blocks place-
ment, allowing them to express any well-typed code structure. In future, we would like to
enhance Wysteria with computation mode inference based on the analyses developed in
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Chapter 4. Wysteria also does not have an ORAM backend and does not support state-
ful secure computations (the type system prohibits state manipulation in secure blocks).
If we were to provide oblivious array accesses without ORAM, the complexity for each
access would be O(log n), which would clearly not scale. But Wysteria does provide
the instruction-trace obliviousness property – the circuit compiler hoists the then and else
branches of an if conditional in a secure block, using a multiplexer circuit to select the
branch.
5.2.2 DSLs for cloud-based MPC
Another line of research in MPCs deals with a client-server setting, where client
wants to run a function over his private input using untrusted servers (e.g. in a cloud). To
protect confidentiality of his data, the client distributes secret shares of his input among
the servers. The servers run the same function, but use their own shares. Finally they
send the output shares to the client, who then recovers the clear output value. Launch-
bury et al. [77] present a table-lookup based optimization for such MPC protocols, that
aims at minimizing the cost incurred by expensive operations such as multiplication and
network communication between servers. Mitchell et al. [78] give an expressive calculus
for writing such functions. Their calculus is mixed-mode, but only in terms of data – the
programs can use both encrypted (private) and non-encrypted (public) values. They give
an extended information flow type system that rejects programs that cannot be run on a
secure computation platform (such as homomorphic encryption). In Wysteria, the above
client-server setting can be expressed as a monolithic secure block to be run by the servers,
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each of which holds secret shares of client’s input. As we have shown in the dissertation,
we can express more general mixed-mode MPCs.
5.2.3 Other MPC languages
Kerschbaum et al. [79] explore automatic selection of mixed protocols consisting
of garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption. They provide an extended cost model
for mixed protocols, and present two algorithms for automatically selecting mixed pro-
tocols with (near-) optimal performance based on this model. Jif/Split enables writing
multi-party computations in Java as (conceptually) single-threaded programs [80]. It of-
fers compiler support for dividing Java programs into pieces to run on different hosts, based
on information-flow analysis and explicit declassifications. Unlike our work, Jif/Split does
not have support for collaborative computations, such as two parties looping in-parallel
performing a secure computation every loop iteration. It depends on actual trusted third
parties, and lacks language abstractions and run-time techniques for employing secure
computations without a trusted third party. On the other hand, Jif/Split automatically par-
titions the program, while in our DSLs, the programmer has to provide computation mode
annotations.
5.3 Crypto DSLs
Similar to Wysteria, researchers have proposed other DSLs for making cryptogra-
phy more accessible to programmers. λ• is a DSL for generic authenticated data-structures
(ADS) [81]. ADS aim to minimize the amount of client storage by allowing the client to
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store a hash digest of their data, while the actual data is stored on a server. A prover and
verifier protocol between client and server guarantees that the client can query the data,
with formal guarantees that the server sends the correct result. A λ• source program, like
Wysteria, is for the most part a typical functional language program except for certain
types designated as authenticated types, and coercions auth and unauth. The compiler
then compiles a function f that uses authenticated types to two variations fP and fV for
prover and verifier respectively, while the type system guarantees the correctness and secu-
rity of the generated code. This is similar to Wysteria where the source program contains
computation mode annotations, and the interpreter interprets them accordingly.
ZQL [82] is a query language for expressing simple computations over private data in
scenarios such as smart meters. Given a ZQL source program, the compiler produces code
to perform the computation, and verify the correctness of its result. Behind the scenes, it
generates zero-knowledge protocols that guarantee both the privacy of the data and correct-
ness of the computation result. Pinocchio [83] is a framework for efficiently verifying the
results of outsourced (such as to the cloud) computations. It provides a compiler that con-
verts C code into verifiable arithmetic circuits, and tools for running the actual verification
protocol. As with Wysteria, these languages make cryptographic protocols accessible to
the application programmers with no cryptography expertise.
5.4 Verification of source MPC programs
None of the DSLs that we mentioned above provides formal reasoning about the cor-
rectness and the security properties of the source MPC programs, or a verified toolchain.
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While the verification of the underlying crypto protocols has received some atten-
tion [84], the verification of the MPC source programs has remained largely unexplored.
The only previous work that we know of is Backes et al. [85] who devise an applied pi-
calculus [86] based abstraction for MPC, and use it for formal verification. For an auction
protocol that computes the min function, their abstraction comprises about 1400 lines of
code. In contrast, Wys? permits direct verification of higher-level MPC source programs
and provides a verified toolchain.
5.5 DSL implementation strategies
Similar to Wys?, other researchers have also embedded DSLs in verification-oriented
host languages. Chlipala [87] presents design and implementation of an extensible macro-
system in Coq [88], intended for verified low-level programming. In his system, every
macro, in addition to a compilation rule to the Bedrock IL, comes with a proof rule, and
the system requires the macro designers to prove that the macro definition satisfies the
proof rule. The macros can then be assembled to build applications that can be verified
by modular composition of the macro proof rules. The semantics of the BedRock IL is
trusted, but small enough to be audited manually.
Similar to the Bedrock IL, Wys? defines the deep embedding of Wysteria AST
in F? and formalizes its semantics. However, instead of taking the macro approach, we
have taken the API approach, with modifications to the F? compiler for producing those
ASTs from the F? source. Also, the API specifications (pre- and post-conditions) are
trusted in Wys?. As we mentioned in Section 3.3.3, verifying these is future work. Wys?
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additionally has a notion of multi-party with distributed target semantics, while Bedrock IL
has a straightforward compilation to the assembly code. Wys? API (and formal semantics)
also provides a notion of observable traces that can be used to verify the security properties
of the MPC programs.
Wys?’s language-integrated syntax bears relation to the approach taken in LINQ [89],
which embeds a query language in normal C# programs, and implements these programs
by extracting the query syntax tree and passing it to a custom-provider that implements a
particular backend.
5.6 Knowledge inference for MPC
Huang et al. [13, 69] identify the need for knowledge based MPC optimizations,
while leaving the automatic generation of optimized MPC protocols to future work. Ker-
schbaum [5] solves the knowledge inference problem using a custom program analysis
based on epistemic modal logic inference rules. He shows that his approach works on the
median example (Section 4.1), and the lot size computation example (Figure 4.11). Our
work in Chapter 4 can be viewed as a generalization and improvement of his approach,
making several advances. First, we formally define the notion of knowledge in SMC, and
the problem of knowledge inference. In addition, we also formally define and solve the
related constructive knowledge inference problem. Second, we prove our algorithms are
sound and (relatively) complete. Moreover, our algorithms are built on top of the SMT
solvers, thus leveraging recent advances in SMT solving techniques. Indeed, we present
experimental measurements to characterize the performance of our algorithms, while he
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does not.
5.6.1 Self-composition and noninterference
This section considers some aspects of our approach to knowledge inference, includ-
ing the relationship of knowledge inference to the property of delimited release [51], the
relationship of constructive knowledge inference to required release [61], and the effect
of using a different program analysis to determine a program’s final states.
Relating knowledge inference to noninterference. As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, the
knowledge inference problem bears some resemblance to the problem of proving noninter-
ference, as evidenced by the similarity of our use of self-composition with its previous use
in proving noninterference [60]. More precisely, knowledge inference is closely related
Sabelfeld and Myers’ delimited release [51] property. Next we define delimited release,
and then show how a method for proving a program satisfies delimited release can be
applied to knowledge inference.
In the setting of normal delimited release, we suppose there exists a security labeling
Γ, which maps each program variable in S to one of two security labels, L (low) and
H (high). We say that memories σ1 and σ2 are low-equivalent, written σ1 ∼Γ σ2, if
σ1(x) = σ2(x) for all variables x such that Γ(x) = L. We also suppose that the program
S may contain expressions declassify(e), which signal that e’s security label should
be considered L, even if its contents may otherwise suggest its label should be H . (In
an MPC, we can think of the output as being declassified; e.g., in the median example,
we would change the last line to be return declassify(m).) We say that S enjoys
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delimited release with respect to Γ iff for all memories σ1, σ2, σ′1, σ′2 such that if σ1 ∼Γ σ2,
and 〈S, σ1〉 ⇓ σ′1 and 〈S, σ2〉 ⇓ σ′2 where 〈σ′1, ei〉 ⇓ v ⇔ 〈σ′2, ei〉 ⇓ v for some v for
all declassification expressions ei ∈ S, then σ′1 ∼Γ σ′2. In short, all pairs of program
evaluations that agree on the results of declassified expressions ei should also agree on
other low-visible outputs. Satisfying this condition means that nothing is leaked via low
outputs beyond what the declassification expressions already reveal.
We can describe knowledge inference for p in terms of delimited release. Let Γp
map p-visible variables to L and all remaining variables to H . The set of declassification
expressions is the set of output variables (e.g., m in the median example). Now, to see
whether local variable y can be inferred by p, we simply label y with L and see whether S
still satisfies delimited release. If so, revealing y to p provides no additional information.
The self-composition algorithm described in Section 4.1.1 is basically checking de-
limited release. For example, consider the condition presented for the median example:
φscpost ∧ (a1 = a1’ ∧ a2 = a2’ ∧ m = m’)⇒ (x1 = x1’)
The φscpost part captures the semantics of the two executions. The next two equalities are
establishing σ1 ∼Γ σ2, since they require Alice’s two input variables to be equal. The third
equality establishes the equality of the declassified output variable m. The final equality
x1 = x1’ establishes that σ′1 ∼Γ σ′2 (where the other low-security variables are known to be
equal by virtue of them appearing to the left of the implication, and the program respecting
single-assignment semantics).
Constructive knowledge inference is related to required release [61]. In this setting,
a program S satisfies required release of an input expression e to user p using output
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expression F if p can evaluate F (i.e. F only uses variables visible to p) and F evaluates
to the same value as e, i.e. for all final states σ of S, 〈σ, e〉 ⇓ v ⇔ 〈|σ|p, F 〉 ⇓ v where |σ|p
denotes the state visible to p. The problem of constructive knowledge inference then is to
infer the function F for a party p and program variable y such that the program S satisfies
required release of y to party p using F .
As far as we are aware, we are the first to observe that knowledge inference can be
reduced to the question of deciding delimited release [51], and we are the first to show
how to decide this property using self-composition. Moreover, in the form of constructive
knowledge inference, we are the first to propose inference algorithms for inferring the
output function to decide the problem of required release [61].
Alternatives to ς(S, φ). The role of ς(S, φ) (Figure 4.5) is to provide a sound approx-
imation of final states of executing the program S starting from an initial state that satisfies
φ. We can use other program analyses to get such an approximation. In Section 4.1.1 we
used symbolic execution for this purpose; for our language (Figure 4.3), which lacks loops,
symbolic execution generates equivalent formula as ς .
While ς(S, φ) as defined in Figure 4.5 provides a complete approximation of final
program states (Theorem 12), for large programs the formula can become prohibitively
large. In such cases, we can always trade completeness of the approximation, and use
abstract interpretation [90] to provide a sound approximation. With such analyses, our
knowledge inference algorithms are still sound, in that if they output y is known to p then
K(S, p, y), but they lose completeness.
Using information flow. Inferring local variables known to p via information flow
analysis, as described earlier, is similar to the splitting algorithm employed by Jif/Split [65],
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which partitions a program to run on multiple hosts. As mentioned before, Jif/Split does
not employ MPCs, but rather relies on trusted third parties, and employs a simple syntactic
algorithm incapable of inferring deeper relationships, e.g., it would not be able to deduce
that the parties can infer the two booleans in the median example
5.6.2 Template based program verification
Our constructive knowledge inference algorithms (Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, and Fig-
ure 4.10) are inspired by template driven program verification techniques [38, 39]. How-
ever, our algorithms take advantage of features specific to our problem. Our templates,
instead of having arbitrary structure, have restricted form of φL ⇒ y ∧ y ⇒ φR. For
negative variables (i.e., variables on the left side of an implication), independent of c and
d, we never have to consider more than one lattice, since we always have only one template
variable on the left of implication. Second, as mentioned in the inference of φL earlier, in
addition to pruning the subtree of a solution node, we also prune subtrees whose root node
has size greater than c. Finally, we infer φL independent of φR, i.e. solve φL ⇒ y sepa-
rately from y ⇒ φR, which is different from [39], where negative variables are inferred
for every permutation of positive variables (variables on the right side of an implication).
Again, the simple structure of our templates enables us to do so.
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Chapter 6: Looking back and going forward
MPC eliminates the need for a trusted third party and replaces it with a crypto-
graphic protocol. It provides a general-purpose solution to address growing data privacy
concerns – users do not have to trust a third-party with their data, instead they can retain
control of their data while using MPC for computing useful information with other users.
Cryptographic protocols for evaluating arbitrary functions as MPC have existed since the
1980s [1]. More recent developments have enabled the use of MPC in real-world applica-
tions [9, 10, 91].
6.1 Looking back
We began this dissertation with the vision of rich, practical, and provably secure
MPC applications. To attain this goal, the advances in the MPC cryptographic protocols
are necessary, but not sufficient – we also need to make MPC accessible to the application
programmers in an easy-to-use manner. This dissertation has applied techniques from
programming language design and program verification to do so.
We have followed a three pronged strategy. Firstly, we have designed high-level,
modular abstractions for MPC that enjoy a conceptual single-threaded interpretation. We
have embedded these abstractions inside a general purpose, verification-oriented program-
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ming language, so that the application programmers can build upon them while prov-
ing useful correctness and security properties about their programs. Secondly, we have
formally verified parts of our MPC toolchain, thereby considerably reducing the risk of
security-critical bugs that can compromise the privacy of parties’ data. Finally, we have de-
signed algorithms to optimize monolithic MPC programs to mixed-mode MPC programs,
with formal guarantees that the mixed-mode versions do not reveal more information about
the parties’ data than their monolithic counterparts.
6.1.1 Wysteria
Wysteria is the first mixed-mode MPC DSL that provides a formalized type system
and a conceptual single-threaded semantics, with theorems that prove the type system to
be sensible, and establish the correspondence between the single-threaded and the actual
distributed semantics. Wysteria also provides high-level support for secret shares (secure
state), while the Wysteria interpreter transparently handles the low-level cryptography
and message passing details.
We have experimentally demonstrated that Wysteria makes significant advances
towards our goal of practical and rich secure computations. We have built several novel
MPC applications using Wysteria, including, for the first time, a card dealing application.
Crucially, this application relies on multiple rounds of secure computations, that manip-
ulate the deck of cards in the form of secure state. Wysteria’s easy-to-use, high-level
abstractions simplify the programming task, reducing the risks of programmer mistakes,
while the Wysteria interpreter handles cryptography behind-the-scenes. Wysteria’s
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conceptual, single-threaded semantics also simplifies the reasoning about the programs.
6.1.2 Wys?
Wys? is the first language to provide formal verification capabilities for the mixed-
mode MPC programs. It is also the first DSL to provide a partially verified MPC toolchain.
Wys? enhances the Wysteria semantics with observable traces, with which the program-
mers can state and verify security properties of their programs. Wys? also enhances the
usability of Wysteria – Wys? programs can directly use the standard language constructs
and libraries from the host language F?.
Wys? makes advances towards more reliable and trustworthy MPCs. Using Wys?,
we have shown that tricky MPC programs that use multiple rounds of secure computations
and message exchanges, such as PSI and the joint median computation, can be formally
verified for correctness and security. At the same time, we have used F?’s extraction facil-
ities to extract an executable, verified interpreter for Wys? programs, that we have shown
to be practical and usable.
6.1.3 Knowledge inference
Unlike previous approaches for knowledge inference for MPC programs, we have
taken a more formal approach. We have formally defined the notion of knowledge, the
knowledge inference problem, and a novel constructive notion of knowledge inference. We
have then developed sound and (relatively) complete algorithms to solve these problems.




This dissertation has made important contributions towards the goal of rich, practi-
cal, and trustworthy MPC applications. Yet, we still have a way to go. Below we discuss
limitations of our work and several avenues of future work.
Inferring computation mode annotations. Wysteria requires the programmer to
annotate computation modes, i.e. the programmer needs to decide which parts of the code
are executed locally and which parts are executed securely (the knowledge inference anal-
yses that we developed in Chapter 4 can guide this decision). This can, sometimes, be
onerous for the programmer. SCVM [73], on the other hand, only requires the program-
mers to annotate private data of the parties, while the compiler performs a lightweight,
information-flow based analysis to allocate code blocks to local or secure computations.
However, the information-flow based analysis can miss several opportunities for optimiza-
tions. For example, for the joint median computation example, their analysis would fail to
identify that only the two comparisons need to be done securely. It would be an interest-
ing future work to integrate our knowledge inference analysis directly into the compiler
for inferring computation modes.
Support for stateful secure blocks. Our current Wysteria development lacks the
support of stateful secure computations, the Wysteria type system forbids updating state
inside secure blocks. Recent work [73, 92] has used ORAM-based backends for support-
ing stateful MPCs. One of the key properties that such frameworks aim for is that of
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memory trace obliviousness [76]. Extending Wysteria with an ORAM backend would
enable writing, for example, big-data applications. Interestingly, we can perhaps provide
the memory traces in the Wys? API (adding to the observation traces), and the program-
mers would be able to prove that their programs enjoy the memory trace obliviousness
property, rather than rely on a one-size-fits-all type system.
Supporting the malicious adversary threat model. Our work assumes a semi-honest
adversary, i.e. the parties are honest (they follow the prescribed protocol) but curious (they
want to learn about other parties’ data). However, in some settings this model may not be
applicable. One difficulty in extending mixed-mode MPCs to the malicious setting is that
parties would need to be able to verify the local computations of other parties (secure
computation protocols for malicious settings are already known [93, 94]). One possibil-
ity is to leverage recent advances in verifiable computation [83], where with every local
computation, a party generates a proof about the computation that other parties can verify.
The practicality of such an approach could be an issue.
Eliminating trust from the API specification and the source semantics. As we noted
previously, the Wys? single-threaded semantics that we have formalized in F?, is a trusted
model of the embedded Wysteria API in F?. Although the API and the semantics are
quite small and can be easily audited, there is still a chance of bugs. Formally connecting
the two would require us to formalize the F?’s monadic type system, and connect the Wys?
source semantics to the official F? semantics [37]. Our circuit library is also unverified.
While verifying the circuit compiler that converts Wys? ASTs to boolean circuits seems
straightforward, verifying the GMW protocol is an open and interesting problem. Previous
work on verifying Yao’s garbled circuits protocol [84] provides a starting point.
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Security policies for MPC. Wys? makes observation traces accessible to program-
mers. As we have seen, these traces can be used to reason about the security of the MPC
programs. In particular, we have seen the use of these traces in verifying the security of
the mixed-mode versions of the median and PSI programs. However, users might want to
verify other types of security policies for their MPC programs. For example, Mardziel et
al. [95] present abstract interpretation-based analysis for quantifying adversary knowledge
during an MPC. As they demonstrate, a party can use such an analysis to decide whether
to participate in an MPC depending on if the participation would lead to unacceptable
knowledge increase of the other parties. As another example, for the card dealing applica-
tion, we might want to verify that the dealt cards are from a randomized deck (verifying
freshness of the newly dealt card should be easier). In short, future work might investigate
what other security policies users want to enforce for their MPC programs, and whether
those policies can be formalized in our Wys? framework. Since such policies typically
involve probabilistic reasoning, we would probably use the probabilistic relational version
of F? [52].
Cloud computing. In addition to joint computations over private data, MPC also
opens up new opportunities for cloud computations [78, 96]. Untrusted cloud servers can
obliviously compute a function on a client’s private data using secret shares-based MPC
protocol (such as GMW) or homomorphic encryption. For better performance, the com-
putations could involve both secret and public data, and secure and local computations
(mixed-mode). We can express and verify such computations easily in Wysteria. One
way would be to write the MPC program as a multi-party program betweenn cloud servers,
with some secret-share inputs provided by the client. Moreover, the Wys? interpreter pro-
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vides a generic way to run such computations on the cloud servers. However, to realize
practical cloud applications, we would need to enhance the Wys? toolchain with support
for state (so that applications such as those related to the databases can be programmed),
and a way to bootstrap the computation using client data’s input shares. To handle the
malicious cloud servers, we would need enhancements similar to those for the malicious
model (discussed above).
Building rich MPC applications. Wys? enables the programmers to write the MPC
specific code only in Wys?, while the rest of the application code can be written in the host
language F?. Wys? provides a Foreign Function Interface (FFI) to seamlessly integrate
the MPC code and the rest of the application code. We have, for example, used standard
datatypes such as lists, tuples, and options, and I/O libraries from F? in our example Wys?
applications. However, we leave it for future work to build a more complete, rich MPC
application using Wys?.
Some example applications that we could target are the email client and web browser
plug-in based applications that we discussed at the beginning of Chapter 1. One way to
go forward is to enhance F? with a JavaScript backend (previous F? version used to have
it), and extract the Wys? interpreter and source programs to JavaScript. Building these
applications might also require us to enhance the Wys? FFI interface to handle higher-
order data, it is currently first-order. We can use standard techniques of function wrappers
for this purpose [57]. Such JavaScript applications can then be easily executed using a
web-browser, or a JavaScript engine such as node.js [97]. To run native C/C++ based im-
plementations of the cryptographic protocols (such as GMW), we can look into the Native
Client technology [98].
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One potential concern with JavaScript-based MPC could be the presence of mali-
cious scripts (such as ads) on the same page. Since all the scripts on a webpage run in
the same security sandbox, such malicious scripts can easily access the private data in the
MPC programs. To protect the MPC code and data from the malicious JavaScript context,
we can use recently developed type-based sandboxing techniques [99, 100].
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Appendix A: Formal definitions for Wysteria
In this appendix, we present several formal definitions for Wysteria that were elided
from Chapter 2.
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Γ ` v : τ (Value typing with no mode)
tn-var
x : τ ∈ Γ Γ ` τ
Γ ` x : τ
tn-unit
Γ ` () : unit
tn-inj
Γ ` v : τi j ∈ {1, 2}
τj IsFlat Γ ` τj
Γ ` inji v : τ1 + τ2
tn-prod
Γ ` vi : τi
Γ ` (v1, v2) : τ1 × τ2
tn-princ
Γ ` p : ps (ν = {p})
tn-psone
Γ ` w : ps (singl(ν))
Γ ` {w} : ps (ν = {w})
tn-psunion
Γ ` wi : ps φi
Γ ` w1 ∪ w2 : ps (ν = w1 ∪ w2)
tn-psvar
Γ ` x : ps φ
Γ ` x : ps (ν = x )
tn-sub
Γ ` v : τ ′
Γ ` τ ′ <: τ Γ ` τ
Γ ` v : τ
Figure A.1: Value typing with no mode
Γ `M  ε (Effects delegation)
effdel-empty
Γ `M  ·
effdel-mode
Γ `M  ε Γ `M N
Γ `M  ε,N
Figure A.2: Effects delegation
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τ1 IsFO τ2 IsFO
τ1 + τ2 IsFO
f-prod
τ1 IsFO τ2 IsFO
























τ1 IsFlat τ2 IsFlat
τ1 + τ2 IsFlat
w-prod
τ1 IsFlat τ2 IsFlat
τ1 × τ2 IsFlat
w-arr








Figure A.3: Auxiliary judgements used in the type system
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Γ ` ε Γ `M
Γ ` ε,M






Γ ` w : ps φ
Γ ` ν ⊆ w
wfref-eq
Γ ` w : ps φ
Γ ` ν = w
wfref-conj
Γ ` φi
Γ ` φ1 ∧ φ2




Γ ` τi τi IsFlat
Γ ` τ1 + τ2
wf-prod
Γ ` τi
Γ ` τ1 × τ2
wf-princ
Γ ` φ
Γ ` ps φ
wf-arrow
Γ ` τ1 Γ, x : τ1 ` ε
Γ, x : τ1 ` τ2
Γ ` x :τ1
ε→ τ2
wf-wire
Γ ` w : ps φ




Γ ` Array τ
wf-share
Γ ` w : ps φ Γ ` τ
τ IsFO τ IsFlat
Γ ` Shw τ




Γ ` w : ps φ
Γ ` m(w)
Figure A.4: Well-formedness judgements
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ψJv1KΓM = v2 (Closing value)
vl-var1
x 7→N v ∈ ψ
Γ ` N M
ψJxKΓM = v
vl-var2




















ψJv1 ∪ v2KΓM = ψJv1KΓM ∪ ψJv2KΓM
ψJv1K = v2 (Closing value)
vlt-var1








ψJ(v1, v2)K = (ψJv1K, ψJv2K)
vlt-inj






ψJ(v1 ∪ v2)K = (ψJv1K) ∪ (ψJv2K)






ψJν ⊆ wK = ν ⊆ ψJwK
rl-eq
ψJν = wK = ν = ψJwK
rl-conj
ψJ(φ1 ∧ φ2)K = (ψJφ1K) ∧ (ψJφ2K)
Figure A.5: Environment closing judgements
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ψJ(τ1 + τ2)K = (ψJτ1K) + (ψJτ2K)
tl-prod
ψJ(τ1 × τ2)K = (ψJτ1K)× (ψJτ2K)
tl-princs
ψJ(ps φ)K = ps ψJφK
tl-wire
ψJ(Ww τ)K = W (ψJwK)ψJτK
tl-array
ψJArray τK = ArrayψJτK
tl-share
ψJShw τK = ShψJwKψJτK
tl-arrow
ψJx :τ1
ε→ τ2K = x :ψJτ1K
ψJεK→ ψJτ2K











ψJ(ε1, ε2)K = (ψJε1K), (ψJε2K)





ψJΓ, x : τK = Γ′, x : ψJτK
tel-bnd2
ψJΓK = Γ′
ψJΓ, x :M τK = Γ′, x :ψJMK ψJτK
Figure A.6: Environment closing judgements
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slicep(ψ) ; ψ




p ∈ w slicep(ψ) ; ψ′
slicep(ψ{x 7→p(w) v}) ; ψ′{x 7→p({p}) slicep(v)}
sliceEnv-Bind2
p 6∈ w slicep(ψ) ; ψ′
slicep(ψ{x 7→p(w) v}) ; ψ′
sliceEnv-Bind3




slicep(ψ{x 7→s(w) v}) ; ψ′
slicep(κ) ; κ












slicep(κ :: 〈ψ; x .e〉) ; κ′ :: 〈ψ′; x .e〉
slicep(σ) ; σ
′ (Store slicing: “Store σ sliced for p is σ′. ”)
sliceStr-Par1




slicep(σ{` :p(w) v1, .. , vk}) ; σ′{` :p({p}) v ′1, .. , v ′k}
sliceStr-Par2
p 6∈ w slicep(σ) ; σ′
slicep(σ{` :p(w) v1, .. , vk}) ; σ′
Figure A.7: Slicing judgements
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slicew1∪w2(C) ; π1 · π2
sliceCfg-Par





slice{p}(p(w){σ;κ;ψ; e}) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e}
sliceCfg-Abs1
p 6∈ w
slice{p}(m1(w1){σ;κ;ψ2; e1}) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e ′}
ψ2 = ψ1{x 7→m1(w) ©}
slice{p}(m(w){σ;κ :: 〈m1(w1);ψ1; x .e1〉 ;ψ; e}) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e ′}
sliceCfg-Abs2
p 6∈ w
slice{p}(m(w){σ;κ;ψ2; e1}) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e ′}
ψ2 = ψ1{x 7→ ©}
slice{p}(m(w){σ;κ :: 〈ψ1; x .e1〉 ;ψ; e}) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e ′}
sliceCfg-Sec









· p {σ′;κ1; ·; wait}
p ∈ w
slicep(κ :: 〈p(w);ψ1; x .e1〉) ; κ1
slicep(σ) ; σ
′ κ′smallest
slice{p}(s(w){σ;κ :: 〈p(w);ψ1; x .e1〉 :: κ′;ψ; e}) ; π
Figure A.8: Configuration slicing judgements
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slicep(v) ; v

















slicep((w1 ∪ w2)) ; (w1 ∪ w2)
sliceVal-Wire
slicep(({p : v} ++ v1)) ; {p : v}
sliceVal-WireAbs
p 6∈ dom((v1 ++ v2))




slicep(clos (ψ;λx .e)) ; clos (ψ′;λx .e)
sliceVal-FixClos




slicep(shw v) ; shw v ′
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ3 (Environment composing: “Environment ψ1 composed with ψ2 is ψ3. ”)
compEnv-Emp
· ◦ ψ ; ψ
compEnv-Bind1
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ
ψ1{x 7→p({p}) v1} ◦ ψ2{x 7→p(w) v2}; ψ{x 7→p({p}∪w) (v1 ◦ v2)}
compEnv-Bind2
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ
ψ1{x 7→s(w) v1} ◦ ψ2{x 7→s(w) v2}; ψ{x 7→s(w) (v1 ◦ v2)}
compEnv-Bind3
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ
ψ1{x 7→ v1} ◦ ψ2{x 7→ v2}; ψ{x 7→ v1 ◦ v2}
Figure A.9: Slicing and composing judgments
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v1 ◦ v2 ; v3 (Value composing: “Value v1 composed with v2 is v3. ”)
compVal-Unit
() ◦ () ; ()
compVal-Inj
v1 ◦ v2 ; v ′
inji v1 ◦ inji v2 ; inji v ′
compVal-Prod
vi ◦ v ′i ; v ′′i
(v1, v2) ◦ (v ′1, v ′2) ; (v ′′1 , v ′′2 )
compVal-Ps
(w1 ∪ w2) ◦ (w1 ∪ w2) ; (w1 ∪ w2)
compVal-Wire
{p : v} ◦ v1 ; {p : v} ++ v
compVal-Loc
` ◦ `; `
compVal-Clos
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ
clos (ψ1;λx .e) ◦ clos (ψ2;λx .e) ; clos (ψ;λx .e)
compVal-FixClos
ψ1 ◦ ψ2 ; ψ
clos (ψ1; fix x .λy .e) ◦ clos (ψ2; fix x .λy .e) ; clos (ψ; fix x .λy .e)
compVal-Sh
v1 ◦ v2 ; v
shw v1 ◦ shw v2 ; shw v
σ1 ◦ σ2 ; σ3 (Store composing: “Store σ1 composed with σ2 is σ3. ”)
compStr-Emp
· ◦ ·; ·
compStr-Par
σ1 ◦ σ2 ; σ
σ1{` :p({p}) v1, .. , vk} ◦ σ2{` :p(w) v ′1, .. , v ′k}; σ{` :p({p}∪w) v1 ◦ v ′1, .. , vk ◦ v ′k}
Figure A.10: Value and store composing judgements
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Γ `M v : τ (Runtime value typing)
t-ps-emp
Γ `M · : ps (ν = ·)
t-emp
. ` τ
Γ `M · : W · τ
t-singlwire
M = m(w1)
m = s⇒ N = s(w1)
m = p⇒ N = p({p})
. `N v : τ
. ` τ τ IsFlat
Γ′ `M {p : v} : W {p} τ
t-wirecat
. `M v1 : Ww1 τ
. `M v2 : Ww2 τ
Γ′ `M v1 ++ v2 : W (w1 ∪ w2) τ
t-loc
Σ(`) = τ . ` τ
Γ′ `M ` : Array τ
t-sh
. `M v : τ . ` τ
τ IsFO τ IsFlat
Γ′ `M shw v : Shw τ
t-clos
Σ ` ψ ; Γ
Γ, x : τ1 `M e : τ2; ε
. ` (x :τ1
ε→ τ2)
Γ′ `M clos (ψ;λx .e) : x :τ1
ε→ τ2
t-fixclos
Σ ` ψ ; Γ
Γ, f : y :τ1
ε→ τ2 `M λx .e : y :τ1
ε→ τ2; ·
. ` (y :τ1
ε→ τ2)
Γ′ `M clos (ψ; fix f .λx .e) : y :τ1
ε→ τ2
Γ `M e : τ ; ε (Runtime expression typing)
t-secblk
Γ ` w : ps (ν = w ′)
Γ `s(w) e : τ ; ε
Γ `m(w ′) securew (e) : τ ; ε
Figure A.11: Runtime value and expression typing
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Σ ` σwf Σ; . `M vi : τ
Σ, ` :M τ ` σ{` :M v1, .. , vk}wf
Σ `M κ : τ1 ↪→ τ2 (Stack typing)
tstk-emp
. ` τ w is all parties
Σ `p (w)· : τ ↪→ τ
tstk-frame1
M = (w) N = m( )
Σ ` ψ ; Γ Γ ` τ1
Σ; Γ, x :m(w) τ1 `N e : τ2; ε
Σ `N κ : ψJτ2K ↪→ τ3
Σ `M κ :: 〈N ;ψ; x .e〉 : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ3
tstk-frame2
Σ ` ψ ; Γ Γ ` τ1
Σ; Γ, x : τ1 `M e : τ2; ε
Σ `M κ : ψJτ2K ↪→ τ3
Σ `M κ :: 〈ψ; x .e〉 : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ3
Σ ` ψ ; Γ (Environment typing)
tenv-emp
Σ ` ·; .
tenv-mapp
Σ ` ψ ; Γ
Σ; . `M v : ψJτK
Σ ` ψ{x 7→M v}; Γ, x :M τ
tenv-mapp2
Σ ` ψ ; Γ
Σ; . ` v : ψJτK
Σ ` ψ{x 7→ v}; Γ, x : τ
tenv-munk
Σ ` ψ ; Γ Γ ` τ
Σ ` ψ{x 7→M ©}; Γ, x :M τ
tenv-munk2
Σ ` ψ ; Γ Γ ` τ
Σ ` ψ{x 7→ ©}; Γ, x : τ
Figure A.12: Typing for store, stack, and environment
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Σ ` C : τ (Configuration typing)
tconfig-config
Σ ` σwf . `M
Σ `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ2
Σ ` ψ ; Γ
Σ; Γ `M e : τ1; ε
Σ `M{σ;κ;ψ; e} : τ2
C halted (Configuration halt states)
halted-answer




C st (Stack structure invariants)
stok-sec
κ = κ′ :: 〈p(w);ψ′; x .e2〉 :: κ1
s(w){σ;κ;ψ; e} st
stok-sece
κ = κ′ :: 〈p(w);ψ′; x .e2〉
p(w){σ;κ;ψ; securew ′(e)} st
stok-par1
p(w){σ; ·;ψ; e} st
stok-par2
w ⊆ w ′
p(w){σ;κ;ψ; e} st
p(w){σ;κ :: 〈p(w ′);ψ′; x .e ′〉 ;ψ; e} st
stok-par3
p(w){σ;κ;ψ; e} st
p(w){σ;κ :: 〈ψ′; x .e ′〉 ;ψ; e} st
Figure A.13: Runtime configuration typing
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Appendix B: Wysteria Proofs
We first present several auxiliary lemmas. Main theorems are proved towards the
end. This section is best read electronically, as it has several hyperlinks to aid navigation
(such as for skipping long proofs, etc.).
Lemma 18 (Weakening of type environment).
Let x /∈ dom(Γ) and Γ1 = Γ, x :M1 τ ′.
1. If Γ `M v : τ , then Γ1 `M v : τ .
2. If Γ ` v : τ , then Γ1 ` v : τ .
3. If Γ ` τ , then Γ1 ` τ .
4. If Γ ` φ, then Γ1 ` φ.
5. If Γ ` τ1 <: τ2, then Γ1 ` τ1 <: τ2.
6. If Γ ` N , then Γ1 ` N .
7. If Γ `M N , then Γ1 `M N .
8. If Γ ` ε, then Γ1 ` ε.
Proof. (Skip) By simultaneous induction.
(1.) Induction on derivation of Γ `M v : τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-var. We have,
(a) v = y
(b) y :M τ ∈ Γ ∨ y : τ ∈ Γ
(c) Γ ` τ
((b) means y is different from x )
From (b) we have,
(d) y :M τ ∈ Γ1 ∨ y : τ ∈ Γ1
Use I.H. (3.) on (c) to get,
(e) Γ1 ` τ
With (d) and (e), use rule t-var to derive Γ1 `M v : τ .
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Rule t-unit. Use rule t-unit with Γ1.
Rule t-inj. We have,
(a) Γ `M v : τi
(b) τj IsFlat
(c) Γ ` τj
Use I.H. (1.) on (a), I.H. (3.) on (c), and with (b) use rule t-inj.
Rule t-prod. Use I.H. (1.) on premises.
Rule t-princ. Use rule t-princ with Γ1.
Rule t-psone. Use I.H. (1.) on rule premise, and then use rule t-psone.
Rule t-psunion. Use I.H. (1.) on rule premises, and then use rule t-psunion.
Rule t-psvar. Use I.H. (1.) on rule premise, and then rule t-psvar (note that v = y ,
different from x ).
Rule t-msub. Use of I.H. (6.), (1.), and (7.), and then use rule t-msub.
Rule t-sub. use of I.H. (1.), (5.), and (3.), and then use rule t-sub.
Rule t-singlwire. given premises, use rule t-singlwire with Γ1.
Rule t-wirecat. given premises, use rule t-wirecat with Γ1.
Rule t-loc. given premises, use rule t-loc with Γ1.
Rule t-sh. given premises, use rule t-sh with Γ1.
Rule t-clos. given premises, use rule t-clos with Γ1.
Rule t-fixclos. given premises, use rule t-fixclos with Γ1.
(2.) Similar to proof above.
(3.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wf-unit. use rule wf-unit with Γ1.
Rule wf-sum. use I.H. (3.) on premises, and then use rule wf-sum.
Rule wf-prod. use I.H. (3.) on premises, and then use rule wf-prod.
Rule wf-princ. use I.H. (4.) on rule premise, and then use rule wf-princ.
Rule wf-arrow. we have,
(a) τ = y :τ1
ε→ τ2
(b) Γ ` τ1
(c) Γ, y : τ1 ` ε
(d) Γ, y : τ1 ` τ2
Use I.H. (3.) on (b), I.H. (8.) on (c), and I.H. (3.) on (d) to get
(e) Γ1 ` τ1
(f) Γ, y : τ1, x :M1 τ ′ ` ε
(g) Γ, y : τ1, x :M1 τ ′ ` τ2
Use type environment permutation lemma on (f) and (g) and then use rule wf-arrow
with (e) to get the derivation.
Rule wf-wire. use I.H. (2.) and (3.), and then use rule wf-wire.
Rule wf-array. use I.H. (3.), and then use rule wf-array.
Rule wf-share. use I.H. (2.) and (3.), and then use rule wf-share.
(4.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` φ, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfref-true. use rule wfref-true with Γ1.
Rule wfref-singl. use rule wfref-singl with Γ1.
Rule wfref-sub. use I.H. (2.) on the premise, and then use rule wfref-sub.
Rule wfref-eq. use I.H. (2.) on the premise, and then use rule wfref-eq.
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Rule wfref-conj. use I.H. (4.) on the premises, and then use rule wfref-conj.
(5.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` τ1 <: τ2, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule s-refl. use rule s-refl with Γ1.
Rule s-trans. use I.H. (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-trans.
Rule s-sum. use I.H. (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-sum.
Rule s-prod. use I.H. (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-prod.
Rule s-princs. we have,
(a) JΓK  φ1 ⇒ φ2
We can derive
(b) JΓ1K  φ1 ⇒ φ2
Use rule s-princs again.
Rule s-wire. use I.H. (2.) and (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-wire.
Rule s-array. use I.H. (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-array.
Rule s-share. use I.H. (2.) and (5.) on premises, and then use rule s-share.
Rule s-arrow. use I.H. (5.) on premises, permutation lemma, and then use rule s-
arrow.
(6.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` N , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfpl-top. use rule wfpl-top with Γ1.
Rule wfpl-other. use I.H. (2.) on premise, and then use rule wfpl-other.
(7.) Induction on derivation of Γ `M N , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule d-refl. use I.H. (2.) on premise, and then use rule d-refl.
Rule d-top. use I.H. (2.) on premise, and then use rule d-top.
Rule d-par. use I.H. (2.) on premise, and then use rule d-par.
Rule d-sec. use I.H. (2.) on premise, and then use rule d-sec.
(8.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` ε, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfeff-empty. use rule wfeff-empty with Γ1.
Rule wfeff-mode. use I.H. (8.) and I.H. (6.) on premises, and then use rule wfeff-
mode.
Lemma 19 (Weakening of type environment).
Let x /∈ dom(Γ) and Γ1 = Γ, x : τ ′.
1. If Γ `M v : τ , then Γ1 `M v : τ .
2. If Γ ` v : τ , then Γ1 ` v : τ .
3. If Γ ` τ , then Γ1 ` τ .
4. If Γ ` φ, then Γ1 ` φ.
5. If Γ ` τ1 <: τ2, then Γ1 ` τ1 <: τ2.
6. If Γ ` N , then Γ1 ` N .
7. If Γ `M N , then Γ1 `M N .
8. If Γ ` ε, then Γ1 ` ε.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 18.
Lemma 20 (Weakening of type environment under subtyping).
Let Γ ` τ ′ <: τ and Γ ` τ ′. Let Γ1 = Γ, x :M τ . For Γ2 = Γ, x :M τ ′,
1. If Γ1 `N v : τ , then Γ2 `N v : τ .
2. If Γ1 ` v : τ , then Γ2 ` v : τ .
3. If Γ1 ` τ1 <: τ2, then Γ2 ` τ1 <: τ2.
4. If Γ1 ` τ , then Γ2 ` τ .
5. If Γ1 ` φ, then Γ2 ` φ.
6. If Γ1 ` N M1, then Γ2 ` N M1.
7. If Γ1 `M1, then Γ2 `M1.
8. If Γ1 ` ε, then Γ2 ` ε.
9. If Γ1 `N e : τ ; ε, then Γ2 `N e : τ ; ε.
Proof. (Skip)
By simultaneous induction.
(1.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 `N v : τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-var. We have,
(a) v = y
(b) y :N τ ∈ Γ1 ∨ y : τ ∈ Γ1
(b’) Γ1 ` τ
We have two cases now,
(i) y = x
This means,
(c) M = N
With lemma premise Γ ` τ ′, use Lemma 18 to get,
(d) Γ1 ` τ ′
Use I.H. (4.) on (d) to get,
(e) Γ2 ` τ ′
With (d), use rule t-var on Γ2 to get,
(f) Γ2 `M x : τ ′
With Γ ` τ ′ <: τ , use Lemma 18 to get
(g) Γ2 ` τ ′ <: τ
Use I.H. (4.) on (b’) to get,
(h) Γ2 ` τ (M = N )
With (f), (g) and (h), use rule t-sub.
(ii) y is different from x , in which case rule t-var still holds on Γ2 (with use of I.H.
(4.)).
Rule t-unit. Use rule t-unit with Γ2.
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Rule t-inj. Use I.H. (1.) and (4.) on premises, and then use rule t-inj.
Rule t-prod. Use I.H. (1.) on premises, and then use rule t-prod.
Rule t-princ. Use rule t-princ with Γ2.
Rules t-psone, t-psunion, and t-psvar. Use I.H. (1.) on premises, and then use
respective rule again.
Rule t-msub. We have,
(a) v = y
(b) Γ1 `M1
(c) Γ1 `M1 y : τ
(d) Γ1 `M1 N
Use I.H. (7.) on (b),
(f) Γ2 `M1
Use I.H. (1.) on (c)
(g) Γ2 `M1 y : τ
Use I.H. (6.) on (d)
(h) Γ2 `M1 N
With (f), (g), (h), use rule t-msub (the fact about τ IsSecIn carries)
Rule t-sub. Use I.H. (1.), (3.), and (4.) on premises, and then use rule t-sub.
Runtime value typing rules are similar to proof of Lemma 18 (they don’t depend on
Γ).
(2.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` v : τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule tn-var. We have,
(a) v = y
(b) y : τ ∈ Γ1
(c) Γ1 ` τ
From (b) it follows that y is different from x , and so,
(d) y : τ ∈ Γ2
Use I.H. (4.) on (c) and with (b), use rule tn-var.
Other cases are similar to (1.).
(3.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 ` τ1 <: τ2, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule s-refl. Use rule s-refl with Γ2.
Rules s-trans, s-sum, and s-prod. Use I.H. (3.) on premises, and the use respective
rule.
Rule s-princs. We have,
(a) JΓ1K  φ1 ⇒ φ2
We need to prove JΓ2K  φ1 ⇒ φ2. Informally, only principal types in Γ matter
when deciding logical implications. And, a more precise type in the typing environment
means stronger assumption.
Rule s-wire. Use I.H. (2.) and I.H. (3.) on premises, and then use rule s-wire.
Rule s-array. Use I.H. (3.) on premises, and then use rule s-array.
Rule s-share. Use I.H. (2.) and I.H. (3.) on premises, and then use rule s-share.
Rule s-arrow. Use I.H. (3.) on premises with permutation lemma for second
premise, and then use rule s-arrow.
(4.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 ` τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wf-unit. Use rule wf-unit with Γ2.
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Rule wf-sum. Use I.H. (4.) on premises, and then use rule wf-sum.
Rule wf-prod. Use I.H. (4.) on premises, and then use rule wf-prod.
Rule wf-princ. Use I.H. (5.) on premise, and then use rule wf-princ.
Rule wf-arrow. Use I.H. (4.) and (8.) with permutation lemma on typing environ-
ment, and then use rule wf-arrow.
Rule wf-wire. Use I.H. (2.) and (3.) on premises, and then ise rule wf-wire.
Rule wf-array. Use I.H. (4.) on premise, and then use rule wf-array.
Rule wf-share. Use I.H. (2.) and (4.) on premises, and then use rule wf-share.
(5.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 ` φ, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfref-true. Use rule wfref-true with Γ2.
Rule wfref-singl. Use rule wfref-singl with Γ2.
Rules wfref-sub and wfref-eq. Use I.H. on premises, and then use respective rule.
Rule wfref-conj. Use I.H. on premises, and then use rule wfref-conj.
(6.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 ` N M1, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule d-refl. Use I.H. on premise, and then use rule d-refl.
Rule d-top. Use I.H. on premise, and then use rule d-top.
Rules d-par and d-sec. Similar use of I.H. and then respective rule.
(7.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 `M1, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfpl-top. Use rule wfpl-top with Γ2.
Rule wfpl-other. Use I.H. on premise, and then use rule wfpl-other.
(8.) Induction on derivation of Γ1 ` ε, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfeff-empty. Use rule wfeff-empty with Γ2.
Rule wfeff-mode. Use I.H. on premises, and then use rule wfeff-mode.
(9.) Proof by induction on derivation of Γ1 `N e : τ ; ε.
Lemma 21 (Can derive self equality in refinements).
If Γ ` v : ps φ, then Γ ` v : ps (ν = v).
Proof. Structural induction on v .
v = x . We have,
(a) Γ ` x : ps φ
With (a) use rule tn-psvar to get Γ ` x : ps (ν = x ).
v = p. Use rule tn-princ.
v = {w}. Use rule tn-psone.
v = w1 ∪ w2. Use rule tn-psunion.
No other form of v is possible.
Lemma 22 (Can derive self subset refinements).
If Γ ` v : ps φ, then Γ ` v : ps (ν ⊆ v).
Proof. Using Lemma 21, we have
(a) Γ ` v : ps (ν = v)
Also,
(b) JΓK  (ν = v)⇒ (ν ⊆ v)
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With (b) use rule s-princs to get
(c) Γ ` ps (ν = v) <: ps (ν ⊆ v)
With lemma premise Γ ` v : ps φ, we can use rule wfref-sub and rule wf-princ
to get,
(d) Γ ` ps (ν ⊆ v)
With (a), (c), and (d), use rule t-sub.
Lemma 23 (Transitivity of Delegation).
If Γ `M M1, and Γ `M1 M2, then Γ `M M2.
Lemma 24 (Secure place can only delegate to self).
If Γ ` s(w1) m(w2), then
1. m = s
2. Γ ` w2 : ps (ν = w1)
3. Γ ` p(w1) m(w2)
Proof. Γ ` s(w1)  m(w2) can only be derived using rule d-refl, which immediately
gives us (1.) and (2.). For (3.), use rule d-sec and then Lemma 23.
Lemma 25 (Delegation implies well-formedness).
If Γ `M , Γ `M N , then Γ ` N .
Proof. Proof by induction on derivation of Γ `MN , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule d-refl. We have,
(a) M = m(w1)
(b) N = m(w2)
(c) Γ ` w2 : ps (ν = w1)
With (c), use rule wfpl-other on m(w2).
Rule d-top. We have,
(a) M = >
(b) N = m(w)
(c) Γ `> w : ps φ
With (c), use rule wfpl-other to get Γ ` m(w).
Rules d-par and d-sec. Similar to rule d-top.
Lemma 26 (Effect delegation implies well-formedness).
If Γ `M , Γ `M  ε, then Γ ` ε.
Proof. Straightforward extension of Lemma 25.
Lemma 27 (Typing results in well-formed types).
Let Γ `M .
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1. If Γ `M v : τ , then Γ ` τ .
2. If Γ ` v : τ , then Γ ` τ .
3. If Γ `M e : τ ; ε, then Γ ` τ and Γ `M  ε.
Proof. (Skip)
Proof by induction on derivation of Γ `M v : τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-var. Follows from rule premise.
Rule t-unit. Use rule wf-unit.
Rule t-inj. With rule premises, use rule wf-sum.
Rule t-prod. Use I.H. on rule premises, and then rule wf-prod.
Rule t-princ. We have
(a) Γ `M p : ps (ν = {p})
With (a), use rule wfref-eq and rule wf-princ.
Rules t-psone, t-psunion, and t-psvar. Use rule premise in rule wfref-eq and
rule wf-princ.
Rule t-msub. We have,
(a) Γ `N x : τ
(b) Γ ` N M
Use I.H. on (a) to get Γ ` τ
Rule t-sub. Follows from rule premise.
Rule t-singlwire. We have,
(a) v = {p : v ′}
(c) τ = W {p} τ
(d) . ` τ
(d’) τ IsFlat
Use rule tn-princ to get,
(e) . ` p : ps (ν = {p})
With (e), use rule t-psone to get,
(f) . ` {p} : ps (ν = {p})
Use weakening on (d) and (f), and then with (d’) use rule wf-wire.
Rule t-wirecat. We have,
(a) v = v1 ++ v2
(b) τ = W (w1 ∪ w2) τ
(c) . `M v1 : Ww1 τ
(d) . `M v2 : Ww2 τ
Use I.H. on (c) and (d) to get,
(e) . `Ww1 τ
(f) . `Ww2 τ
Invert rule wf-wire on (e) and (f) to get,
(g) . ` τ
(h) . ` wi : ps φi
Use weakening on (g) and (h) (with Γ), and then use rule wf-wire.
Rule t-loc. Follows from the premise.
Rule t-sh. We have,
181
(a) . `M
(b) M = (w)
(c) . ` τ
With (a) and (b), invert rule wfpl-other to get,
(d) . ` w : ps φ
Use weakening on (c) and (d), and then use rule wf-share.
Rules t-clos and t-fixclos. Follows from the premises (with weakening).
(2.) Induction on derivation of Γ `M e : τ ; ε, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-fst. We have,
(a) e = fst (v)
(b) ε = ·
(c) Γ `M v : τ1 × τ2 (rule premise)
(d) τ = τ1
With (c), use I.H. to get
(e) Γ ` τ1 × τ2
With (e), invert rule rule wf-prod to get,
(f) Γ ` τ1
With (f), and rule effdel-empty, we have the proof.
Rule t-snd. Similar to rule t-fst.
Rule t-case. Follows from the premises.
Rule t-app.
Rules t-let1, t-let2, and t-fix. Follows directly from rule premises.
Rule t-array. We have,
(a) e = array(v1, v2)
(b) τ = Array τ2
(c) Γ `M v2 : τ2 (rule premise)
With (c), use Lemma 27, to get
(d) Γ ` τ2
With (d), use rule wf-array to get Γ ` Array τ2. Γ ` M  · follows from
rule effdel-empty.
Rule t-select. Use inversion on Γ ` Array τ (from rule premise and I.H.).
Rule t-update. Use rule wf-unit and rule effdel-empty.
Rule t-wire. We have,
(a) Γ ` w1 : ps (ν ⊆ w2)
(b) Γ `N v : τ
Use I.H. on (b) and then with (a) use rule wf-wire.
Rule t-wproj. Use I.H. on premise Γ `m(w1) v : Ww2 τ , and then invert rule wf-
wire.
Rule t-wireun. Use I.H. on premises and then rule wf-wire.
Rule t-wfold. Follows from rule premise Γ `M v2 : τ2.
Rule t-wapp. We have,
(a) e = wappw(v1, v2)
(b) τ = Ww τ2
(c) M = p( )
(d) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
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(e) Γ `M v2 : Ww (τ1
·→ τ2)
With (d) and (e), use I.H., to get,
(f) Γ `Ww (τ1
·→ τ2)
(g) Γ ` w : ps φ
Inverting rule wf-wire on (f),




Inverting rule wf-arrow on (h) to get
(j) Γ ` τ2
Inverting rule w-arr on (i),
(k) τ2 IsFlat
With (g), (j), (k), use rule wf-wire to get Γ `Ww τ2.
Rule t-waps. We have,
(a) e = wapsw(v1, v2)
(b) M = s( )
(c) τ2 IsFlat
(d) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
(e) Γ `M λx .e : τ1
·→ τ2; ·
Invert rule wf-wire on (d) to get,
(f) Γ ` w : ps φ
Invert rule wf-arrow on (e) to get,
(g) Γ ` τ2
With (b), (f), (g), (c), use rule wf-wire, to get Γ `Ww τ2.
Rule t-wcopy. Use I.H. on premise.
Rule t-makesh. Invert rule wfpl-other with lemma premise Γ ` M , use I.H. on
Γ `M v : τ , and then use rule wf-share.
Rule t-combsh. Invert rule wf-share on rule premise.
Lemma 28 (Subtyping inversion).
1. If Γ ` τ <: unit, then τ = unit.
2. If Γ ` τ <: τ1 × τ2, then τ = τ3 × τ4 s.t. Γ ` τ3 <: τ1 and Γ ` τ4 <: τ2.
3. If Γ ` τ <: τ1 + τ2, then τ = τ3 + τ4 s.t. Γ ` τ3 <: τ1 and Γ ` τ4 <: τ2.
4. If Γ ` τ <: ps φ, then τ = ps φ2 s.t. JΓK  φ2 ⇒ φ.
5. If Γ ` τ <: Ww2 τ2 and Γ ` w2 : ps φ, then τ = Ww1 τ1 s.t. Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
and Γ ` τ1 <: τ2.
6. If Γ ` τ <: Array τ2, then τ = Array τ1 s.t. Γ ` τ1 <: τ2 and Γ ` τ2 <: τ1.
7. If Γ ` Shw2 τ2 and Γ ` w2 : ps φ, then τ = Shw1 τ1 s.t. Γ ` w1 : ps (ν = w2),
Γ ` τ1 <: τ2, and Γ ` τ2 <: τ1.
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8. If Γ ` τ <: x :τ1
ε→ τ2, then τ = x :τ3
ε→ τ4 s.t. Γ ` τ1 <: τ3 and Γ, x : τ1 ` τ4 <:
τ2.
Proof. (Skip)
(1.) Only possible last rules in derivation of Γ ` τ <: unit are rule s-refl (imme-
diate) and rule s-trans (Use I.H. twice)
(2.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` τ <: τ1× τ2, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule s-refl. We get τ = τ1× τ2, use rule s-refl on τ1 and τ2 to complete the proof.
Rule s-trans. We have,
(a) Γ ` τ <: τ ′
(b) Γ ` τ ′ <: τ1 × τ2
Use I.H. on (b) to get,
(c) τ ′ = τ ′1 × τ ′2
(d) Γ ` τ ′1 <: τ1
(e) Γ ` τ ′2 <: τ2
Substitute τ ′ from (c) in (a), and then use I.H. on (a) to get,
(f) τ = τ3 × τ4
(g) Γ ` τ3 <: τ ′1
(h) Γ ` τ4 <: τ ′2
Use rule s-trans on (g) and (d), and then (h) and (e), with (f) this completes the
proof.
Rule s-prod. Read from the rule.
(3.) Similar to (2.)
(4.) Induction on derivation of Γ ` τ <: ps φ, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule s-refl. τ = ps φ, and JΓK  φ⇒ φ is trivially true.
Rule s-trans. We have,
(a) Γ ` τ <: τ1
(b) Γ ` τ1 <: ps φ
Use I.H. on (b), we get
(c) τ1 = ps φ1
(d) JΓK  φ1 ⇒ φ
Substitute (c) in (a) to get
(e) Γ ` τ <: ps φ1
Use I.H. on (e), we get
(f) τ = ps φ2
(g) JΓK  φ2 ⇒ φ1
From (f) and transitivity of implication on (g) and (d), we have the proof.
Rule s-princs. Read from the rule.
(5.) Proof by induction on derivation of Γ ` τ <: Ww2 τ2, case analysis on the last
rule used.
Rule s-refl. We have τ = Ww2 τ2, thus τ1 = τ2 and w1 = w2. To prove Γ `
τ1 <: τ2, use rule s-refl. To prove Γ `M w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w2), use Lemma 22 (we have
Γ ` w2 : ps φ from premise.)
Rule s-trans. We have,
(a) Γ ` τ <: τ ′
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(b) Γ ` τ ′ <: Ww2 τ2
Using I.H. (6.) on (b) to get,
(c) τ ′ = Ww3 τ3
(d) Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w3)
(e) Γ ` τ3 <: τ2
Using Lemma 27 on (d), we get
(f) Γ ` ps (ν ⊆ w3)
Inverting rule wf-princ on (f),
(g) Γ ` ν ⊆ w3
Inverting rule wfref-sub, we get
(h) Γ ` w3 : ps φ
Use I.H. on (a) (now that we have (h)) (substitute τ ′ from (c))
(i) τ = Ww1 τ1
(j) Γ ` w3 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
(k) Γ ` τ3 <: τ1
From (j), we can use rule s-princs to derive:
(l) Γ ` ps (ν ⊆ w3) <: ps (ν ⊆ w1)
From (j), use Lemma 27 and inversions on rule wf-princ and rule wfref-sub to get
(m) Γ ` w1 : ps φ
With (d), (l), and (m), use rule t-sub to derive
(n) Γ ` w2 : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
With (e) and (k), use rule s-trans to complete the proof.
Rule s-wire. Read from the rule.
(6.) Straightforward using I.H.
(7.) Similar to (5.)
(8.) Interesting case is rule s-trans. We have,
(a) Γ ` τ <: τ ′
(b) Γ ` τ ′ <: x :τ1
ε→ τ2
Using I.H. (9.) on (b),
(c) τ ′ = x :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2
(d) Γ ` τ1 <: τ ′1
(e) Γ, x : τ1 ` τ ′2 <: τ2
Using I.H. on (a) now (with (c))
(f) τ = x :τ3
ε→ τ4
(g) Γ ` τ ′1 <: τ3
(h) Γ, x : τ ′1 ` τ4 <: τ ′2
With (d), (h), use Lemma 20, to get
(i) Γ, x : τ1 ` τ4 <: τ ′2
Use rule s-trans on (d) and (g), and then on (i) and (e) to complete the proof.
Lemma 29 (Canonical forms).
1. If . `M v : unit, then v = ().
2. If . `M v : τ1 × τ2, then v = (v1, v2) s.t. . `M v1 : τ1 and . `M v2 : τ2.
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3. If . `M v : τ1 + τ2, then v = inji v ′ s.t. . `M v ′ : τi .
4. If . `M v : ps φ, then v = w1 ∪ w2 s.t. J.K  φ[w1 ∪ w2/ν].
5. If . `p(w ′) v : Ww τ , then v = v1 ++ v2 s.t. w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2) and for all
p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2), . `p({p}) v [p] : τ .
6. If . `s(w1) v : Ww τ , then v = v1 ++ v2 s.t. w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2) and for all
p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2), . `s(w1) v [p] : τ .
7. If . `M v : Array τ , then v = ` s.t. Σ(`) = τ1, . ` τ1 <: τ , and . ` τ <: τ1.
8. If . `M v : Shw τ , then v = shw v ′ s.t. . `M v ′ : τ .
9. If . `M v : x :τ1
ε→ τ2, then either v = clos (ψ;λx .e) s.t. Σ ` ψ ; Γ and
Γ, x : τ1 `M e : τ2; ε, or v = clos (ψ; fix f .λx .e) s.t. Σ ` ψ ; Γ and Γ, f : y :τ1
ε→
τ2 `M λx .e : y :τ1
ε→ τ2; ·.
10. If . ` N , then N = > or N = m(w1 ∪ w2).
Proof. (Skip) By simultaneous induction.
(1.) Proof by induction on derivation of . `M v : unit, case analysis on the last rule
used.
Rule t-unit. Follows from the rule.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ
(b) . ` τ <: unit
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get
(c) τ = unit
Use I.H. on (a).
(2.) Proof by induction on derivation of . `M v : τ1 × τ2, case analysis on the last
rule used.
Rule t-prod. We have,
(a) v = (v1, v2)
(b) . `M vi : τi
Proof follows.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ
(b) . ` τ <: τ1 × τ2
(c) . ` τ1 × τ2
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get,
(d) τ = τ3 × τ4
(e) . ` τ3 <: τ1
(f) . ` τ4 <: τ2
Use I.H. on (a) (subtituting from (d)) to get,
(g) v = (v1, v2)
(h) . ` v1 : τ3
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(i) . ` v2 : τ4
Inverting rule wf-prod on (c),
(k) . ` τ1
(l) . ` τ2
Use rule t-sub on (h), (e) and (k), and then (i), (f), and (l) to get rest of the proof.
(3.) Similar to rule t-prod.
(4.) Induction on derivation of . `M v : ps φ, case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-princ. We have,
(a) v = p
(b) φ = (ν = {p})
Choose w1 = {p}, w2 = ·, and J.K  (ν = {p})[{p}/ν].
Rule t-psone. We have,
(a) v = {w}
(b) φ = (ν = {w})
Choose w1 = {w}, w2 = ·, and then similar to rule t-princ.
Rule t-psunion. Follows similarly.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ
(b) . ` τ <: ps φ
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get,
(c) τ = ps φ1
(d) J.K  φ1 ⇒ φ
Use I.H. on (a) (substituting from (c)),
(e) v = w1 ∪ w2
(f) φ1[v/ν]
With (e), (d), and (f), we have the proof.
(5.) Induction on derivation of . `p(w ′) v : Ww τ , case analysis on the last rule
used.
Rule t-singlwire. We have,
(a) v = {p : v ′}
(b) w = {p}
Choose v1 = {p : v ′}, v2 = ·, clearly w ⊆ dom(v1 ∪ v2). We need to show
. `p({p}) v ′ : τ , it follows from premise of the rule.
Rule t-wirecat. We have,
(a) v = v1 ++ v2
(b) w = w1 ∪ w2
(c) . `p(w ′) v1 : Ww1 τ
(d) . `p(w ′) v2 : Ww2 τ
Use I.H. on (c) to get,
(e) w1 ⊆ dom(v1)
(f) for all p ∈ dom(v1), . `p({p}) v1[p] : τ
Use I.H. on (d) to get,
(g) w2 ⊆ dom(v2)
(h) for all p ∈ dom(v2), . `p({p}) v2[p] : τ
From (e) and (g), we get
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(g) w1 ∪ w2 ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
From (f) and (h), we get
(i) for all p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2), . `p({p}) (v1 ++ v2)[p] : τ
From (a), (g), and (i), we have the proof.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `p(w ′) v : τ ′
(b) . ` τ ′ <: Ww τ
(c) . `Ww τ
Invert rule wf-wire on (c) to get,
(c’) . ` τ
(d) . ` w : ps φ
With (b) and (d) use Lemma 28 to get,
(e) τ ′ = Ww1 τ1
(f) . ` w : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
(g) . ` τ1 <: τ
Use I.H. (5.) on (a) (substituting τ from (c)) to get,
(h) v = v1 ++ v2
(i) w1 ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
(j) for all p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2), . `p({p}) v [p] : τ1
Use I.H. (f) to get,
(k) J.K  (ν ⊆ w1)[w/ν]
From (i) and (k) we get,
(l) w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
Use rule t-sub with (j), (g) and (c’), we have the proof.
(6.) Induction on derivation of . `s(w1) v : Ww τ , case analysis on the last rule.
Rule t-singlwire. We have,
(a) v = {p : v ′}
(b) w = {p}
(c) . `s(w1) v ′ : τ
Choose v1 = {p : v ′}, v2 = ·. We have w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2), and (c) completes rest
of the proof.
Rule t-wirecat. We have,
(a) v = v1 ++ v2
(b) . `s(w1) v1 : Ww ′1 τ
(c) . `s(w1) v2 : Ww ′2 τ
(d) w = w1 ∪ w2
Use I.H. (6.) on (b), and on (c) to get,
(e) w ′1 ⊆ dom(v1)
(f) w ′2 ⊆ dom(v2)
(g) for all p ∈ dom(v1), . `s(w1) v1[p] : τ .
(h) for all p ∈ dom(v2), . `s(w1) v2[p] : τ .
Using (d), (e), and (f), we get,
(i) w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
(g), and (h) complete rest of the proof.
Rule t-sub. We have,
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(a) . `s(w1) v : τ ′′
(b) . ` τ ′′ <: Ww τ
(c) . `Ww τ
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get,
(d) τ ′′ = Ww ′ τ ′
(e) . ` w : ps (ν ⊆ w ′)
(f) . ` τ ′ <: τ
Use I.H. (6.) on (a) (substituting (d) in (a)),
(g) v = v1 ++ v2
(h) w ′ ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
(i) for all p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2), . `s(w1) v [p] : τ ′.
Use I.H. on (e) to get,
(j) J.K  (ν ⊆ w ′)[w/ν]
Use (h) and (j) to get,
(k) w ⊆ dom(v1 ++ v2)
Invert rule wf-wire on (c) to get,
(l) . ` τ
With (i), (f), and (l), use rule t-sub to complete rest of the proof.
(7.) Induction on derivation of . `M v : Array τ , case analysis on the last rule.
Rule t-loc. Read from the rule, use rule s-refl.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ ′
(b) . ` τ ′ <: Array τ
(c) . ` Array τ
With (b) use Lemma 28 to get,
(d) τ ′ = Array τ ′′
(e) . ` τ ′′ <: τ
(f) . ` τ <: τ ′′
Use I.H. (7.) on (a) (substituting τ ′ from (d)),
(g) v = `
(h) Σ(`) = τ1
(i) . ` τ1 <: τ ′′
(j) . ` τ ′′ <: τ1
Use rule s-trans on (i) and (e), and then (f) and (j) to complete the proof.
(8.) Induction on derivation of . `M v : Shw τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule t-sh. Read from the rule.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ ′
(b) . ` τ ′ <: Shw τ
(c) . ` Shw τ
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get,
(d) τ ′ = Shw2 τ2
(e) . ` w2 : ps (ν = w)
(f) . ` τ2 <: τ
(g) . ` τ <: τ2
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Use I.H. (8.) on (a) (substituting τ ′ from (d)),
(h) v = shw v ′
(j) . `M v ′ : τ2
Invert rule wf-share on (c) to get,
(l) . ` τ
With (j), (f), and (l), use rule s-trans to complete rest of the proof.
(9.) Induction on derivation of . `M v : x :τ1
ε→ τ2, case analysis on the last rule
used.
Rule t-clos. Read from the rule.
Rule t-fixclos. Read from the rule.
Rule t-sub. We have,
(a) . `M v : τ ′
(b) . ` τ ′ <: x :τ1
ε→ τ2
(c) . ` (x :τ1
ε→ τ2)
With (b), use Lemma 28 to get,
(d) τ ′ = x :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2
(e) . ` τ1 <: τ ′1
(f) ., x : τ1 ` τ ′2 <: τ2
Use I.H. on (a) (substituting τ ′ from (d)), we have 2 cases,
(i) v = clos (ψ;λx .e)
(g) Σ ` ψ ; Γ
(h) Γ, x : τ ′1 `M e : τ ′2; ε
Use weakening and permutation of type environment on (f) and (e) to get,
(i) Γ, x : τ1 ` τ ′2 <: τ2
(j) Γ ` τ1 <: τ ′1
With (h) and (j), use Lemma 20 to get (well-formedness of τ1 follows from Lemma 27
applied on typing of v ).
(k) Γ, x : τ1 `M e : τ ′2; ε
With (k) and (i), use rule t-sube to complete the proof.
Second case is,
(ii) v = clos (ψ; fix f .λx .e)
(g) Σ ` ψ ; Γ
(h) Γ, f : y :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2 `M λx .e : y :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2; ·.
Use weakening of type environment on (b) to get,
(i) Γ ` y :τ ′1
ε→ τ ′2 <: x :τ1
ε→ τ2
With (h) and (i), use Lemma 20, and then rule t-sube to complete the proof (similar
to above).
(10.) Induction on derivation of . ` N , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wfpl-top. Follows.
Rule wfpl-other. Use I.H. on premise.
Lemma 30 (Delegation among closed places).
Let w be a closed principal set. Let . ` m(w) N . Then, N = m1(w1) s.t. one of
the following holds:
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1. m1 = m and w1 = w .
2. m = p, m1 = p, and w1 ⊆ w .
3. m = p, m1 = s, and w1 = w .
Proof. Induction on derivation of . ` m(w)N , case analysis on the last rule used, using
Lemma 29.
Lemma 31 (Environment lookup same across delegation).
If Γ `M N , then ψJxKΓN = ψJxKΓM .
Proof. Case analysis on ψJxKΓM .
Rule vl-var1. We have,
(a) ψJxKΓM = v
(b) x 7→M1 v ∈ ψ
(c) Γ `M1 M
With (c) use Lemma 23 to get,
(d) Γ `M1 N
With (b) and (d), we get ψJxKΓN = v
Rule vl-var2. Use rule vl-var2 again with N .
Rule vl-var3. Use rule vl-var3 again with N .
Lemma 32 (Well-formedness of runtime environment).
Let Σ ` ψ ; Γ and Γ,Γ′ `M . Also, let dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = φ.
1. If Γ,Γ′ `M v : τ , then ψJΓ′K `ψJMK ψJvKψJΓ
′K
ψJMK : ψJτK.
2. If Γ,Γ′ ` v : τ , then ψJΓ′K ` ψJvK : ψJτK.
3. If Γ,Γ′ ` τ1 <: τ2, then ψJΓ′K ` ψJτ1K <: ψJτ2K.
4. If Γ,Γ′ ` τ , then ψJΓ′K ` ψJτK.
5. If Γ,Γ′ ` φ, then ψJΓ′K ` ψJφK.
6. If Γ,Γ′ ` N , then ψJΓ′K ` ψJNK.
7. If Γ,Γ′ ` ε, then ψJΓ′K ` ψJεK.
8. If Γ,Γ′ ` N1 N2, then ψJΓ′K ` ψJN1K  ψJN2K.
Proof. (Skip) By simultaneous induction.
(1.) By induction on derivation of Γ,Γ′ `M v : τ , case analysis on the last rule
used.
Rule t-var. We have two cases here,
(a) x :M τ ∈ Γ,Γ′
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(b) Γ,Γ′ ` τ
If x :M τ ∈ Γ, then using rule tenv-mapp,
(c) x 7→M v ∈ ψ
(d) . `M v : τ
(e) M is closed.
Since M is closed,
(f) ψJMK = M
(g) ψJΓ′K `M M
Use Lemma 27 on (e),
(h) . ` τ
Since τ is closed,
(i) ψJτK = τ




We want to prove,
(k) ψJΓ′K `ψJMK ψJxKψJΓ
′K
ψJMK : ψJτK.
i.e. (substitute using (f)),
(l) ψJΓ′K `M ψJxKψJΓ
′K
M : ψJτK.
i.e. (substitute using (j) and (i)),
(m) ψJΓ′K `M v : τ .
which is true by weakening (d).
If x :M τ ∈ Γ′, then
(c) x :ψJMK ψJτK ∈ ψJΓ′K
Using I.H. on (b), we get,
(d) ψJΓ′K ` ψJτK
Since dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′) = φ, we have





We want to prove,
(g) ψJΓ′K `ψJMK ψJxKψJΓ
′K
ψJMK : ψJτK
Substitute (f), we want
(h) ψJΓ′K `ψJMK x : ψJτK
Derive using rule t-var on (c) and (d).
The second case is,
(a) x : τ ∈ Γ,Γ′
(b) Γ ` τ
Split on two cases Γ and Γ′ as above.
Rule t-unit. We have,
(a) v = ()
(b) τ = unit




(d) ψJunitK = unit
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So, now we need to prove ψJΓ′K `ψJMK () : unit.
Follows from rule t-unit.
Rules t-inj and t-prod. Use I.H. on premises and then correponding typing rule.
Rule t-princ. Similar to rule t-unit.
Rules t-psone, t-psunion, and t-psvar. Use I.H. on premises and then correspond-
ing typing rule.
Rule t-msub. We have,
(a) Γ,Γ′ ` N
(b) Γ,Γ′ ` N M
(c) Γ,Γ′ `N x : τ
Use I.H. on (a) and (c) to get,
(d) ψJΓ′K `ψJNK ψJxKψJΓ
′K
ψJNK : ψJτK.
Use I.H. on (b),
(e) ψJΓ′K ` ψJNK  ψJMK
Use I.H. on (a),
(f) ψJΓ′K ` ψJNK
With (d), (e), and (f), use rule t-msub to get,
(g) ψJΓ′K `ψJMK ψJxKψJΓ
′K
ψJNK : ψJτK






Substitute in (g) to get the proof.
(2.) Similar to proof of (1.)
(3.) Induction on derivation of Γ,Γ′ ` τ1 <: τ2, case analysis on the last rule.
Rule s-refl. Use Rule s-refl on ψJτK
Rule s-trans. Use I.H. on premises, and then rule s-trans.
Rule s-sum. Use I.H. on premises, and then rule s-sum.
Rule s-prod. Use I.H. on premises, and then rule s-prod.
Rule s-princs.
Rules s-wire, s-array, and s-share. Use I.H. on premises and then corresponding
rule.
Rule s-arrow. We have,
(a) Γ,Γ′ ` τ ′1 <: τ1
(b) Γ,Γ′, x : τ ′1 ` τ2 <: τ ′2
Use I.H. on (a),
(c) ψJΓ′K ` ψJτ ′1K <: ψJτ1K
Use I.H. on (b),
(d) ψJΓ′K, x : ψJτ ′1K ` ψJτ2K <: ψJτ ′2K
With (c) and (d), use rule s-arrow.
(4.) By induction on derivation of Γ,Γ′ ` τ , case analysis on the last rule used.
Rule wf-unit. Since ψJunitK = unit, use rule wf-unit.
Rule wf-sum. Use I.H. on the premises, and then use rule wf-sum.
Rule wf-prod. Use I.H. on the premises, and then use rule wf-prod.
Rule wf-princ. Use I.H. on the premise, and then use rule wf-princ.
Rule wf-arrow. We have,
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(a) τ = x :τ1
ε→ τ2
(b) Γ,Γ′ ` τ1
(c) Γ,Γ′, x : τ1 ` ε
(d) Γ,Γ′, x : τ1 ` τ2
Using I.H. on (b), (c), and (d), we get,
(e) ψJΓ′K ` ψJτ1K
(f) ψJΓ′K, x : ψJτ1K ` ψJεK
(g) ψJΓ′K, x : ψJτ1K ` ψJτ2K
Use rule wf-arrow on (e), (f), and (g).
Rule wf-wire. Use I.H. on the premises, and then use rule wf-wire.
Rule wf-array. Use I.H. on the premise, and then use rule wf-array.
Rule wf-share. Similar to rule wf-wire.
(5.), (6.), (7.), (8.): Induction on respective derivations.
Lemma 33 (Well-formedness of runtime environment).
Let Σ ` ψ ; Γ and Γ `M .
1. If Γ `M v : τ , then . `ψJMK ψJvK.ψJMK : ψJτK.
2. If Γ ` v : τ , then . ` ψJvK : ψJτK.
3. If Γ ` τ1 <: τ2, then . ` ψJτ1K <: ψJτ2K.
4. If Γ ` τ , then . ` ψJτK.
5. If Γ ` φ, then . ` ψJφK.
6. If Γ ` N , then . ` ψJNK.
7. If Γ ` ε, then . ` ψJεK.
8. If Γ ` N1 N2, then . ` ψJN1K  ψJN2K.
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 32 with Γ′ = .
Lemma 34 (Subset of environment).
If ψ1 ⊆ ψ2, Σ1 ` ψ1 ; Γ1, Σ1 ` ψ2 ; Γ2, Γ1 ` τ , and Γ2 ` τ , then ψ1JτK =
ψ2JτK.
Lemma 35 (Value and Environment Slicing Always Exists).
For all v and ψ, slicep(v) ; v ′ and slicep(ψ) ; ψ′.
Proof. Structural induction on v and ψ.
Lemma 36 (Going up the stack for slicing retains config well-typedness).
1. If Σ ` m(w){σ;κ :: 〈m1(w1);ψ1; x .e1〉 ;ψ; e} : τ , then
Σ ` m1(w1){σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→m1(w) ©}; e1} : τ
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2. If Σ ` m(w){σ;κ :: 〈ψ1; x .e1〉 ;ψ; e} : τ , then Σ ` m(w){σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→ ©}; e1} :
τ
Lemma 37 (Existence of Slice).
If Σ ` C : τ and C st, then slicew(C) ; π.
Proof. Let C = M{σ;κ;ψ; e}. We consider slice{p}(C). If M = p(w) s.t. p ∈ w , then
use rule sliceCfg-Par with rules stok-par1, stok-par2, and stok-par3. IfM = s(w) s.t.
p ∈ w , then use rule sliceCfg-Sec with rule stok-sec(we have C st. When p 6∈ w , stack
cannot be empty (empty stack is well typed only in a context when all parties are present,
rule tstk-emp). Then, use rule sliceCfg-Abs1 or rule sliceCfg-Abs2 with Lemma 36
for well-typedness of inductive configurations.
Lemma 38 (Lookup in sliced environment).
1. If ψJvKp(w) = v ′, p ∈ w , slicep(ψ) ; ψ′, and slicep(v ′) ; v ′′, then ψ′JvKp({p}) =
v ′′.





Lemma 39 (Unique local transitions).
If p {σ;κ;ψ; e} −→ p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e ′}, then there exists no other rule by which
p {σ;κ;ψ; e} can step (and σ′, κ′, ψ′ are unique).
Proof. Proof sketch: By structural induction on e, and verifying that every syntactic form
corresponds to one semantics rule. Moreover the unique rule is also algorithmic: the
input configuration uniquely determines the output configuration, including the rule stpl-
array, where the fresh location is chosen by the function nextM(σ).
Theorem 40 (Progress).
If Σ ` C : τ , then either C halted or C −→ C ′. Moreover if C st, then C ′ st.
Proof. (Skip) We have C = M{σ;κ;ψ; e}, Σ ` σwf, . ` M , Σ `M κ : τ1 ↪→ τ2,
Σ ` ψ ; Γ, and Σ; Γ `M e : τ1; ε. We proceed by induction on derivation of Σ; Γ `M
e : τ1; ε, case analysis on the last rule used.
Since . `M , ψJMK = M .
Rule t-fst. We have,
(a) e = fst (v)
(b) Γ `M v : τ1 × τ2
With (b), use Lemma 33 to get,
(c) . `M ψJvK.M : (ψJτ1K)× (ψJτ2K)
With (c), use Lemma 29 to get,
(d) ψJvK.M = (v1, v2)
C can now take step using stpc-local and stpl-fst to M{σ;κ;ψ; v1}.
Rule t-snd. Similar to rule t-fst.
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Rule t-case. We have,
(a) e = case (v , x1.e2, x2.e2)
(b) Γ `M v : τ1 + τ2
(c) Γ, xi : τi `M ei : τ ; εi
(d) Γ ` τ
(e) Γ `M  εi
With (b), use Lemma 33 to get,
(d) . `M ψJvK.M : (ψJτ1K) + (ψJτ2K)
With (d), use Lemma 29 to get,
(e) ψJvK.M = inji v ′
C can now take a step using stpc-local and stpl-case toM{σ;κ;ψ{xi 7→ v ′}; ei}.
Rule t-lam. We have,
(a) e = λx .e
C can take a step using stpc-local and stpl-lambda.
Rule t-app. We have,
(a) e = v1 v2
(b) Γ `M v1 : x :τ1
ε→ τ2
(c) Γ ` v2 : τ1
With (b) and (c) use Lemma 33 to get,
(d) . `M ψJv1K.M : x :ψJτ1K
ψJεK→ ψJτ2K
(e) . ` ψJv2K : ψJτ1K
With (d) use Lemma 29 to get,
Case 1: ψJv1K.M = clos (ψ;λx .e)
C can take a step using stpc-local and stpl-apply.
Case 1: ψJv1K.M = clos (ψ; fix x .λy .e)
C can take a step using stpc-local and stpl-fixapply.
Rule t-let1. We have,
(a) e = let x N= e1 in e2
(b) M = m( )
(c) N = (w)
(d) Γ `M N
(e) Γ `N e1 : τ1; ε1
(f) Γ, x :m(w) τ1 `M e2 : τ2; ε2
(g) Γ ` τ2
(h) Γ `M  ε2
With (d), use Lemma 25 to get,
(i) Γ ` N
With (i), use Lemma 33 to get,
(j) . ` ψJNK
With (d), use Lemma 33 to get,
(k) . `M  ψJNK
With (k), use Lemma 30 to get,
Either
(l) M = p(w), N = p(w1), and w1 ⊆ w
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In this case, C can take a step using stpc-delpar to p(w1){σ;κ :: 〈p(w);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
Or
(l) M = p(w) and N = s(w).
In this case, C can take a step using stpc-delssec to
p(w){σ;κ :: 〈p(w);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; securew(e1)}
Or
(l) M = m(w) and N = m(w).
Depending on m, one of the above applies.
Rule t-let2. We have,
(a) e = let x = e1 in e2
(b) Γ `M e1 : τ1; ε1
(c) Γ, x : τ1 `M e2 : τ2; ε2
(d) Γ ` τ2
(e) Γ `M  ε2
C can take a step using stpc-local to M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}.
Rule t-fix. C can take a step using stpc-local and stpl-fix.
Rule t-array. We have,
(a) e = array(v1, v2)
(b) Γ `M v1 : nat
(c) Γ `M v2 : τ
With (b) and (c), use Lemma 33 to get,
(d) . `M ψJv1K.M : nat
(e) . `M ψJv2K.M : (ψJτK)
C can take a step using stpc-local and stpl-array toM{σ{` :M { ¯ψJv2K.M}k};κ;ψ; `}.
Rule t-select. We have,
(a) e = select(v1, v2)
(b) Γ `M v1 : Array τ
(c) Γ `M v2 : nat
With (b) and (c), use Lemma 33 to get,
(d) . `M ψJv1K.M : ArrayψJτK
(e) . `M ψJv2K.M : nat
With (d) use Lemma 29 to get,
(f) ψJv1K.M = `
(g) Σ(`) = ψJτK
Since Σ ` σwf, ` ∈ dom(σ)
C can take a step using stpc-local with stpl-select or stpl-sel-err.
Rule t-update. Similar to rule t-select.
Rule t-wire. We have,
(a) e = wirew1(v)
(b) M = m(w2)
(c) Γ ` w1 : ps (ν ⊆ w2)
(d) m = s⇒ N = M and m = p⇒ N = p(w1)
(e) Γ `N v : τ
With (c), use Lemma 33 to get,
(f) . ` ψJw1K : ps (ν ⊆ w2)
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Case 1: m = s⇒ N = s(w2)
With (e), use Lemma 33 to get,
(g) . `M ψJvK.M : ψJτK
C can now take step using stpc-local and stpl-wire toM{σ;κ;ψ; {|(ψJvKN)|}wiresψJw1K}.
Case 2: m = p⇒ N = p(w1)
With (e), use Lemma 33 to get,
(g) . `p(ψJw1K) ψJvK.p(ψJw1K) : (ψJτK)
C can now take step using stpc-local and stpl-wire toM{σ;κ;ψ; {|(ψJvKN)|}wiresψJw1K}.
Rule t-wproj. We have,
(a) e = v [w2]
(b) M = m(w1)
(c) m = p⇒ φ = ν = w1 and m = s⇒ φ = ν ⊆ w1
(d) Γ `M v : Ww2 τ
(e) Γ ` w2 : ps (φ ∧ singl(ν))
Case 1: m = p⇒ φ = ν = w1
With (e), use Lemma 33 to get,
(f) . ` (ψJw2K) : ps ((ψJ(ν = w1)K) ∧ (singl(ν)))
With (f), use Lemma 29 to get,
(g) ψJw2K = p, w1 = p, and M = p({p})
With (d), use Lemma 33 to get,
(h) . `M ψJvK.M : WψJw2KψJτK
With (h), use Lemma 29 to get,
(i) ψJvK.M = v1 ++ v2 and p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2).
C can now take a step using stpc-local and stpl-parproj.
Case 2: m = s⇒ φ = ν ⊆ w1
With (e), use Lemma 33 to get,
(f) . ` (ψJw2K) : ps ((ψJ(ν ⊆ w1)K) ∧ (singl(ν)))
With (f), use Lemma 29 to get,
(g) ψJw2K = p, w1 = p ∪ w ′′, and M = s({p ∪ w ′′})
With (d), use Lemma 33 to get,
(h) . `M ψJvK.M : WψJw2KψJτK
With (h), use Lemma 29 to get,
(i) ψJvK.M = v1 ++ v2 and p ∈ dom(v1 ++ v2).
C can now take a step using stpc-local and stpl-parproj.
Rule t-wireun. We have,
(a) e = v1 ++ v2
(b) Γ `M v1 : Ww1 τ
(c) Γ `M v2 : Ww2 τ
With (b) and (c) use Lemma 33, and then Lemma 29, and then C can take a step
using stpc-local and stpl-wireun.
Rule t-wfold. We have,
(a) e = wfoldw(v1, v2, v3)
(b) M = s( )
(c) φ = ν ⊆ w ∧ singl(ν)
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(d) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ
(e) Γ `M v2 : τ2
(f) Γ `M v3 : τ2
·→ ps φ ·→ τ ·→ τ2
With (d) use Lemma 27 to get,
(g) Γ `Ww τ
With (g) invert rule wf-wire to get,
(h) Γ ` w : ps φ
With (h) use Lemma 33 to get,
(i) . ` ψJwK : ps (ψJφK)
With (i) use Lemma 29 to get,
(j) ψJwK = w1 ∪ w2
C can take a step using stpc-local and either stpl-wfold1 or stpl-wfold2.
Rule t-wapp. We have,
(a) e = wappw(v1, v2)
(b) M = p( )
(c) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
(d) Γ `M v2 : Ww (τ1
·→ τ2)
Similar to rule t-wfold now.
Rule t-waps. Similart to rule t-wfold.
Rule t-wcopy. C can take a step using stpc-local with stpl-wcopy.
Rule t-makesh. We have,
(a) e = makesh(v)
(b) M = s(w)
(c) Γ `M v : τ
With (c) use Lemma 33 we get,
(d . `M ψJvK.M : ψJτK
C can take a step using stpc-local with stpl-makesh.
Rule t-combsh. We have,
(a) e = combsh(v)
(b) M = s(w) (therefore w is closed)
(c) Γ `M v : Shw τ
With (c) use Lemma 33 we get,
(d) . `M ψJvK.M : Shw ψJτK
With (d) use Lemma 29 we get,
(e) ψJvK.M = shw v ′
C can take a step using stpc-local with stpl-combsh.
Rule t-secblk. We have,
(a) e = securew(e)
(b) M = m(w ′)
(c) Γ ` w : ps (ν = w ′)
Use Lemma 33 and then Lemma 29 on (c). C can take a step using stpc-secenter.
Rule t-value. We consider case when
(a) e = v
(b) Γ `M v : τ
If κ is empty then by rule halted-answer C is empty.
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If κ is not empty, then depending on top frame, C can take a step using stpc-popstk1
or stpc-popstk2.
(After applying Lemma 33 and then Lemma 29 on (b).)
Theorem 41 (Preservation). If Σ1 ` C1 : τ and C1 −→ C2, then there exists Σ2 ⊇ Σ1
s.t. Σ2 ` C2 : τ .
Proof. (Skip) Case analysis on C1 −→ C2.
stpl-case. We have,
(a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; case (v , x1.e1, x2.e2)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ{xi 7→ v ′}; ei}
(c) ψJvK.M = inji v ′
(d) Σ1 ` σwf
(e) . `M
(f) Σ1 `M κ : τ1 ↪→ τ
(g) Σ1 ` ψ ; Γ
(h) Σ1; Γ `M case (v , x1.e1, x2.e2) : τ1; ε
(i) Γ `M  ε
Inverting rule t-case on (h), we get,
(j) Γ `M v : τ ′1 + τ ′2
(k) Γ, xi : τ ′i `M ei : τ1; εi
(l) Γ ` τ
(m’) ε = ε, ε1, ε2
(m) Γ `M  εi
With (j) use Lemma 33 to get,
(n) . `M ψJvK.M : (ψJτ ′1K) + (ψJτ ′2K)
Substitute (c) in (n) to get,
(o) . `M inji v ′ : (ψJτ ′1K) + (ψJτ ′2K)
Inverting rule t-inj on (o) we get,
(p) . `M v ′ : ψJτ ′i K
With (p) and (g), use rule tenv-mapp2 to get,
(q) Σ1 ` ψ{xi 7→ v ′}; Γ, xi : τ ′i
Choose Σ2 = Σ1
With (d), (e), (f), (q), (k), (m), use rule tconfig-config to get
Σ2 `M{σ;κ;ψ{xi 7→ vi}; ei} : τ
stpl-fst. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; fst (v)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v1}
(c) ψJvK.M = (v1, v2)
(d) Σ1 ` σwf
(e) . `M
(f) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(g) Σ1 ` ψ ; Γ
(h) Σ1; Γ `M fst (v) : τ1; ·
(i) Γ `M  ε
Invert rule t-fst on (h) to get,
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(j) Γ `M v : τ1 × τ2
With (j) and (c) use Lemma 33 to get,
(k) . `M v1 : ψJτ1K
Choose Σ2 = Σ1
With (d), (e), (f), (g), (k) (after weakening), we get,
Σ2 `M{σ;κ;ψ; v1} : τ
stpl-snd. Similar to stpl-fst.
stpl-lambda. There is no change in the stack andenvironment, and the closure has
same type as lambda.
stpl-apply. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ1; v1 v2}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ2{x 7→ v ′}; e}
(c) ψ1Jv1K.M = clos (ψ2;λx .e)
(d) ψ1Jv2K.M = v ′
(e) Σ `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(f) Γ `M v1 v2 : τ1; ε
(g) Γ `M  ε
Invert rule t-app on (f) to get,
(h) Γ `M v1 : τ2
ε1→ τ1
(i) Γ `M v2 : τ2
(j) Γ `M  ε1[v2/x ]
(k) ε = ε1[v2/x ]
With (h) and (c) use Lemma 33 to get,
(l) . `M clos (ψ2;λx .e) : (ψJτ2K)
(ψJε1K)→ (ψJτ1K)
Invert rule t-clos on (l) to get,
(m) Σ1 ` ψ2 ; Γ2
(n) Γ2, x : ψJτ2K `M e : ψJτ1K;ψJε1K
With (i) and (d) use Lemma 33 to get,
(o) . `M v ′ : ψJτ2K
i.e.
(p) . `M v ′ : ψ2J(ψJτ2K)K
From (m) and (o), use rule tenv-mapp2 to derive,
(q) Σ1 ` ψ2{x 7→ v ′}; Γ2, x : ψJτ2K
(e) can also be written as,
(r) Σ `M κ : ψ2J(ψJτ1K)K ↪→ τ
With (q), (n), (r), we get Σ1 `M{σ;κ;ψ2{x 7→ v ′}; e} : τ (effect delegation comes
from Lemma 33 on (j).)
stpl-fix. Similar to stpl-lambda.
stpl-fixapply. Similar to stpl-apply.
stpl-array. Standard proof, choose Σ2 as Σ1 with new `. Other array cases are
also standard.
stpl-makesh. We have, (a) C1 = s(w){σ;κ;ψ; makesh(v)}
(b) C2 = s(w){σ;κ;ψ; shw v ′}
(c) ψJvK.s(w) = v
′
(d) Σ1 `s (w)κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ2
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(e) Σ1 ` ψ ; Γ
(f) Γ `s(w) makesh(v) : τ1; ε
Invert rule t-makesh on (f) to get,
(g) τ1 = Shw τ2
(g’) Γ `s(w) v : τ2
Use Lemma 33 on (g’) and (c) to get,
(h) . `s(w) v ′ : ψJτ2K
Use rule t-sh on (h) to get,
(i) . `s(w) shw v ′ : Shw ψJτ2K
Observe that ψJ(Shw ψJτ2K)K = ψJ(Shw τ2)K
Therefore, stack typing (d) still holds, and new configuration is well-typed.
stpl-combsh. Similar to stpl-makesh.
stpl-wire. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; wirew(v)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; {|v ′|}wiresw ′ }
(c) ψJwK = w ′
(d) ψJvK.N = v ′
(e) M = m(w1)
(f) m = p⇒ N = p(w ′) and m = s⇒ N = M
(g) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(e) Σ1 ` ψ ; Γ
(f) Γ `M wirew(v) : Ww τ2; ·
(g) τ1 = Ww τ2
Invert rule t-wire on (f) to get,
(h) Γ ` w : ps (ν ⊆ w1)
(i) m = p⇒ N1 = p(w) and m = s⇒ N1 = M
(j) Γ `N1 v : τ2
Case 1: m = p
Use Lemma 33 on (j) to get,
(k) . `p(w ′) v ′ : ψJτ2K
Using rule t-singlwire and rule t-wirecat, we can derive:
(l) . `p(w1) {|v ′|}wiresw ′ : Ww ′ (ψJτ2K)
Observe that ψJWw ′ (ψJτ2K)K = ψJτ1K.
Hence, stack typing (g) still holds, therefore C2 is well-typed.
Case 2: m = s
Use Lemma 33 on (j) to get,
(k) . `M v ′ : ψJτ2K
Using rule t-singlwire and rule t-wirecat, we can derive:
Observe that ψJWw ′ (ψJτ2K)K = ψJτ1K.
Hence, stack typing (g) still holds, therefore C2 is well-typed.
(l) . `M {|v ′|}wiresw ′ : Ww ′ (ψJτ2K)
stpl-parproj. We have, (a’) M = p({p})
(a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v1[v2]}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v ′}
(c) ψJv1K.M = {p : v ′} ++ w ′
(d) ψJv2K.M = p
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(e) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(f) Γ `M v1[v2] : τ1; ε
Inverting rule t-wproj with M = p( ) we get,
(g) Γ `M v1 : W v2 τ1
(h) Γ ` v2 : ps (ν = {p} ∧ singl(ν))
Applying Lemma 33 on (h) we get,
(i) ψJv2K = {p}
Applying Lemma 33 on (g) we get,
(j) . `M {p : v ′} ++ w ′ : W {p}ψJτ1K
Inverting rule t-wirecat and rule t-singlwire on (j) we get,
(k) . `M v ′ : ψJτ1K
Observe that ψJ(ψJτ1K)K = ψJτ1K
Hence, stack typing (e) still holds and C2 is well-typed.
stpl-secproj. We have, (a’) M = s({p} ∪ w)
(a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v1[v2]}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v ′}
(c) ψJv1K.M = {p : v ′} ++ w ′
(d) ψJv2K.M = p
(e) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(f) Γ `M v1[v2] : τ1; ε
Similar to stpl-parproj.
stpl-wireun. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v1 ++ v2}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; v ′1 ++ v ′2}
(c) ψJv1K.M = v ′1
(d) ψJv2K.M = v ′2
(e) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(f) Γ `M v1 ++ v2 : τ1; ε
Inverting rule t-wireun on (f), we get,
(g) τ1 = W (w1 ∪ w2) τ2
(h) Γ `M v1 : Ww1 τ2
(i) Γ `M v2 : Ww2 τ2
Applying Lemma 33 on (h) and (i), we get,
(j) . `M v ′1 : WψJw1KψJτ2K
(k) . `M v ′2 : WψJw2KψJτ2K
Using rule t-wirecat with (j) and (k) we get,
(l) . `M v ′1 ++ v ′2 : W (ψJw1K) ∪ (ψJw2K)ψJτ2K
Proof now follows by showing that stack typing holds.
stpl-wapp1. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; wappw(v1, v2)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; ·}
(c) ψJwK = ·
(d) Γ `M wappw(v1, v2) : Ww τ2; ·
(e) Σ1 `M κ : ψJ(Ww τ2)K ↪→ τ
Rewriting (e),
(f) Σ1 `M κ : W · (ψJτ2K) ↪→ τ
We have,
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(g) Γ `M · : W · (ψJτ2K)
Also,
(h) ψJ(W · (ψJτ2K))K = W · (ψJτ2K)
With (h) and (f), we can derive stack typing in C2.
stpl-wapp2. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; wappw(v1, v2)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; e}
(b’) M = p(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1)
(c) ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′
(d) ψJv1K.M = v ′1
(e) ψJv2K.M = v ′2
(f) e = let z1
p({p})
= let z2 = v ′1[p] in let z3 = v ′2[p] in z2 z3 in
let z4 = wappw ′(v ′1, v ′2) in (wire{p}(z1 ++ z4))
(g) Γ `M wappw(v1, v2) : Ww τ2; ·
(h) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
(i) Γ `M v2 : τ1
·→ τ2
(j) Σ1 `M κ : ψJ(Ww τ2)K ↪→ τ
Using Lemma 33 on (h) and (i) we get,
(k) . `M v ′1 : W {p} ∪ w ′ ψJτ1K
(l) . `M v ′2 : W ({p} ∪ w ′) ((ψJτ1K)
·→ (ψJτ2K))
We now consider typing of e from (f).
Using rule t-wproj we get,
(m) . `p({p}) v ′1[p] : ψJτ1K; ·
(n) . `p({p}) v ′2[p] : ((ψJτ1K)
·→ (ψJτ2K)); ·
Using rule t-app we get,
(o) . `p({p}) z2 z3 : ψJτ2K; ·
Using rule t-wire we get,
(p) . `M wire{p}(z1) : W {p}ψJτ2K; ·
Using rule t-wapp we get,
(q) . `M wappw ′(v ′1, v ′2) : Ww ′ ψJτ2K; ·
Using rule t-wireun we get,
(r) . `M (wire{p}(z1 ++ z4)) : W ({p} ∪ w ′)ψJτ2K; ·
We also have,
(s) ψJ(W ({p} ∪ w ′)ψJτ2K)K = ψJ(Ww τ2)K
and hence stack typing from (j) holds for C2 as well.
stpl-waps1. Similar to stpl-wapp1.
stpl-waps2. We have,
(a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; wapsw(v1, v2)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; e}
(b’) e = let z1 = v ′1[p] in let z2 = v ′2 z1 in let z3 = wapsw ′(v ′1, v ′2) in (wire{p}(z2 ++
z3))
(c) M = s(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1)
(d) ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′
(e) ψJv1K.M = v ′1
(f) ψJv2K.M = v ′2
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(g) Γ `M wapsw(v1, v2) : Ww τ2; ·
(h) Σ1 `M κ : ψJ(Ww τ2)K ↪→ τ
Inverting rule t-waps on (g) we get,
(i) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ1
(j) Γ `M v2 : τ1
·→ τ2
Using Lemma 33 on (i) and (j),
(k) . `M v ′1 : W ({p} ∪ w ′) (ψJτ1K)
(l) . `M v ′2 : (ψJτ1K)
·→ (ψJτ2K)
We now consider typing of e from (b’)
Using rule t-wproj we get,
(m) . `M v ′1[p] : ψJτ1K; ·
Using rule t-app we get,
(n) . `M v ′2 z1 : ψJτ2K; ·
Using rule t-wire we get,
(o) . `M wire{p}(z2) : W {p} (ψJτ2K); ·
Using rule t-waps we get,
(p) . `M wapsw ′(v ′1, v ′2) : Ww ′ (ψJτ2K); ·
Using rule t-wireun we get,
(q) . `M (wire{p}(z2 ++ z3)) : W ({p} ∪ w ′) (ψJτ2K); ·
Also,
(r) ψJ(W ({p} ∪ w ′) (ψJτ2K))K = ψJ(Ww τ2)K
and hence stack typing (h) holds for C2 also.
stpl-wfold1. Immediate from typing of wfold andLemma 33.
stpl-wfold2. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; wfoldw(v1, v2, v3)}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ; e}
(c) ψJwK = {p} ∪ w ′
(d) M = s(({p} ∪ w ′) ∪ w1)
(e) ψJv1K.M = v ′1
(f) ψJv2K.M = v ′2
(g) ψJv3K.M = v ′3
(h) e = let z1 = v ′1[p] in let z2 = v ′3 v ′2 p z1 in wfoldw ′(v ′1, z2, v ′3)
(i) Γ `M wfoldw(v1, v2, v3) : τ2; ·
(j) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ2K ↪→ τ
Inverting rule t-wfold on (i) we get,
(k) Γ `M v1 : Ww τ
(l) Γ `M v2 : τ2
(m) Γ `M v3 : τ2
·→ ps (ν ⊆ w ∧ singl(ν)) ·→ τ ·→ τ2
Using Lemma 33 on (k), (l), and (m), we get,
(n) . `M v ′1 : W ({p} ∪ w ′) (ψJτK)
(o) . `M v ′2 : ψJτ2K
(p) . `M v ′3 : (ψJτ2K)
·→ ps (ν ⊆ ({p} ∪ w ′) ∧ singl(ν)) ·→ (ψJτK) ·→ (ψJτ2K)
We now consider typing of e from (h).
Using rule t-wproj, we get,
(q) . `M v ′1[p] : ψJτK; ·
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Using rule t-app we get,
(r) . `M v ′3 v ′2 p z1 : ψJτ2K; ·
Using rule t-wfold we get,
(s) . `M wfoldw ′(v ′1, z2, v ′3) : ψJτ2K; ·
And,
(t) ψJ(ψJτ2K)K = ψJτ2K
and hence stack typing (j) remains valid for C2.
stpc-let. We have, (a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; let x = e1 in e2}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
(c) Σ1 ` σwf
(d) . `M
(e) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(f) Σ1 ` ψ ; Γ
(g) Σ1; Γ `M let x = e1 in e2 : τ1; ε
Invert rule t-let1 on (g) to get,
(h) Γ `M e1 : τ ′1; ε1
(i) Γ, x : τ ′1 `M e2 : τ1; ε2
(j) ε = ε1, ε2
To prove Σ2 `M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1} : τ ,
we need to prove
(e) Σ2 `M κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 : ψJτ ′1K ↪→ τ
i.e. (from rule rule tstk-frame2) we need to prove,
(f) Γ, x : τ ′1 `M e : τ1; ε2
and
(g) Σ2 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
Choose Σ2 = Σ1, then (f) is same as (i) and (g) is same as (e)
Thus (e) holds.
With (c), (d), (e), (f), (h) (effect delegation follows from Lemma 27 on (h)), we have
Σ2 `M{σ;κ :: 〈ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1} : τ
stpc-delpar. We have, (a’) M = p(w1 ∪ w2)
(a) C1 = M{σ;κ;ψ; let x
p(w ′)
= e1 in e2}
(b) C2 = p(w2){σ;κ :: 〈M ;ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
(c) ψJw ′K = w2
(d) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(e) Γ `M let x
p(w ′)
= e1 in e2 : τ1; ε
(f) Γ `M  ε
Inverting rule t-let1 on (e) we get,
(g) Γ `p(w2) e1 : τ2; ε1
(h) Γ, x :p(w2) τ2 `M e2 : τ1; ε2
(i) ε = p(w2), ε2
(j) Γ ` p(w1 ∪ w2)  ε2
To prove C2 is well-typed, we need to prove:
(k) Γ `p(w2) e1 : τ2; ε1
(l) Σ1 `p (w2)κ :: 〈M ;ψ; x .e2〉 : ψJτ2K ↪→ τ
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(k) follows from (g)
To prove (l), we need to prove:
(m’) Γ ` τ2 (follows from Lemma 27 on (g).
(m) Γ, x :p(w2) τ2 `M e2 : τ1; ε
(n) Σ1 `M κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(m) follows from (h), (n) follows from (d).
stpc-delssec. We have, (a) C1 = m(w){σ;κ;ψ; let x
s(w ′)
= e1 in e2}
(b) C2 = m(w){σ;κ :: 〈m(w);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; securew ′(e1)}
(c) Σ1 `m (w)κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(d) Γ `m(w) let x
s(w ′)
= e1 in e2 : τ1; ε
(d’) Γ ` m(w)  s(w ′)
Inverting rule t-let1 on (d) we get,
(e) Γ `s(w ′) e1 : τ2; ε1
(f) Γ, x :m(w ′) τ2 `m(w) e2 : τ1; ε2
(g) ε = s(w ′), ε2
Inverting rule d-refl or rule d-sec on (d’) we get,
(h) Γ ` w ′ : ps (ν = w)
Using rule t-secblk on (h) and (e) we get,
(i) Γ `m(w) securew ′(e) : τ2; ε1
To prove C2 is well-typed, we need to prove,
(j) Σ1 `m (w)κ :: 〈m(w);ψ; x .e2〉 : ψJτ2K ↪→ τ
i.e.
(l) Γ, x :m(w) τ2 `m(w) e2 : τ1; ε2
and
(m) Σ1 `m (w)κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
(l) follows from (f) and (h), (m) follows from (c).
stpc-secenter. We have, (a) C1 = m(w){σ;κ;ψ; securew ′(e)}
(b) C2 = s(w){σ;κ;ψ; e}
(c) ψJw ′K = w
(d) Γ `m(w) securew ′(e) : τ1; ε
(e) Σ1 `m (w)κ : ψJτ1K ↪→ τ
Inverting rule t-secblk on (d) we get,
(f) Γ ` w ′ : ps (ν = w)
(g) Γ `s(w ′) e : τ1; ε
Proof now follows from (g), (f), and (e).
stpc-popstk1. We have, (a) C1 = N{σ;κ :: 〈M ;ψ1; x .e〉 ;ψ2; v}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→m(w) v ′}; e}
(c) N = (w)
(d) M = m( )
(e) ψ2JvK.N = v ′
(f) Σ1 `N κ :: 〈M ;ψ1; x .e〉 : ψ2Jτ1K ↪→ τ
(g) Γ2 `N v : τ1
Inverting rule tstk-frame1 on (f) we get,
(h’) Γ1 ` τ1
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(h) Γ1, x :m(w) τ1 `M e : τ2; ε
(i) Σ1 `M κ : ψ2Jτ2K ↪→ τ
Using Lemma 33 on (g) to get,
(j) . `N v ′ : ψ2Jτ1K
Using Lemma 34,
(j’) . `N v ′ : ψ1Jτ1K
Use rule tenv-mapp2 with (j’) to get,
(k) Σ1 ` ψ1{x 7→m(w) v ′}; Γ1, x :m(w) τ1
With (k), (h), and (i), we have the proof.
stpc-popstk2. Similar to stpc-popstk1.
Theorem 42 (Sound simulation).
Let Σ ` C : τ , C1 −→ C2, C st, and slicew(C1) ; π1, where w is the set of all
parties. Then, there exists π2 s.t. π1 −→∗ π2 and slicew(C2) −→ π2.
Proof. Case analysis on C1 −→ C2.
stpc-delpar. We have,
(a) C1 = p(w1 ∪ w2){σ;κ;ψ; let x
p(w ′)
= e1 in e2}
(b) C2 = p(w2){σ;κ :: 〈p(w1 ∪ w2);ψ; x .e2〉 ;ψ; e1}
(c) ψJw ′K = w2
(d) slicep(C1) ; p
{
σ′;κ′;ψ′; let x p(w
′)
= e1 in e2
}
, where slicep(σ) ; σ′, slicep(κ) ;
κ′, and slicep(ψ) ; ψ′ when p ∈ w1 ∪ w2
(e) slicep(C1) ; slicep(m(w){σ;κ′;ψ′{x 7→m(w1∪w2) ©}; e ′}) when κ = κ′ ::
〈m(w);ψ′; x .e ′〉 or slicep(C1) ; slicep(p(w1 ∪ w2){σ;κ′;ψ′{x 7→ ©}; e ′}) when κ =
κ′ :: 〈ψ′; x .e ′〉
Consider p ∈ w1 ∪ w2. By Lemma 38,
(f) ψ′JwK = w2
Case 1. p ∈ w2
Then it can take step using stpp-present to p {σ′;κ′ :: 〈p({p});ψ′; x .e2〉 ;ψ′; e1}
which is slice of C2.
Case 2. {p} not in w2
Then it takes step using stpp-absent to p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; e2} which is slice of C2 using
rule sliceCfg-Abs1.
Consider {p} not in w1∪w2. These parties do not take a step, and their slice remains
same via rule sliceCfg-Abs1.
stpc-delssec. In the protocol only secure agent takes a step per rule stpp-secstep
and stpc-delssec. All other parties remain as is.
stpc-secenter. We have,
(a) C1 = p(w){σ;κ;ψ; securew ′(e)}
(b) C2 = s(w){σ;κ;ψ; e}
(c) ψJw ′K = w
(d) slicep(C1) ; p {σ′;κ′;ψ′; securew ′(e)} when p ∈ w
(e) For {p} not in w slice is by rule sliceCfg-Abs1 or rule sliceCfg-Abs2.
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For parties not in w , they do not take any step and easy to see that their slice holds
in C2 as well.
For parties in w , we first note that κ = κ1 :: 〈p(w);ψ′; x .e ′〉 (rule stok-sece).
Their slice in C2 is p {σ′;κ1; ·; wait}, where slicep(κ) ; κ1.
The execution goes as: stpp-secbegin, followed by stpp-secenter for each p ∈ w .
stpc-popstk1. We have,
(a) C1 = N{σ;κ :: 〈M ;ψ1; x .e〉 ;ψ2; v}
(b) C2 = M{σ;κ;ψ1{x 7→m(w) ψJvKN}; e}
(c) M = m( )
(d) N = (w)
If p ∈ w , slicing in C2 follows easily (since parties in N must be there in M , parties
remain same or grow up the stack).
If {p} not in w .
Depending on whether {p} in M or not, we can prove the slicing relation on C2 (if
{p} in M but not in N , it cannot be the case that either M or N is secure).
stpc-let, stpc-local, stpc-delpsec. Similar to stpc-delpar. In protocol, parties
in w take same step, while others do not.
Theorem 43 (Confluence).
Suppose that π1 −→ π2 and π1 −→ π3, then there exists π4 such that π2 −→ π4
and π3 −→ π4.
Proof. Proof sketch: From Lemma 39, if same agent (a party or secure agent) takes step
in π1 −→ π2 and π1 −→ π3, then π2 = π3.
If different agents take step, then they can take corresponding steps in π2 and π3 to
reach π4.
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